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New Case Filed 
Post Conviction Relief Filing & Petition For 
Writ Of Habeas Corpus 
Petition for postconviction relief and petition for 
writ of habeas corpus (Appendicies A, B, & C 
sealed per order filed 7/2/07. 
Motion For Extension Of Time 
Answer To Fourth Petition For Post Conviction 
Affidavits In Support Of Petition For Post- 
Conviction Relief (Affidavits A-D SEALED) 
Document sealed 
Hearing Scheduled - (04/09/2003) Ron Schilling 
Order (supreme Court Order Appoints Schilling 
Change Assigned Judge 
Interim Hearing Held 
Court Minutes 
Petition For Appoint. Of Special Prosecutor 
Briefing Order 
Notice Of And Brief In Opposition To 
Respondent's Petition For Appt. Of Special 
Prosecutor 
Order To Appoint Special Prosecutor 
Petitioner's Response In Opposition To Motion 
For Summary Dismissal Of Petition For Post- 
Conviction Relief & Pet. For Writ Of H.c. 
Motion For Summary Dismissal 
Brief In Support Of Respondents Motion For 
Summary Dismissal 
Appendices A-e In Support Of Respondent's 
Motion For Summary Judgment 
Motion For Enlargement Of Time In Which To 
File Brief In Opp. To Res. Mot./dismissal 
Order 
Petitioner's Response In Opposition To Second 
Motion For Summary Dismissal Of Petition 
For Postconviction Relief And Petition For 
Writ Of Habeas Corpus 
Hearing Scheduled - (03/03/2004) Ron Schilling 
Judge 
George Reinhardt 
George Reinhardt 
George Reinhardt 
George Reinhardt 
George Reinhardt 
George Reinhardt 
George Reinhardt 
George Reinhardt 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
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Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code 
AFFD 
MOTN 
INHD 
CMlN 
RMK9 
MOTN 
ORDR 
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HRSC 
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MOTN 
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CMlN 
HRSC 
BRIE 
BREF 
HRHD 
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HRSC 
AFFD 
AFFD 
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User Judge 
SUE Affd. In Support Of Mot. To Stay Proceedings Ron Schilling 
SUE Motion To Stay Proceedings Ron Schilling 
SUE Interim Hearing Held Ron Schilling 
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SUE Motion For Limited Admission Ron Schilling 
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the Idaho Supreme Court 
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SUE Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status Ron Schilling 
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SUE Prosecutor assigned Lori Gilmore Ron Schilling 
SUE Motion to lift stay Ron Schilling 
SUE Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Ron Schilling 
held on 01/06/2006 10:OO AM: Hearing Held 
SUE Court Minutes Ron Schilling 
SUE Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Scheduling Ron Schilling 
Conference 03/30/2006 10:OO AM) 
SUE Notice Of Hearing Ron Schilling 
SUE Notice Of Hearing Ron Schilling 
SUE Petitioner's supplemental respons in opposition to Ron Schilling 
second moiton for sumary dismissal of petition for 
postconviction relief and petition for writ of 
habeas corpus 
SHARON Supplementai Brief in Support of Respondents' Ron Schilling 
Motion for Sumamry Dismissal 
SUE Hearing result for Telephonic Scheduling Ron Schilling 
Conference held on 0313012006 10:OO AM: 
Hearing Held 
SUE Court Minutes Ron Schilling 
VICKY Petitioner's Reply to Supplemental Brief in Ron Schilling 
Support of Respondents' Motion for Summary 
Dismissal 
SUE Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Scheduling Ron Schilling 
Conference 05/22/2006 10:OO AM) To be held at 
the mximum security prison in Boise 
SUE Affidavit of Susan Kathleen Stuart Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
SUE Affidavit of Jim Bigley Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
SUE Affidavit of Mary Jane Bigley Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
. 11 1 1 s  
Page 
. VL.LO ~ I V I  ROA Report 
Case: CV-2002-0000473 Current Judge: Ron Schilling 
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
Ron Schilling 5/22/2006 AFFD SUE Affidavit of Gene Lee Dally 
Document sealed 
AFFD .SUE Affidavit of Daniel Heagly 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of Malvin W. Kraft 
Document sealed 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of Sharie Lee Kuhl 
Document sealed 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
AFFD 
AFFD 
SUE 
SUE 
Affidavit of Robert Daniel McDowell Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling Affidavit of Donna Marquette 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Delores Mary Nichols 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Claudia J. Petrie 
Affidavit of Doug Seeger 
AFFD SUE Ron Schilling 
AFFD 
AFFD 
AFFD 
AFFD 
SUE 
SUE 
SUE 
SUE 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Affidavit of Coby L. Smith 
Affidavit of Thomas ti. Thorn 
Document sealed 
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Affidavit of Esther Ziemann 
Affidavit of Virginia Lee Presler 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Michael A. Lowe 
Affidavit of Debra K. Johnson 
AFFD 
AFFD 
AFFD 
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SUE 
SUE 
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Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
AFFD 
AFFD 
AFFD 
SUE 
SUE 
SUE 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling Affidavit of Rose Mary Connelly 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Coby L. Smith 
Affidavit of Doug Seeger 
Affidavit of Claudia J. Petrie 
Affidavit of Delores Mary Nichols 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Donna Marquette 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Robert Daniel McDowell 
Affidavit of Sharie Lee Kuhl 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Malvin W. Kraft 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Daniel Heagy 
Affidavit of Gene Lee Dally 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Mary Jane Bigley 
Document sealed 
AFFD 
AFFD 
AFFD 
AFFD 
SUE 
SUE 
SUE 
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Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
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AFFD 
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Ron Schilling 
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AFFD 
AFFD 
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Ron Schilling 
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Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User 
5/22/2006 AFFD SUE 
Judge 
Affidavit of Jim Bigley Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Susan Kathleen Stuart Ron Schilling AFFD SUE 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Thomas H. Thorn Ron Schilling AFFD SUE 
Document sealed 
Hearing result for Motion held on 05/22/2006 Ron Schilling 
10:OO AM: Case Taken Under Advisement To 
be held at the mximum security prison in Boise 
ADVS SUE 
CMlN SUE 
6/8/2006 MlSC SUE 
10/30/2006 ORDR SUE 
STlP SUE 
Court Minutes Ron Schilling 
Petitioner's supplemental authority Ron Schilling 
Order Ron Schilling 
Stipulation that parties may examine the exhibits Ron Schilling 
in the custody of the Clerk of the Clerk 
3/12/2007 CDlS SUE Civil Disposition entered for: Beauclair, Tom, Ron Schilling 
Other Party; Fisher, Greg, Other Party; Gilmore, 
Lori, Other Party; State Of Idaho, Other Party; 
Stuart, Gene Francis, Subject. 
order date: 3/12/2007 
MEMO SUE Memorandum Opinion on Petition for Post Ron Schilling 
Conviction Relief and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus 
and Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, to Vacate 
Sentence of Death and for New Sentencing Trial 
SCAN 
SCAN 
JDMT 
NOTA 
APSC 
MOTN 
ORDR 
MlSC 
MlSC 
ST1 P 
SUE 
SUE 
SUE 
SUE 
SUE 
SUE 
SUE 
SUE 
SUE 
SUE 
Scanned 03/29/07 Ron Schilling 
Scanned 04/26/2007 Ron Schilling 
Judgment Dismissing Case with Prejudice Ron Schilling 
NOTICE OF APPEAL Ron Schilling 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Ron Schilling 
Motion that costs of appeal be at county expense Ron Schilling 
Order Ron Schilling 
Amended Notice of Appeal Ron Schilling 
Second Amended Notice of Appeal Ron Schilling 
Stipulation Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
Ron Schilling ORDR SUE Order 
Document sealed 
Notice of lodging reporters transcript and clerk's Ron Schilling 
record 
NOTC SUE 
Affidavit in support of motion Ron Schilling AFFD 
MOTN 
SUE 
SUE Motion for extension of time to file objections to Ron Schilling 
clerk's record and reporter's transcript 
ORDR 
NOTC 
SUE 
SUE 
Order Ron Schilling 
Notice of hearing in RE: Settlement of Clerk's Ron Schilling 
Record 
ROA Report 
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Date Code User Judge 
9/25/2007 NOTC SUE Notice of and objeciton to Clerk's record and Ron Schilling 
reporter's transcript on appeal 
10/4/2007 HRSC BARBIE Hearing Scheduled (Objection 10/09/2007 10:OO Ron Schilling 
AM) 
10/31/2007 ORDR SUE Order Ron Schilling 
12/21/2007 STlP SUE Stipulation regarding correction of clerk's record Ron Schilling 
1/2/2008 ORDR SUE Order regarding correction of Clerk's record Ron Schilling 
r e v e r s i b l e  e r r o r  where it represen ts  only a  smal l  p a r t  of t h e  
evidence presented a t  t r i a l ,  S t a t e  v. Hatton,  supra ,  a t  7 3 ,  t h e  
tes t imonies  of t h e s e  t h r e e  women represented more than one hun- 
dred pages of t h e  t r i a l  t r a n s c r i p t ,  f a r  more than a "small p a r t " .  
A s  e a r l y  as seven months p r i o r  t o  t r i a l ,  a t  t h e  time defend- 
an t  moved t o  dismiss  t h e  information,  t h e  T r i a l  Court acknowledged 
t h e  p r e j u d i c i a l  and inflammatory e f f e c t  t h e  tes t imonies  of t h e s e  
women would have upon defendant ' s  case. I t  was t h e  Cour t ' s  opin- 
ion t h a t  a  r u l i n g  could not  be made u n t i l  t r i a l  a s  t o  which por- 
t i o n s  of  these  tes t imonies  would survive t h e  balancing t e s t  set  
f o r t h  above. This a t t i t u d e  i s  r e f l e c t e d  a s  w e l l  i n  comments of  
t h e  Court p r i o r  t o  p resen ta t ion  of t h i s  evidence a t  t r i a l .  ( T r i a l  )-t 
4 
Transcr ip t  p. 444-462). Appellant urges t h e  Court t o  review t h i s  H 
I-L 
test imony, s c r u t i n i z e  it c a r e f u l l y ,  conclude t h a t  it i s  almost i3 
e n t i r e l y  i r r e l e v a n t  and, when balanced a g a i n s t  t h e  enormous p r e  j - 
udice it 9enerate.d aga ins t  t h e  accused, i n  t h e  eyes  of t h e  j u ry ,  
i t  was an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n  on the p a r t  of  t h e  T r i a l  Court t o  
permit  it t o  reach t h e  e a r s  of t h e  ju ry .  A s  a  f i n a l  i n d i c a t i o n  
of  t h e  inflammatory e f f e c t  t h i s  testimony had upon appe l l an t ,  
t h i s  Court need only examine t h e  record t o  f i n d  t h a t  i t  is r e p l e t e .  
wi th  recesses  c a l l e d  f o r  t h e  purpose of a l lowing these  wi tnesses  
t o  rega in  composure. 
I N  CHANGING VENUE FOR TRIAL FROM CLEAI?-WATER'COUNTY TO MOSCOW, 
I N  U T A H  COUNTY, OSTENSIBLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF AVOIDING EXTEN- 
SIVE PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY, THE TRIAL COURT PREVENTED APPELLANT 
FROM OBTAINING A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL BY A J U R Y  OF HIS 
PEERS AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. 
The S i x t h  Amendment t o  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  of  t h e  United S t a t e s  
guaran tees  c e r t a i n  enumerated r i g h t s  t o  accused persons  i n  a l l  
c r i m i n a l  p r o s e c u t i o n s .  P e r t i n e n t  language of t h e  Amendment reads  
i n  p a r t ,  t h a t ,  " I n  a l l  c r i m i n a l  p r o s e c u t i o n s ,  t h e  accused s h a l l  
en joy t h e  r i g h t  p u b l i c  t r i a l ,  by an i m p a r t i a l  
I n  I r v i n  v. Dowd, 366  U.S. 717, 81  S.Ct .  1639, 6 L.Ed. 2d 751 
(1961) , t h e  United S t a t e s  Supreme Court took t h e  requi rement  of  
i m p a r t i a l i t y  one s t e p  f u r t h e r  when it s t a t e d :  
" I n  e s s e n c e ,  t h e  r i g h t  t o  j u r y  t r i a l  guaran tees  t o  t h e  
c r i m i n a l l y  accused a  f a i r  t r i a l  by a p a n e l  of  i m p a r t i a l ,  
' i n d i f f e r e n t '  j u r o r s . "  366 U.S. a t  722, 8 1  S.Ct.  a t  
1 6 4 2 ,  6 L.Ed. 2d a t  '755. 
The language o f  Article 1, S 7 o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  of t h e  S t a t e  of 
Idaho,  comports wi th  f e d e r a l  c o n s t F ~ u @ i o n a l  guaran tees  by s t a t i n g  
t h a t ,  "The r i g h t  o f  t r i a l  by j u r y  s h a l l  remain i n v i o l a t e  . . ."  
The Sixth Amendment r i g h t  of an accused i n  a c r i m i n a l  c a s e  
t o  a p u b l i c  t r i a l  h a s  been made a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  S t a t e s  th rough  
t h e  due p r o c e s s  o f  l a w  requi rements  of t h e  F o u r t e e n t h  Amendment 
t o  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  of t h e  United S t a t e s .  R i s t a i n o  v. Ross, 424 
U.S. 589,  96 S.Ct. 1012,  47  L.Ed. 2d 258 (1976) .  The p e r t i n e n t  
language of t h e  F o u r t e e n t h  Amendment r eads  i n  p a r t ,  ". . . n o r  s h a l l  
any S t a t e  depr ive  any person o f  l i f e ,  l i b e r t y ,  o r  p r o ~ e r t y  w i t h o u t  
due p r o c e s s  o f  l a w  ..." Article 1, S 13  of t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  of 
t h e  S t a t e  o f  Idaho h a s  i n c o r p o r a t e d  t h e s e  requ i rements .  
I n  complying w i t h  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  mandated requi rements  
t h a t  t h e  c r i m i n a l l y  accused s h a l l  en joy t h e  r i g h t  t o  a  p u b l i c  
t r i a l  by an i m p a r t i a l  and i n d i f f e r e n t  j u r y ,  every S t a t e  h a s  en- 
a c t e d  l e g i s l a t i o n  a l l o w i n g  t r i a l  judges i n  t h e i r  own d i s c r e t i o n  
t o  change t h e  venue of a  t r i a l  where p r e - t r i a l  p u b l i c i t y  h a s  made 
t h e  p a n e l i n g  of an i m p a r t E a l  j u r y  imprac t i cab le  o r  i m p o s s i b l e .  
The r u l e  i n  Idaho is as fo l lows :  
"The c o u r t  upon motion of e i t h e r  p a r t y  s h a l l  t r a n s f e r  t h e  
proceeding t o  a n o t h e r  county i f  t h e  c o u r t  i s  s a t i s f i e d  
t h a t  a  f a i r  and i m p a r t i a l  t r i a l  cannot be  had i n  t h e  
county where t h e  case i s  pending."  I .C .  R. 2 1  ( a ) .  See 
a l s o  I.C. 19-1801. 
T h i s  Court h a s  on s e v e r a l  occas ions  r u l e d  on t h e  r e q u i r e d  
showing which must be made p r i o r  t o  a change of venue o r d e r  be ing 
g iven.  I n  S t a t e  v. Cypher, 9 2  Idaho a t  166, 438 P.  2d a t  911  
(1968) , it was s a i d  t h a t  t h e  "Removal of  an a c t i o n  by change i n  
venue i s  a  m a t t e r  w i t h i n  t h e  sound d i s c r e t i o n  of t h e  t r i a l  judge." 
The c o u r t  went on f u r t h e r  t o  say ,  
"Howeverl where there i s  a reasonable  l i k e l i h o o d  (emphasis  
mine) t h a t  p r e j u d i c i a l  news p r i o r  t o  t r i a l  w i l l  p r e v e n t  
a f a i r  t r i a l ,  t h e  judge should  cont inue  t h e  c a s e  u n t i l  t h e  
t h r e a t  a b a t e s ,  o r  t r a n s f e r  it t o  
permeated w i t h  such p u b l i c i t y . "  
v. Cypher, s u p r a ,  c i t i n g  Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 
3 3 3 ,  86 S.Ct. 1607, 16 L . E ~ .  2d 6 m s t a t e  v. 
Ti lden ,  2 7  Idaho 2 6 2 ,  1 4 7  Pac, 1056 (1915) ; I r v i n  v,  
Dowd, 366 U . S .  717, 8 1  S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed. 2d 751 
(1961) ;  E s t e s  v .  S t a t e  o f  Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S .Ct .  
1628, 1 4  L.Ed. 2d 542 (1965) ; Palmer v. Utah & N. Ry.  
Co.,  2 Idaho 315, 1 3  Pac. 425 (1887).  See a l s o  33 
Appel lant  r e c o g n i z e s  t h a t  it h a s  been t h e  long-s tand ing  
p o s i t i o n  of t h e  Idaho Supreme Court  when faced w i t h  t h e  i s s u e  of  
t h e  p r o p r i e t y  of a change i n  venue t o  look a t  t h e  t o t a l i t y  of t h e  
ci rcumstances  ( i . e . ,  whether it appears  t h a t  t h e  de fendan t  had a  
f a i r  t r i a l  and whether any d i f f i c u l t y  w a s  experienced i n  s e c ~ r i t y  
a j u r y ) .  S t a t e  v. Needs, 99 Idaho 883, 
c i t i n g  Murphy v. F l o r i d a ,  421 U.S. 794, 95  S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed. 
and a l s o  S t a t e  v. G i l b e r t ,  8 Idaho 346, 69 Pac .  
j 62 (1902) . The c o u r t  i n  Needs, s u p r a ,  went on t o  s a y  t h a t ,  
("Among t h e  f a c t o r s  which t h i s  Cour t  w i l l  c o n s i d e r  i n  
de te rmin ing  whether a c r i m i n a l  defendant  a c t u a l l y  r e c e i v e d  
a f a i r  t r i a l  a r e  a f f i d a v i t s  i n d i c a t i n g  p r e j u d i c e  o r  an 
absence  o f  p r e j u d i c e  i n  t h e  community where t h e  de fendah t  
w a s  t r i e d ,  test imony of  t h e  j u r o r s  a t  v o i r  d i r e  a s  t o  
whether  t h e y  had formed an op in ion  o f  t h e  d e f e n d a n t ' s  
g u i l t  o r  innocence based upon adverse  p r e - t r i a l  p u b l i c i t y ,  b b  
whether  t h e  defendant  cha l l enged  f o r  cause any of t h e  C 3  
j u r o r s  f i n a l l y  s e l e c t e d ,  t h e  n a t u r e  and c o n t e n t s  of t h e  
p r e - t r i a l  p u b l i c i t y ,  and t h e  amount of t ime e l a p s e d  f r o m  CJ. 
t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  p r e - t r i a l  p u b l i c i t y  t o  t h e  t r i a l  i t s e l f .  "1 4 
c.+ 
To t h e s e  requi rements  t h e  a p p e l l a n t  would l i k e  t o  add t h e  . fo l low-  W 
C 
i n g  f o r  t h e  C o u r t ' s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n :  t h e  s i z e  and t y p e  of t h e  
l o c a l e ,  t h e  r e v e a l e d  sources  o f  t h e  news s t o r i e s ,  t h e  volume and 
i n t e n s i t y  o f  t h e  coverage,  and t h e  p u b l i c a t i o n  of h i g h l y  inc r im-  
i n a t i n g  f a c t s  n o t  admissible a t  t r i a l .  The a d d i t i o n a l  r e q u i r e -  
ments are l i s t e d  i n  People v. McCrary, Colo., 549 P.2d 1320 (1976).  
See a l s o  People v. Szeto ,  1 7 1  C a l .  Rpt r .  652, 6 2 3  P.2d 213 (1981).  
It i s  a p p e l l a n t ' s  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t o o  much emphasis can  be 
p l a c e d  on t h e  s t a t ements  made by p r o s p e c t i v e  j u r o r s  d u r i n g  v o i r  
d i  r e  examinat ion .  
("Where a j u r o r  has been exposed t o  p r e - t r i a l  p u b l i c i t y ,  
b u t  asserts t h a t  he  is i m p a r t i a l ,  it has o f t e n  been 
emphasized t h a t  he may be u n w i l l i n g  t o  admit h i s  own 
p r e j u d i c e  on t h e  v o i r  d i r e  examinat ion o r  may be un- 
consc ious  of  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  h e  i s  pre judiced.  I f  t h e  
j u r o r  has seen o r  heard  i n f o r m a t i o n  which i s  e i t h e r  
i n a d m i s s i b l e  i n  evidence o r  s t r o n g l y  s l a n t e d  a g a i n s t  
t h e  de fendan t ,  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  p e r m i t t i n g  t h e  j u r o r  t o  
s i t  as a  t r i e r  of  f a c t  may be  (1) t o  depr ive  t h e  t r i a l  
judge  of e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  over  t h e  admission of e v i -  
dence ,  o r  ( 2 )  t o  have t h e  j u r o r  g i v e  more weight t o  
t e s t imony  which i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  p u b l i c i t y  t h a n  
t o  t e s t imony  which i s  n o t .  Some major dilemmas a r e  
r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  i s s u e  o f  whether  p r o s p e c t i v e  j u r o r s  who 
have been exposed t o  p r e - t r i a l  p u b l i c i t y  should be ex- 
c u s e d  f o r  cause. For example, al though t h e  t r i a l  judge 
may i n d i c a t e  h i s  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  j u r o r s  are q u a l i f i e d  
d e s p i t e  t h e i r  having been exposed t o  c e r t a i n  p r e - t r i a l  
p u b l i c i t y ,  de fense  counse l  may f e e l  t h a t  t h e  j u r o r s  
have some p r e j u d i c e  a g a i n s t  t h e  defendant  a s  a r e s u l t  
o f  t h e  p u b l i c i t y ,  b u t  t h a t  such p r e j u d i c e  w i l l  be i n -  
t e n s i f i e d  i f  defense  counse l  t a k e s  s t e p s  t o  i n d i c a t e  
t h a t  he does n o t  b e l i e v e  t h e  j u r o r s '  a s s e r t i o n  o f  
i m p a r t i a l i t y .  Another dilemma, which h a s  been re- 
s o l v e d  i n  v a r i o u s  ways i n  v a r i o u s  c a s e s ,  i s  t h a t  t h e  
d e f e n d a n t  must be t r i e d  by someone, but  t h a t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
i f  t h e  defendant  wishes t o  i n s i s t  upon h i s  r i g h t  t o  a  
speedy t r i a l  i n  t h e  a r e a  where t h e  crime was a l l e g e d l y  
committed, t h o s e  who have been exposed t o  p r e j u d i c i a l  
p r e - t r i a l  p u b l i c i t y  may be  t h e  only  j u r o r s  a v a i l a b l e .  " )  
1 0  L.Ed. 2d a t  1247, See a l s o ,  Gelb, F a i r  T r i a l s  and 
F r e e  Speech, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 607, 608 (1963) .  
I n  t h e  c a s e  a t  b a r  i n  e x c e s s  o f  n i n e t y  p r o s p e c t i v e  j u r o r s  
w e r e  c a l l e d .  Even w i t h  t h i s  l a r g e  a group from which t o  c h o o s e ,  
on3.y f o u r  of t h e  f i n a l  twelve j u r o r s  and two a l t e r n a t e s  had n o t  
been exposed t o  some degree t o  i n t e n s e  p r e - t r i a l  p u b l i c i t y .  I n  
t h e  e n d ,  a p p e l l a n t  w a s  f aced  w i t h  " t a k i n g  t h e  b e s t  of  what w a s  
a v a i l a b l e "  or waiving h i s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  guaranteed r i g h t  t o  
a  t r i a l  by j u r y .  For t h i s  r e a s o n ,  a p p e l l a n t  urges t h e  Cour t  t o  
adopt  S tandard  9-3.3, American B a r  Associa t ion  Standards  f o r  
C r i m i n a l  J u s t i c e  2d, which states, 
" (d) . . . The f a c t  t h a t  a j u r y  s a t i s f y i n g  p r e v a i l i n g  
s t a n d a r d s  o f  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  h a s  been s e l e c t e d  s h a l l  
n o t  be c o n t r o l l i n g  i f  t h e  r e c o r d  shows t h a t  t h e  
c r i t e r i o n  f o r  t h e  g r a n t i n g  o f  r e l i e f  set f o r t h  i n  
pa ragraph  (c) has been m e t .  " 
" ( c )  A motion f o r  change of venue o r  continuance s h a l l  
be granted whenever it i s  determined t h a t ,  because of 
t h e  disseminat ion of p o t e n t i a l l y  p r e j u d i c i a l  ma te r i a l ,  
t h e r e  i s  a s u b s t a n t i a l  l ikel ihood t h a t ,  i n  t he  absence 
of such r e l i e f ,  a f a i r  t r i a l  by an i m p a r t i a l  jury can- 
no t  be had..  ." 
/ 
I Here t h e  record obviously shows t h a t  t h e  requirements. of 
! paragraph ( c )  above have been met. On t h e  11 th  day of March, 
i 
1 9 8 2 ,  defense counsel  f i l e d  a motion f o r  change of venue, moving 
i 
i t h e  Court f o r  an o rde r  changing venue "from t h e  County of Clear- 
water,  S t a t e  of Idaho, t o  a county within t h e  S t a t e  of Idaho, 
I 
1 outs ide  t h e  pub l i ca t ion  a rea  of t h e  Lewiston .Morning Tribune." 
I& 
I (emphasis added). The motion f o r  change o f  venue was t h e r e a f t e r  c3 
j 
granted by t h e  t r i a l  judge on t h e  30th day o f  August, 1982. The + 
-3 
grant ing  of t h i s  motion by the  t r i a l  judge i l l u s t r a t e s  i n  h i s  I-+ ta 
opinion t h a t ,  owing t o  extensive p r e - t r i a l  p u b l i c i t y  emanating 3 9  
! from t h e  Lewiston Morning Tribune, t h e  defendant could not  receive 
a f a i r  t r i a l  i n  Clearwater County. The t r i a l  cou r t  then t rans-  
f e r r e d  venue t o  Moscow, Idaho i n  Latah County. Appel lant ' s  con- 
t e n t i o n  o f  e r r  on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  t r i a l  c o u r t  i n  i t ' s  choice of 
venue f o r  t r i a l  l i e s  here.  Through informat ion obtained from the  
Lewiston Morning Tribune,  appe l l an t ' s  counsel  has discovered t h a t  
t h e  average d a i l y  c i r c u l a t i o n  of t h i s  newspaper i n  Clearwater 
1 County, a s  of September 3 0 ,  1982, was one thousand f ive  hundred 
! s i x t y  i s s u e s .  The average d a i l y  c i r c u l a t i o n  f o r  t h e  Tribune i n  
Latah County, where t h e  t r i a l  was held o s t e n s i b l y  t o  escape pre- 
! 
t r i a l  p u b l i c i t y  e a r l i e r  given t h e  case from t h e  same newspaper, 
was over twice t h e  c i r c u l a t i o n  i n  Clearwater County, approximating 
I 
t h r e e  thousand f i v e  hundred f i f t y  f i v e  i s sues  da i ly .  With h i s  
r e s i d e n t  chambers located i n  Moscow, t h e  t r i a l  cour t  must have 
been aware t h a t  t h e  e x t e n t  of readersh ip  of t h e  Tribune i n  Moscow 
was s u b s t a n t i a l l y  g r e a t e r  than i n  Clearwater County; none the less ,  
venue was t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  Moscow. I t  i s  undisputed t h a t  t h e  
Lewiston Morning Tribune 's  c i r c u l a t i o n  reaches every county 
w i t h i n  t h e  Second J u d i c i a l  D i s t r i c t .  Accordingly, i n  o r d e r  t o  
p rope r ly  have e rad ica ted  t h e  problem of  p r e - t r i a l  p u b l i c i t y ,  the  
t r i a l  c o u r t  should have heeded t h e  ob jec t ions  of defense counsel  
t o  ho ld ing  t r i a l  i n  Moscow, and have t r ans fe r r ed  t h e  m a t t e r  t o  a  
county o u t s i d e  t h e  Second J u d i c i a l  D i s t r i c t .  
I n  James v. S t a t e ,  185 Md. 481, 45 A.2d 350 (1946) , , 
" a  convic t ion  f o r  murder i n  t h e  f i r s t  degree was r eve r sed  
where a t r i a l  judge had abused h i s  d i s c r e t i o n  i n  s e l e c t i n g  
a forum i n  which t h e  t r i a l  was t o  be had, when a  change 
o f  venue w a s  sought on t h e  ground of extreme l o c a l  p r e j -  
du ice .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  forum, t h e  accused maintained t h a t  
t h e y  could no t  ob ta in  a  f a i r  and impar t i a l  t r i a l  i n  t h a t  
c o u r t  o r  any cour t  of t h e  c i r c u i t ,  and prayed t h a t  an 
o r d e r  be passed f o r  t he  removal of t h e  record i n  t h e  
case t o  a cour t  of some o t h e r  c i r c u i t  f o r  t r i a l .  The 
r e q u e s t  w a s  d isregarded,  and t h e  case  was s e n t  t o  a 
C i r c u i t  Court i n  a  county wi th in  t h e  same c i r c u i t .  
T h e r e a f t e r ,  t h e  prosecution a l l eged  t h a t  a  f a i r  t r i a l  
could n o t  be had i n  t h a t  c o u r t ,  and prayed t h a t  t h e  
record  be s e n t  t o  some o t h e r  cou r t  i n  t he  c i r c u i t  f o r  
t r i a l ,  The accuseds ' r e i t e r a t e d  t h e i r  b e l i e f  t h a t  
t h e y  could no t  ob ta in  a  f a i r  t r i a l  i n  any o the r  c o u r t  
w i t h i n  t h e  c i r c u i t ,  bu t  venue was nonetheless changed 
a g a i n  t o  a  county wi th in  t h e  c i r c u i t  which was much 
c l o s e r  t o  t h e  community where t h e  crimes had occurred 
than  was t h e  county t o  which t h e  case  had been f i r s t  
t r a n s f e r r e d .  S t a t i n g  kha t  i f  it appeared doubtful  
t h a t  t h e  j u r i e s  i n  a  given c i r c u i t 3  would be f a i r  and 
i m p a r t i a l ,  a  case should be removed t o  some o the r  c i r -  
c u i t  o r  some o ther  s e c t i o n  of t h e  s t -a te ,  t he  cour t  
agreed  t h a t  t h e  p e t i t i o n  o f  t h e  accused, which was 
n o t  con t r ad i c t ed  bv t h e  s t a t e .  and the re fo re  had t o  
be taken  a s  t r u e ,  c a s t  grave doubt upon whether t h e  
accused could have had a f a i r  t r i a l  before a j u r y  i n  a 
- 
emphasis mine). 50 A.L.R. 
3d a t  825. 
See a l s o ,  Liber v. F lor ,  415 P. 2d a t  335 (Colo. , 1 9 6 6 )  wherein 
t h e  cour t  s t a t e d ,  
"The p l a i n t i f f  a s s e r t s  t h a t  when t h e  t r i a l  c o u r t  g r an t ed  
h i s  f i r s t  motion f o r  change of venue it committed a g ros s  
abuse of d i s c re t ion  i n  on ly  changing t h e  venue t o  t h e  
neighboring county of Montrose ins tead  o f ,  as r eques t ed ,  
t o  Mesa County, which i s  considerably f u r t h e r  away. W e  
agree. The gran t ing  of  a motion f o r  change o f  venue 
based on t h e  grounds r e l i e d  on by p l a i n t i f f  is d i s c r e -  
t i ona ry  wi th  the  t r i a l  cou r t .  ( c i t a t i o n s  omi t t ed ) .  I n  
t h e  absence of a c l e a r  showing of  abuse of d i s c r e t i o n  by 
t h e  t r i a l  cour t  we w i l l  n o t  i n t e r f e r e .  Here, however, 
a showing w a s  made t h a t  t h e  defendant was e n t i t l e d  t o  
a change of venue from Ouray County and s ince  t h e  same 6 
grounds ex i s t ed  f o r  n o t  t r y i n g  the  case i n  Montrose CJ 
County, t h e  cou r t  i n i t i a l l y  should have gran ted  a change 
of venue t o  some o t h e r  county than Montrose. " w 4 
As an i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  graphic  d e t a i l  given t h i s  c a s e  by t h e  Cis. 
E\3 
Lewiston Morning T r i b d e ,  a s  w e l l  as  t h e  da i ly  Idahonian,  Moscow's IP 
l o c a l  paper, appe l lan t  has  prepared an appendix t o  t h i s  brief 
wi th  photocopies of a l l  newspaper coverage given the  t r i a l ,  by 
both  newspapers. 
I n  l i g h t  of t h e  inflammatory circumstances sur rounding  t h e  
t r i a l  i n  t h i s  mat te r  and t h e  extremely high p o s s i b i l i t y  of j u ro r  
p re jud ice  (i. e. , t h e  tremendous amount of p u b l i c i t y  surrounding 
t h e  t r i a l ,  i n  addi t ion  t o  t h e  c o u r t ' s  f a i l u r e  t o  adequa te ly  guard 
a g a i n s t  such j u r o r  p re jud ice  by t r a n s f e r r i n g  venue t o  Latah County 
i n s t e a d  of  t o  a county o u t s i d e  t h e  Second J u d i c i a l  D i s t r i c t  of 
Idaho) it i s  a p p e l l a n t ' s  content ion t h a t  t he  ju ry  should  have 
I 
1 
been sequestered f o r  t h e  du ra t ion  of t h e  t r i a l .  The f a i l u r e  t o  
! seques t e r  the  jury  i n  t h i s  case  simply exacerbated t h e  problems 
j 
of  f a i r n e s s  and i m p a r t i a l i t y  o f  t h e  ju ry  a t t endan t  t o  t r i a l s  o f  
a s e n t a t i o n a l i s t i c  na tu re  a s  t h i s  t r i a l  c e r t a i n l y  was. 
Appel lant  i s  f u l l y  cognizant  o f  t h e  wording of I . C .  19-2126 
i which r e a d s  i n  p a r t ,  "The j u ry  sworn t o  t r y  an indictment  f o r  
! 
any o f f e n s e  may, a t  any t i m e  du r ing  t h e  t r i a l ,  be fore  t h e  submis- 
t s ion  o f  t h e  cause ,  i n  t h e  d i s c r e t i o n  o f  t h e  c o u r t ,  be pe rmi t t ed  
t o  s e p a r a t e ,  o r  t hey  may be k e p t  t o g e t h e r ,  i n  charge of a  p roper  
1 
i o f f i c e r  .,.". 
The wording of  t h i s  s t a t u t e  g ive s  f u l l  d i s c r e t i o n  t o  t h e  
t r i a l  judge i n  r ega rd  t o  s e p a r a t i o n  of  t h e  jury.  Aqain, based 
b b  
on t h e  t o t a l i t y  o f  t h e  c i rcumstances  surrounding t h e  t r i a l  g iv ing  (3 I 
r i s e  t o '  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  i f  n o t  extreme p r o b a b i l i t y ,  of juror 
p r e j u d i c e ,  t h e  f a i l u r e  of t h e  t r i a l  c o u r t  t o  o rder  t h e  j u r y  s e -  w- w 
ques t e r ed  was an abuse of t h i s  d i s c r e t i o n .  When a  fe l low human 
Cn 
I b e i n g ' s  l i f e  i s  a t  s t ake ,  t h e  inconvenience t o  j u ro r s  should  not 
1 be a  d e c i d i n g  o r  l i m i t i n g  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  dec i s i on  as t o  whether  o r  
! 
no t  s e q u e s t r a t i o n  i s  app rop r i a t e  i n  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  i n s t ance .  See 
S t a t e  v. Ke l i ho loka i ,  569 P.2d 891 (Hawaii, 1 9 7 7 ) .  
I N  ITS RELIANCE UPON IDAHO CODE SECTION 19-2515 ( 5 )  (5)  AND 
(8 )  AS SUPPORT FOR IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY, THE SEN- 
TENCING JUDGE DENIED APPELLANT DUE PROCESS OF LAW I N  THAT 
THE ITEMS THEREIN SET FORTH AS SENTENCING GUIDELINES A m  
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, THEREBY AFFORDING THE SENTENCING 
COURT UNBRIDLED DISCFETION TO IMPOSE THE. DEATH PENALTY. 
i 
! The Uni ted  S t a t e s  Supreme Court  i n  Furman v. Georgia, 4 0 8  
I 
U ~ S .  238, 92 S.Ct.  2726, 3 3  L.Ed. 2d 346 (1972) ,  f i r s t  l a i d  down 
: 
1 
f t h e  r u l e  o f  l a w  which s t a t e d  g e n e r a l l y  t h a t  any s ta te  s t a t u t e  
a l lowing  f o r  t h e  d e a t h  p e n a l t y  t o  be imposed on a  pure ly  d i s c r e -  
t i o n a r y  b a s i s ,  unguided by any s t a n d a r d s  o r  s t a t u t o r y  s e n t e n c i n g  
I scheme, must s u r e l y  f a l l  as b e i n g  v i o l a t i v e  o f  t h e  Eighth  Amend- j 
ment t o  t h e  United S t a t e s  C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s  p r o h i b i t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  
i i n f l i c t i o n  o f  "Cruel  and Unusual" punishment a s  app l i ed  t o  t h e  
, 
S t a t e s  by t h e  Four teen th  Amendment. Robinson v.  C a l i f o r n i a ,  370  
I 
U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8  L.Ed, 2d 758 (1962).  
The Court  i n  McGauthor v. ~ a l i f o r n i a ,  402 U . S .  183, 198 ,  91 
S.Ct. 1 4 5 4 ,  1 4 6 2 ,  28 L.Ed. 2d 711 (1971) ,  no ted  t h a t  i n  t h i s  coun- 
t r y  t h e r e  was almost  from t h e  beginning a  " r e b e l l i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  
common-law r u l e  imposing a mandatory dea th  sen tence  on a l l  con- 
v i c t e d  murderers ."  The f i r s t  a t tempted remedy was t o  r e s t r i c t  
t h e  d e a t h  p e n a l t y  t o  d e f i n e d  o f f e n s e s  such as "premedi ta ted"  mur- 
de r .  I b i d .  B u t  j u r i e s  " took t h e  law i n t o  t h e i r  own hands" and 
r e f u s e d  t o  c o n v i c t  on t h e  c a p i t a l  o f f e n s e .  Id .  , a t  199, 9 1  S . C t .  , 
a t  1463 .  
" I n  o r d e r  t o  m e e t  t h e  problem of j u r y  n u l l i f i c a t i o n ,  l e g i s l a -  
t u r e s  d i d  n o t  try, as b e f o r e ,  t o  r e f i n e  f u r t h e r  t h e i r  d e f i n i t i o n  
of c a p i t a l  homicides.  I n s t e a d  t h e y  adopted t h e  method o f  f o r t h -  
r i g h t l y  g r a n t i n g  j u r i e s  t h e  d i s c r e t i o n  which t h e y  had been e x e r -  
c i s i n g  i n  f a c t .  " I b i d .  
The Court  concluded: " I n  l i g h t  of h i s t o r y ,  exper ience ,  and 
t h e  p r e s e n t  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  human knowledge, w e  f i n d  it q u i t e  
imposs ib le  t o  say  t h a t  committing t o  t h e  untrammeled d i s c r e t i o n  
of  t h e  jury the  power t o  pronounce l i f e  o r  dea th  i n  c a p i t a l  cases  
is of fens ive  t o  anything i n  t h e  Cons t i tu t ion ."  I d . ,  a t  207, 9 1  
S .€ t .  , a t  1467. 
The Court refused t o  f i n d  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  dimension i n  t h e  
argument t h a t  those  who exerc i se  t h e i r  d i s c r e t i o n  t o  send a  person 
t o  death should be given s tandards  by which t h a t  d i s c r e t i o n  should 
be exercised.  Id . ,  a t  207-208, 9 1  S.Ct. a t  1467-1468. 
A recen t  wi tness  a t  t h e  Hearings before  Subcommittee No. 3 
of  t h e  House Committee on t h e  Jud ic i a ry ,  92d Cong., 2d Sess . ,  
Ernes t  van den Haag, t e s t i f y i n g  on H.R. 8414 e t  a l ,  s t a t e d :  
"Any pena l ty ,  a  f i n e ,  imprisonment o r  t h e  death  penal ty  
could be u n f a i r l y  o r  un jus t ly  appl ied.  The v i ce  i n  t h i s  
case is n o t  i n  t h e  pena l ty  but  i n  t h e  process  by which 
it i s  i n f l i c t e d .  It i s  u n f a i r  t o  i n f l i c t  unequal pen- 
a l t i e s  on equa l ly  g u i l t y  p a r t i e s ,  o r  on any innocent 
p a r t i e s ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of  what t h e  pena l ty  i s . "  I d . ,  a t  
116-117. 
But those  who advance t h a t  argument overlook McGautha, supra. 
We a r e  now imprisoned i n  t h e  McGautha holding.  Indeed t h e  
seeds  of t h e  p re sen t  c a s e  a r e  i n  McGautha. J u r i e s  ( o r  judges, as  
t he  case  may be)  have p r a c t i c a l l y  untrammeled d i s c r e t i o n  t o  l e t  
an accused l i v e  o r  i n s i s t  t h a t  he die." Furman v. Georgia, supra ,  
(Douglas J . ,  concurr ing)  ( foo tno tes  omi t t ed ) .  
And t h u s  went M r .  J u s t i c e  Douglas's concurr ing opinion i n  
Furman, fo r  t h a t  which t h e  e n t i r e  Court adopted i n  a  per  cuviam 
opinion,  t he  o v e r r u l i n g  of McGautha, and t h e  es tabl ishment  of t h e  
r u l e  t h a t  judges and j u r i e s  a l i k e  would not  i n  t h e  fu tu re  be a l -  
lowed u n f e t t e r e d  d i s c r e t i o n  i n  determining whether o r  not t o  
impose t h e  dea th  pena l ty .  
P r i o r  t o  1973, I . C .  B 18-4004 provided f o r  sen tences  o f  
d e a t h  o r  l i f e  imprisonment f o r  f i r s t  degree  murder. In  r e s p o n s e  
t o  Furman, by amendment i n  1973,  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  s t r u c k  t h e  al-  
t e r n a t i v e  o f  l i f e  imprisonment, 1973 S e s s .  Laws, Ch. 276, § 2 ,  
p. 589, t h u s  r e s u l t i n g  i n  mandatory c a p i t a l  punishment f o r  t h o s e  
d e f e n d a n t s  conv ic ted  of  f i r s t  degree  murder. 
"However, i n  l i g h t  o f  t h e  op in ion  o f  t h e  United S t a t e s  
Supreme Court  i n  Woodson v. North ~ a r o l i n a ,  428 U.S. 
280, 96 S . C t .  2978, 49  L.Ed. 2d 944 (1976) ,  which h e l d  
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a  mandatory d e a t h  p e n a l t y  s t a t u t e  v i r -  
t u a l l y  i d e n t i c a l  t o  I d a h o ' s ,  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  i n  1977 
amended I . C .  5 5  18-4004 and 19-2515 and added 5 19-2827 
i n  an a t t e m p t  t o  m e e t  t h e  Supreme C o u r t ' s  o b j e c t i o n s  t o  
such s t a t u t e s .  1977 Sess .  Laws, Ch. 154,  p. 390. The 
b a s i c  premise  of Woodson and i t s  companion c a s e s ,  Gregg 
v. Georgia,  428 U.S. 153,  96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed. 2d 859 
(1976) ;  P r o f f i t t  v. F l o r i d a ,  428 U.S. 242, 96 S . C t .  
2960, 49 L.Ed. 2d 913 ( 1 9 7 6 ) ;  Jurek v.  Texas, 428 U . S .  
262, 96 S.Ct .  2950, 4 9  L.Ed. 2d 929  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ;  and Rober t s  
v .  Lou i s i ana ,  428 U.S. 325, 9 6  S.Ct. 3001, 49  L.Ed. 2d 
974 (1076) ,  is  t h a t  t h e  s e n t e n c i n g  a u t h o r i t y  must be 
g i v e n  s p e c i f i c  and d e t a i l e d  guidance t o  a s s i s t  them i n  
d e c i d i n g  whether  t o  impose t h e  d e a t h  p e n a l t y  i n  o r d e r  
t o  assure t h a t  t h e  d e a t h  p e n a l t y  w i l l  n o t  be imposed 
i n  an  a r b i t r a r y  o r  c a p r i c i o u s  manner. To m e e t  t h i s  
mandate, t h e  Idaho L e g i s l a t u r e  e n a c t e d  an amended 
v e r s i o n  o f  I . C .  S 19-2515 p r o v i d i n g  f o r  a sen tenc ing  
h e a r i n g  a t  which a l l  r e l e v a n t  in fo rmat ion  could be p re -  
s e n t e d  t o  t h e  sen tenc ing  c o u r t ;  l i s t i n g  t h e  aggrava t ing  
c i rcumstances  which must be found i n  o r d e r  t o  impose 
t h e  sen tence  o f  d e a t h ;  p r o v i d i n g  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  one 
s u c h  a g g r a v a t i n g  circumstance b e  found t o  e x i s t  beyond 
a r e a s o n a b l e  doubt;  and p r o v i d i n g  t h a t  t h e  defendant  
s h a l l  be sentenced t o  dea th  upon such a f i n d i n g  u n l e s s  
t h e  m i t i g a t i n g  c i rcumstances  outweigh t h e  found aggra- 
v a t i n g  c i rcumstances .  F u r t h e r ,  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e  provided 
i n  I.C. 8 19-2827 f o r  mandatory Supreme Court review o f  
a l l  d e a t h  sen tences  imposed." S t a t e  v. Osborn, 1 0 2  
Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981) .  
The s t a t u t o r y  aggrava t ing  c i rcumstances  s e t  f o r t h  i n  I.C. 8 
19-2515 ( f )  (5)  and ( 8 )  , upon which t h e  s e n t e n c i n g  c o u r t  r e l i e d  i n  
-63- 
imposing t h e  dea th  pena l ty  upon Gene Franc is  S t u a r t  have never  
been defined by t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e .  Recently however, t h i s  Court 
has had t h e  oppor tun i ty  t o  construe t he  language o f  items ( 5 )  
and (8 )  and t o  a t tempt  t o  l a y  down a more c l e a r  d e f i n i t i o n  of 
t h e  wording contained the re in .  
The p a r t i c u l a r  language of I .  C. 19-2515 ( f )  ( 5 )  reads t h u s l y ,  
"The murder was e s p e c i a l l y  heinous, a t roc ious  o r  c r u e l ,  manifest-  
i n g  except ional  dep rav i ty . "  P r io r  t o  S t a t e  v. Osborn, supra ,  no 
j u d i c i a l  cons t ruc t ion  of t h e  meaning of t h e  language contained 
within  i tem ( 5 )  was t o  be found. However, i n  t h a t  case t h i s  b b  c.3 
Court adopted wi th  approval  t he  d e f i n i t i o n  of " e spec i a l l y  heinous,  CLE 
a t roc ious  o r  c r u e l ,  " which appears i n  Prof f i t t  v. F lor ida ,  428 
w 
U.S. 2 4 2 ,  9 6  S . C t .  2 9 6 0 ,  49 L.Ed. 2d 913 (1976) ,  and which reads (32 
a s  follows: 
" i t  i s  our  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t h a t  heinous means extremely 
wicked o r  shockingly e v i l ;  t h a t  a t roc ious  means out- 
ragiously  wicked and v i l e ;  and t h a t  c r u e l  means designed 
t o  i n f l i c t  a  h igh  degree of pain wi th  u t t e r  i nd i f f e r ence  
t o ,  or  even enjoyment o f ,  t he  s u f f e r i n g  of others. What 
is  intended t o  be  included were those  c a p i t a l  crimes 
where t h e  a c t u a l  commission of t h e  c a p i t a l  felony was 
accompanied by such add i t i ona l  a c t s  a s  t o  s e t  t he  crime 
a p a r t  from t h e  norm of c a p i t a l  f e l o n i e s  - - t h e  con- 
s c i ence l e s s  o r  p i t i l e s s  crime which i s  unnecessar i ly  
t o r tu rous  t o  t h e  vic t im."  
The Idaho $.upreme Court has s t a t e d ,  "before  a man can be 
punished, h i s  ca se  must be p l a in ly  and unmistakedly within a 
s t a t u t e .  A s t a t u t e  t h a t  e i t h e r  fo rb ids  o r  r e q u i r e s  t h e  doing 
o f  an a c t  i n  terms s o  vague t h a t  men of common i n t e l l i g e n c e  must 
guess as  t o  i t s  meaning and d i f f e r  as t o  i ts  app l i ca t ion  lacks  
t h e  f i r s t  e s s e n t i a l  of  Due Process of Law." S t a t e  v. Pigge, 79 
Idaho 529, 322 P.2d 703 (1957).  Reasoning by analogy, one might 
I 
paraphrase t h e  Cour t ' s  statement as  "before Gene S t u a r t  can be 
punished i n  accordance wi th  t h e  d i c t a t e s  of Idaho Code 19-2515, 
t h e  s t a t u t e  must apply p l a i n l y  and unmistakably t o  h i s  case .  
Furthermore, i f  t h e  s t a t u t e  uses terms t h a t  a r e ' s o  vague t h a t  
judges of common i n t e l l i g e n c e  must guess a s  t o  t h e  meaning of t h e  
t e r m s  and d i f f e r  a s  t o  i t s  appl ica t ion ,  then t h e  s t a t u t e  lacks  
t h e  f i r s t  e s s e n t i a l  of Due Process of Law." 
The void-for-vagueness doc t r ine  was c l e a r l y  contemplated i n  
t h e  Cour t ' s  decision i n  ~ i g g e ,  supra. The Court summarized t h e  
d o c t r i n e  i n  S t a t e  v. Lopez, 98  Idaho 581, 570 P.2d 259 (1977): 
"The concept of void-for-vagueness arose from a common 
law p rac t i ce  i n  r e f u s i n g  t o  enforce l e g i s l a t i o n  deemed 
too  i n d e f i n i t e  t o  be applied.  I t  has evolved i n  a pro- 
t e c t i o n  general ly  regarded a s  embodied i n  a Due Process 
Clause and p r o h i b i t s  holding a person ' ,criminally re-  
sponsible  f o r  conduct which he could not  reasonably 
understand t o  be proscr ibed.  ' In addi t ion t o  .the re-  
quirement of ' f a i r  no t i ce  o r  warning' t h e  d o c t r i n e  is  
s a i d  t o  ' r equ i re  enforcement' and t o  prescr ibe  a pre- 
c i s e  standard f o r  t h e  adjudicat ion of g u i l t .  The 
p r i n c i p l e  c o n s i s t e n t l y  followed i s  t h a t  ' a  statute which 
e i t h e r  forb ids  o r  r e q u i r e s  t h e  doing of an a c t  i n  t e r m s  
s o  vague t h a t  men of common in t e l l i gence  must necessa r i ly  
guess a t  i t s  meaning and d i f f e r  a s  t o  i t s  app l i ca t ion  ' 
viaLat&s:the f i r s t  e s s e n t i a l  of Due Process of Law." 
Idaho Code 19-2515 ( f )  ( 8 )  s t a t e s  a s  follows, " ( 8 )  The Defend- 
a n t ,  by p r i o r  conduct o r  conduct i n  t h e  commission of t h e  murder 
a t  hand, has exhibi ted a propensi ty  t o  commit murder which w i l l  
probably c o n s t i t u t e  a cont inuing t h r e a t  t o  soc ie ty ."  
This Court, i n  t h e  r e c e n t  opinion handed down i n  S t a t e  v. 
Creech, (No. 14480 and 15000) Idaho I 
-- 
P.2d 
- 
(19831, construed t h e  language of I. C. 19-2515 ( f )  (8 )  a s  follows: 
"Here as c o n t r a s t e d  wi th  t h e  argument i n  Osborn r e g a r d i n g  
t h e  ' u t t e r  d i s r e g a r d  f o r  human l i f e ,  ' it cannot be a s s e r t e d  
t h a t  t h e  ' p r o p e n s i t y '  c i rcumstance  cou ld  conceivably be  
a p p l i e d  t o  every  murderer  coming b e f o r e  a cour t  i n  t h i s  
s t a t e .  We would cons t rue  ' p r o p e n s i t y '  t o  exclude,  f o r  
example, a  person who has  no  i n c l i n a t i o n  t o  k i l l  b u t  i n  
an e p i s o d e  o f  r a g e ,  such a s  d u r i n g  an emotional  f a m i l y  o r  
l o v e r ' s  q u a r r e l ,  commits t h e  o f f e n s e  o f  murder. W e  would 
doubt  t h a t  most of t h o s e  c o n v i c t e d  of murder would a g a i n  
commit murder,  and r a t h e r  we c o n s t r u e  t h e  ' p r o p e n s i t y '  
language t o  s p e c i f y  t h a t  pe r son  who i s  a  w i l l i n g ,  p r e -  
d i sposed  k i l l e r ,  a  k i l l e r  who t ends  toward d e s t r o y i n g  
t h e  l i f e  o f  ano the r ,  one who k i l l s  w i t h  less than t h e  
normal amount o f  provocat ion .  W e  would hold t h a t  propen-  
s i t y  assumes a  p r o c l i v i t y ,  a  s u s c e p t i b i l i t y ,  and even an 
a f f i n i t y  toward committing t h e  a c t  of  murder." I d . ,  a t  
15. 
Th i s  Court i n  Creech 11, s u p r a ,  a s  it has come t o  be c a l l e d ,  I& 
c3 
p l a c e s  g r e a t  r e l i a n c e  on t h e  c a s e s  of  Gregg v. Georgia,  428 U.S. 
CI. 
153 ,  96 S.Ct.  2909, 49. L.Ed. 2d 913 (1976) ; and Jurek v. Texas ,  
428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed. 2d 929 (1976);  i n  r e a c h i n g  0 2  
w 
f o r  a workable d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  language conta ined w i t h i n  I . C .  
I 
19-2515 (f) ( 8 ) .  
I 
i A p p e l l a n t ,  however cannot  a g r e e  wi th  t h i s  C o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n  
i n  Creech 11, s u p r a ,  concerning that p a r t  o f  t h e  opinion which 
! 
i h o l d s  t h a t  t h e  language o f  I . C .  19-2515 ( f )  (8 )  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
! narrow i n  d e f i n i t i o n  t o  w i t h s t a n d  a  c h a l l e n g e  f o r  vagueness ,  nor  
can he  a g r e e  w i t h  t h i s  C o u r t ' s  r e l i a n c e  on Gregg v. Georgia ,  s u p r a ;  
and J u r e k  v. Texas,  supra .  
The d i s t i n g u i s h e d  commentator Char les  L. Black, Jr. , i n  h i s  
a r t i c l e  e n t i t l e d ,  "Due Process  F o r  Death: Ju rek  v. Texas and 
Companion Cases, " 26 C a t h o l i c  U.L. Rev. 1 (1977) , argues vehe- 
ment ly ,  i f  n o t  e l e g a n t l y ,  a g a i n s t  a c c e p t i n g  t h e  reasoning o f  t h e  
I Codrt i n  Gregg, supra;  and Jurek,  supra. Appellant  agrees whole- 
! 
hear ted ly  with t h e  arguments made by Mr. Black, exerp ts  o f  which 
! 1 
a r e  s e t  fo r th  i n  t h i s  argument for thwith ,  and adopts t h e  same as 
h i s  own i n  urging t h i s  Court t o  reconsider  i t ' s  opinion i n  Creech 
11, supra. 
-
: 
i 
I 
I n  argument a g a i n s t  t h e  holdings i n  Gregg, supra;  and Jurek ,  
supra ,  which declared language s u b s t a n t i a l l y  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h a t  i n  
i 
i I.C. 19-2515(f) ( 8 )  t o  be s u f f i c i e n t l y  narrow i n  d e f i n i t i o n  t o  
I withstand a chal lenge f o r  vagueness, M r .  Black propounds t h e  
i following: 
"I have s a i d  dur ing  t h i s  l a s t  year ,  be fo re  J u l y  2d, 
t h a t  I did  n o t  see how any lawyer could a t  any time 
have upheld such a s t a t u t e  a s  aga ins t  a due process  
object ion.  I should have thought t h a t  M r .  J u s t i c e  
McReynolds would have s t ruck  it down i n  1925 .  Why 
have I been saying t h i s ?  L e t  me pa r t i cu l a r i ze - - fo r  
t h a t  which has seemed t o  me so  obvious must now be 
searchingly,  even ted ious ly  examined. 
(1) The concept of the exis tence  of a 'p robabi l i ' ty '  
'beyond a reasonable  doubt'  is and can be only puz- 
zling--even mind-boggling--to a jury o r  t o  anybody. 
I n  s t r i c t  mathematical terms, and i n  dea l ing  with  a 
sub jec t  s t r i c t l y  amenable t o  mathematical t rea tment ,  
it is of course  poss ib l e  t o  assert t h a t  there i s  a 
p r o b a b i l i t y '  no t  only 'beyond a reasonable  doubt '  a r e  
repugnant and a t  war with  one another  i n  t h e  common 
speech i n  which j u r i e s ,  l i k e  a l l  of us, t a l k  and 
think.  
( 2 )  The word ' p r o b a b i l i t y '  i s  i t s e l f  t r i p l y  ambiguous, 
and vague i n  a t  l e a s t  two of i t s  poss ib l e  senses .  I n  
t h e  mathematical usage I have j u s t  c i t e d ,  it means one 
thing--any chance, however small .  There i s ,  beyond any 
doubt, a  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  each of 100 success ive ly  
to s sed  coins  w i l l  come up heads--a p r o b a b i l i t y ,  namely, 
of one i n  2100--and t h i s  has no necessary connection,  
by t h e  way, wi th  what w i l l  happen when you t o s s ,  f o r  
it i s ,  t o  t h e  mathematician, q u i t e  i r r e l e v a n t  t h a t  you 
may a c t u a l l y  t o s s  e i t h e r  f a r  more o r  f a r  less than  2100 
sequences of  100 before  a l l  of  one sequence a r e  heads. 
A l l  t h i s  may seem very t echn ica l .  But i f  you t h i n k  
i n  laymen's usage t h e  word ' p r o b a b i l i t y '  cannot some- 
t imes mean ' small  p r o b a b i l i t y '  , l i s t e n  t o  t he  next  
weather fo recas t  on t e l e v i s i o n .  
Q u i t e  another usage would def ine  p robab i l i t y  a s  'more 
than a  50  percent  l i k e l i h o o d  of occurence'.  This may 
be a more widely d i f fu sed  usage. But then ,  what does 
it mean t o  p red ica t e ,  of a  p re sen t ly  e x i s t i n g  person,  
t h a t  it i s  beyond a  reasonable doubt more than 50  per-  
cen t  l i k e l y  t h a t  under r a d i c a l l y  a l t e r e d  circumstances 
he w i l l  do c e r t a i n  unlawful t h ings?  Does anybody t h i n k  
t h a t  you, o r  I ,  o r  a  jury  of 1 2  good persons and t r u e ,  
can otherwise than a r b i t r a r i l y  make t h a t  f ine-grained 
a  p red ic t ion?  What technique of p red ic t ion  i s  being 
r e f e r r e d  to?  Does anybody th ink  t h a t  a  jury " ( o r  a  
judge i n  Idaho)"  understands t h e  words t h i s  way un- 
ambiguously--or has any reason to?  
F i n a l l y ,  though I doubt commonness and even t h e  c o r r e c t -  
ness  of t h e i r  usage, ' p r o b a b i l i t y '  may, and perhaps 
sometimes does, mean 'h igh  probab i l i ty f - -converg ing  on 
a  p red ic t i on  'beyond a  reasonable doubt '  as a  l i m i t .  
If t h a t  i s  what i s  meant, then  t h e  term ' p r o b a b i l i t y '  
i s  wholly o r  p a r t i a l l y  s h o r t c i r c u i t e d  and t h e  jury  
" ( t h e  sentencing judge i n  Idaho) " i s  asked t o  do some- 
t h i n g  c lose- - jus t  how c l o s e  we know not--to f ind ing  
t h a t  t h e  defendant w i l l  'beyond a  reasonable doubt '  
do t h e s e  th ings .  But t h e r e  a r e  two th ings  wrong with  
t h i s .  F i r s t ,  the  jury  i s  no t  t o l d  t h i s .  Second, 
t h e r e  very s u r e l y  e x i s t s  no sc ience of p red i c t i ng  human 
behavior  which can r e l i a b l y  make each a  p red ic t i on  a s  
t o  human beings 'beyond a  reasonable doub t f .  Any group 
o f ,  say ,  nine mature persons ought t o  know t h a t ,  even 
i f  t h i s  quest ion were asked c l e a r l y ,  a s  it i s  n o t ,  no 
ju ry  r e a l l y  can p r e d i c t  'beyond a reasonable doubt' t h a t  
X w i l l  cut  up rough i n  t h e  p e n i t e n t i a r y .  
( 3 )  "Criminal a c t s  of v iolence t h a t  would c o n s t i t u t e  
a  cont inuing t h r e a t  t o  s o c i e t y  i s  a  phrase composed o f  
hope less ly  vague terms. "Criminal '  a s  a  blow with  t h e  
f i r s t  cr iminal?  Vio len t '  a s  such a  blow i s  v i o l e n t ?  
A ' t h r e a t '  of what? "To socie ty ' '  i n  what sense ,  s ince  
t h e  person i s  t o  be i n  p r i s o n ,  under whatever r e s t r a i n t s  
t h e  s t a t e  f i nds  necessary,  and need no t  be r e l ea sed  u n t i l  
t h e  s t a t e  i s  s a t i s f i e d ,  t o  whatever degree i t  d e s i r e s  t o  
be s a t i s f i e d ,  t h a t  he i s  n o t  a  t h r e a t  t o  soc i e ty?  If 
you th ink  a l l  t h i s  f a r f e t c h e d ,  then what do you do about 
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h i s  same p l u r a l i t y  pointed wi th  unequivo- 
c a l  approval ,  on t h i s  same ~ u l y  2d t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
Georgia cou r t  had he ld  ' impermissibly vague' t h e  phrase  
' s u b s t a n t i a l  h i s t o r y  of  s e r i o u s  a s s a u l t i v e  c r imina l  con- 
v i c t i o n s ' ?  ( foo tno te  omi t t ed ) .  
I have been d i s s e c t i n g  t h i s  s t a t u t e  verba l ly  wi th  t h e  aim, 
I suppose, o f  g iv ing  some s c i e n t i f i c  p r e c i s i o n  t o  i t s  
p l a i n  shabbiness ,  t o  i t s  se l f -speaking i n s u f f i c i e n c y  
a s  l a w .  A y e a r  ago,  I would have thought  t h a t  unneces- 
sary .  I would have thought t h a t  t h e  t r a i n e d  i n s t i t u t i o n  
o f  any seasoned lawyer would recognize a t  once,  i n  t h i s  
grimly s i l l y  s t a t u t e ,  something f a r  beyond s e r i o u s  con- 
sideration--much a s  one can t e l l  t h a t  a b a t t e r  has 
s t ruck  ou t  wi thou t  c a l c u l a t i n g  t h e  number of  n i t r ogen  
molecules between t h e  b a t  and t h e  b a l l .  But I do n o t  
t h ink  I have made a po in t  amiss; I t h i n g  I have p a r t l y  
shown why, a s  ought t o  be obvious wi thou t  a l l  t h i s ,  
a jury" ( a  s en t enc ing  judge i n  Idaho) "must e i t h e r  
reso lve  a l l  t h e s e  verba l  puzz les  f o r  i t s e l f ,  without  
s u f f i c i e n t  grounds f o r  t h e  r e s o l u t i o n  chosen,  o r  e l s e  
proceed i n  puzzlement t o  i t s  own s t a n d a r d l e s s  dec i s ion  
--or do a b i t  o f  bo th" .  Id .  , a t  4 ,  5 ,  6 .  
A pe rusa l  of  t h e  sentencing hear ing  t r a n s c r i p t  i n  t h i s  mat ter  
shows t h a t  a p p e l l a n t ' s  sentencing judge exper ienced  many of t h e  
same d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  applying t he  language of  t h e  s t a t u t e  as were 
spoken of  by M r .  Black i n  the  immediately p r i o r  exce rp t  from h i s  
article. 
The s en t enc ing  judge, i n  f ind ing  t h a t  beyond a reasonable  
doubt t h e  "heinousness"  o f  t h e  crime had been demonstrated,  
s t a t e d  t h e  fo l lowing ,  
"This c h i l d  t o l e r a t e d  t h i s  t o r t u r o u s  t r ea tmen t  f o r  
months and months and months. And I cannot conceive 
of  a more depraved o r  more heinous cr ime than  th i s - -  
t h e r e  may be and some day I may hea r  o f  it bu t  1 cer- 
t a i n l y  h a v e n ' t  up t o  now. I have a s  a consequence of 
t h e  p r o s e c u t i o n ' s  p r e sen t a t i on  t o  m e  had t o  read some 
of t h e  most depraved crimes and l e a r n  about  some of 
t h e  most depraved homicides I ' v e  e v e r  seen.  And I 
w i l l  be hones t  i n  admit t ing t h a t  I am n o t  s u r e  t h a t  
t h i s  one i s  any more depraved o r  heinous t han  those  
but it c e r t a i n l y  r i s e s  t o  t h e  l e v e l  o f  a s  heinous 
a crime a s  you can have.. . It may be t h a t  any murder 
bv t o r t u r e  au toma t i ca l l v  c o m ~ l i e s  wi th  Reauirement 
b7;lmber 5 under  t h e  ~ t a t i t e .  "* (emphasis &ne) (Sen- 
t e n c i n g  Hear ing T ransc r ip t ,  p. 9 8 ) .  
The s en t enc ing  judge was a l s o  asked t o  cons ider  Requirement 
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Number 6 under t h e  S t a t u t e ,  which r e q u i r e s  a showing o f  utter 
d i s r e g a r d  f o r  human l i f e .  Although he found t h a t  t h i s  had n o t  
been demonstrated beyond a reasonab le  doubt ,  he d i d  make c e r t a i n  
e n l i g h t e n i n g  comments. 
" I n  read ing  t h e  S t a t u t e  I have had a g r ea t  dea l  of 
t r o u b l e  wi th  t h i s  requirement.  I t ' s  hard f o r  me t o  
imagine t h e  i n t e n t i o n a l  t a k i n g  of a l i f e  which d o e s n ' t  
demonstrate u t t e r  d i s r e g a r d  fox  human l i f e " .  (Sen- 
t e n c i n g  Hearing T r a n s c r i p t ,  p. 9 9 ) .  "And while it 
c e r t a i n l y  demonstrates--while t h e s e  events  c e r t a i n l y  
demonstrate i n  t h e  defendant  a d i s r ega rd  f o r  t h i s  
human's l i f e ,  t h e  deceased ' s  l i f e ,  I don ' t  be l i eve  
t h a t  is what t h e  S t a t u t e  i s  meaning t o  g e t  a t .  I 
unders tand  t h a t  o t h e r  t r i a l  judges have disagreed w i t h  
me. And t end  t o  c o n s i s t e n t l y  f i n d  t h i s  p r e sen t  i n  
any case  where a f i r s t  degree murder i s  presen t .  But 
i f  t h a t  i s -  going t o  be t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  then,  t h e  e n t i r e  
- - 
conceDt of examinina t h e  f a c t s  f o r  a ~ s r a v a t i o n  would 
become meaningless. " (emphasis mine) (Sentencing 
Hear ing T ransc r ip t ,  p. 1 0 0 ) .  
And, f i n a l l y  t h e  sen tenc ing  judge was asked t o  c o n s i d e r  Re- 
quirement Number 8 under t h e  S t a t u t e ,  which r e q u i r e s  a demonstra- 
t i o n  t h a t  t h e  defendant  e x h i b i t  a p ropens i ty  t o  commit murder i n  
t h e  f u t u r e .  The sentencing judge found t h a t  t h i s  requirement  had 
been demonstra ted  beyond a reasonable  doubt. 
"Now, t h i s  S t a t u t e  uses  t h e  same s t r ange  language which 
a ~ ~ e a r e d  i n  t h e  Mental Commitment S t a t u t e  i n  Idaho. It 
&ks me t o  f i nd  beyond a reasonab le  doubt t h a t  t h e  dez 
- 
f endan t  w i l l  probably do something. T h a t ' s  a very 
confus ing  phraseology t o  me.  Because 'probably '  does 
n o t  u s u a l l y  rise t o  the s t a n d a r d  of  beyond a reasonab le  
doubt .  So I ' m - - I  would p r e f e r  t h e  Leg i s l a tu r e  n o t  t o  
use t h a t  combination o f phraseology . " (emphasis mine 1 
(Sen tenc ing  Hearing T r a n s c r i p t ,  p. 1 0 0 )  . 
A s  i s  amply demonstrated by t h e  foregoing passages from 
a p p e l l a n t ' s  sentencing hea r ing ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  much confusion over  
t he  language and proper a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  aggravat ing circum- 
s t a n c e s  l i s t e d  i n  I . C .  19-2515(f) among t h e  d i s t r i c t  judges of 
ou r  s t a t e .  This  ha s  r e s u l t e d  i n  l a r g e  d i s p a r i t i e s  i n  s en t enc ing .  
C e r t a i n l y  t h i s  i s  no t  t h e  r e s u l t  fo reseen  by t h e  Uni ted  
I S t a t e s  Supreme Court i n  Furman, supra ;  Woodson, supra ;  and t h e i r  
progeny. I n  t r u t h  and f a c t  t h i s  r e s u l t  i s  e x a c t l y  what t h e  Court 
i n  Furman has  condemned. " . . .The Eighth  and Four teenth  Amend- 
ments cannot  t o l e r a t e  t h e  i n f l i c t i o n  o f  a  sentence  of dea th  under 
l e g a l  systems t h a t  permit  t h i s  unique pena l t y  t o  be s o  wantonly 
and s o  f r e a k i s h l y  imposed." Furman v. Georgia, supra ,  (S t ewar t ,  
J. , concur r ing)  . 
" I  i n v i t e  you t o  cons ide r  whether  s t a t u t e s  which need 
such reasonings  and such t o n a l i t i e s  t o  uphold them a r e  
n o t  i n  t r u th - - i n  t h a t  t r u t h  no Court can al ter--con- 
sp icuous  i l l u s t r a t i o n s  of  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  our  l e g a l  
system, a f t e r  yea r s  of t ravai l  s i n c e  Furman, cannot 
produce a procedure f i t  f o r  choosing people t o  d i e .  
I f  you go on from t h a t  t o  a  s t i l l  wider  judgment on 
t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  man's jus t i ,ce ,  I welcome you." 26  
C a t h o l i c  U . .  Rev. a t  1 6  (1977).  
THE SENTENCING COURT'S FINDING THAT THE DEATH OF ROBERT 
MILLER OCCURRED I N  AN ESPECIALLY "DEPRAVED" OR "HEINOUS" MANNER, 
AND THAT APPELLANT "EXHIBITED A PROPENSITY TO COMMIT MURDER 
WHICH WILL PROBABLY CONSTITUTE A CONTINUING THREAT TO SOCIETY" 
WAS IMPOSED UNDER THE INFLUEWCE O F  PASSION AND PREJUDICE, AND 
TOTALLY U N S U m & U  BY L K C ~ F - E ~ - W " ~ K ~ .  ---..-.. 
Idaho Code 19-2827(c) (1) and ( 2 )  r e q u i r e s  automat ic  review 
by t h i s  Court  i n  each sentence  wherein t h e  dea th  pena l ty  is  i m -  
posed. The p e r t i n e n t  p rov i s i ons  of I.C. 19-2827 a r e  s e t  o u t  a s  
f o l l ows  : 
" ( a )  Whenever t h e  dea th  p e n a l t y  i s  imposed, and upon 
t h e  judgment becoming f i n a l  i n  t he  t r i a l  c o u r t ,  t h e  sen- 
tence s h a l l  be reviewed on the  record by t h e  Supreme 
Court of Idaho..  . 
( c )  With regard t o  t h e  sentence t h e  Court s h a l l  d e t e r -  
mine : 
(1) Whether t h e  sentence of death was imposed under t h e  
inf luence of pass ion ,  p re jud ice  o r  any o t h e r  a r b i t r a r y  
f a c t o r ,  and 
( 2 )  Whether t h e  evidence supports t h e  judge 's  f i n d i n g  
o f  s t a t u t o r y  aggravat ing circumstance from among 
those  enumerated i n  Sect ion 19-2515, Idaho.. . " 
Appellant contends t h a t  t h e  record i s  devoid of any f a c t  o r  
f a c t s  from which t h e  sentencing cour t  could conclude, beyond a  
reasonable  doubt,  t h a t  t h e  a c t s  o r  circumstances surrounding t h e  
dea th  of Robert M i l l e r  r i s e  t o  t h e  po in t  of being e s p e c i a l l y  "de- 
praved'' o r  "heinous" i n  na ture .  
As  t h i s  Court i s  w e l l  aware, t h i s  case  involves  t h e  dea th  
of  a  t h r e e  yea r  o l d  c h i l d .  Anytime the  death  of a  smal l  c h i l d  
i s  involved t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of passion and p re jud ice  e n t e r i n g  
i n t o  t h e  t r i a l  c o u r t ' s  sentencing decis ion i s  magnified a hun- 
dredfold .  And o f  course we would not p lace  f a u l t  wi th  anyone 
who allowed t h e i r  "blood t o  b o i l "  a b i t  over t h e  s e n s e l e s s  death  
of  t h i s  c h i l d ;  no t  t h e  p o l i c e ,  not t h e  prosecu tor ,  no t  t h e  Mag- 
i s t r a t e  a t  t h e  prel iminary hear ing,  not  the  t r i a l  judge, no t  t h i s  
jury  and not t h e  sentencing judge. However, al lowing o n e ' s  
"blood t o  b o i l "  has no p lace  i n  t h e  decis ions  made a t  any s t a g e  
of t h e  j u d i c i a l  process ,  e s p e c i a l l y  a t  sentencing.  
I n  t h i s  case ,  due t o  t h e  non-existence of evidence showing 
premedi ta t ion o r  i n t e n t  t o  k i l l ,  t h e  S t a t e  was forced  t o  f a l l  
back, i f  you w i l l ,  on t h e  murder by t o r t u r e  s t a t u t e  a s  a charging 
v e h i c l e ,  i n  o rde r  t o  seek a  c a p i t a l  convict ion.  
The s t a t e  t h e n  proceeded t o  p a i n t  a  m e r c i l e s s  p i c t u r e  o f  
a p p e l l a n t  a s  some t y p e  of "baby-k i l l e r "  who d e r i v e s  joy from 
s a d i s t i c a l l y  i n f l i c t i n g  pa in  upon o t h e r s .  
I n  an a t t e m p t  t o  p o r t r a y  t h i s  view, t h e  prosecut ion  i n t r o d u c e d  
t e s t i m o n i e s  o f  s e v e r a l  a d u l t  women w i t h  whom M r .  S t u a r t  had had 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  i n  t h e  p a s t .  Each woman t e s t i . f i e d ,  o v e r  objec-  
t i o n ,  t o  p a s t  b e a t i n g s  i n c u r r e d  a t  t h e  hands o f  M r .  S t u a r t .  E a r l i e r  
i n  t h i s  b r i e f  w e  have argued a g a i n s t  t h e  r e l e v a n c e  and a d m i s s i b i l i t y  
o f  t h i s  same tes t imony.  The i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  t h i s  " i r r e l e v a n t "  
tes t imony i n t o  ev idence ,  i n i t i a l l y  a t  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  h e a r i n g  and 
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aga in  a t  t h e  t r i a l ,  c r e a t e d  a  huge wave of  "pass ion" ,  " p r e j u d i c e "  C33 
and " d i s g u s t "  i n  t h e  minds of t h e  judge and j u r y  a l i k e ,  i n e v i t a b l y  Clt 
G 
b l i n d i n g  them from t h e  r e a l  i s s u e s  and f a c t s  a t  hand. Suddenly,  W 
C13 
l o s t  from s i g h t  was t h e  requirement  of f i n d i n g  t h a t  t h e  e lements  00 
o f  t h e  crime charged had been proven beyond a reasonable  doubt .  
Gene F r a n c i s  S t u a r t  was t h u s  a  "bad person" who needed t o  be pun- 
i shed .  The p r o s e c u t i o n  rode t h i s  wave o f  p a s s i o n ,  p r e j u d i c e  and 
d i s g u s t  th roughou t  t h e  p re l iminary  h e a r i n g ,  t h e  t r i a l ,  and f i n a l l y  
t h e  s e n t e n c i n g .  ' There  was never  a  s h r e d  o f  s u b s t a n t i a l  ev idence  
i n t r o d u c e d  which proved beyond a  r e a s o n a b l e  doubt t h a t  a p p e l l a n t  
in tended  t o  t o r t u r e  Robert M i l l e r .  
We r e s p e c t f u l l y  submit t o  t h i s  c o u r t  t h a t  t h e  sen tenc ing  
judge not  o n l y  a l lowed h i s  "blood t o  b o i l "  he allowed it t o  g e t  
t h e  b e s t  o f  him. H e  sentenced Gene F r a n c i s  S t u a r t  t o  d e a t h  be- 
cause  h e  b e l i e v e d  M r .  S t u a r t  w a s  a  "depraved",  "heinous" p e r s o n ,  
no t  because  t h e  cr ime he  committed was such.  
The same arguments must be made a g a i n s t  t h e  sen tenc ing  
c o u r t ' s  f i n d i n g  t h a t  M r .  S t u a r t  " e x h i b i t e d  a  p r o p e n s i t y  t o  cormnit 
murder which w i l l  p robably  c o n s t i t u t e  a  con t inu ing  t h r e a t  t o  
s o c i e t y " .  Nowhere does t h e  r e c o r d  s u b s t a n t i a t e  a f i n d i n g  s u c h  
as t h i s .  
No one would d i s a g r e e  t h a t  a p p e l l a n t  has a  s u b s t a n t i a l  crim- 
i n a l  h i s t o r y .  But how can t h r e e  p r i o r  non-violence r e l a t e d  fe lony  
c o n v i c t i o n s  be s a i d  t o  prove beyond a  reasonable  doubt t h a t  M r .  
S t u a r t  e x h i b i t s  a  p r o p e n s i t y  t o  commit murder i n  t h e  f u t u r e ?  
The d i s t r i c t  judge d u r i n g  t h e  sen tenc ing  h e a r i n g  made t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  comments i n  suppor t  of h i s  f i n d i n g :  
"So I f i n d  t h i s  t o  be p r e s e n t  beyond a  reasonable  doub t  
because  I f i n d  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  of f u t u r e  murder t o  be 
more t h a n  j u s t  probable .  I f i n d  it t o  be ext remely  
s u b s t a n t i a l .  And t h e  reason  I f i n d  it s o  i s  t h a t  t h i s  
de fendan t  engaged i n  t h e  t o r t u r e  o f  a t  l e a s t  f o u r  o r  
f i v e  people  o v e r  a r e l a t i v e l y  s h o r t  p e r i o d  of  t i m e .  ' 
A few y e a r s .  And i f  you go back t o  h i s  f i r s t  marr iage  
o v e r  t h e  decade f i v e  o r  s i x  people .  I n f l i c t i n g  i n j u r i e s  
upon some of them s o  s e v e r e  t h a t  they  might very  w e l l  
have caused dea th .  And I f e e l  t h a t  when you examine 
his behav io r  w i t h  t h e  b e n e f i t  of h i n d s i g h t  it becomes 
c l e a r  t h a t  i t  was only  a  m a t t e r  o f  t i m e  u n t i l  he k i l l e d  
somebody. " (Sen tenc ing  Hearing T r a n s c r i p t ,  p. 101) . 
H e r e  a g a i n ,  t h e  u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d  tes t imony of t h e s e  women i s  
be ing  used t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  concept ion  of  a p p e l l a n t  as an " e v i l  
person" ,  n o t  d e s e r v i n g  of mercy. 
Throughout t h i s  e n t i r e  m a t t e r ,  from h i s  a r r e s t  th rough  sen-  
tencing, a commonly expressed  a t t i t u d e  of  M r .  S t u a r t ,  even among 
t h o s e  i n t i m k t e l y  invo lved  i n  t h e  j u d i c i a l  p rocess  i s  t h a t  e v e n  
if he d i d  n o t  t o r t u r e  t h e  c h i l d ,  he  r e c e i v e d  what he  dese rved .  
Th i s  c o u r t  must ask  i t s e l f ,  as I have on many occas ions ,  whe the r  
t h e  lack  of a means, j u s t i f i e s  t he  end r e s u l t  des i red  by soc i e ty .  
Appellant urges t h e  Court t o  examine t h e  r eco rd  and observe t h a t  
passion and p r e j u d i c e  permeated t h e s e  proceedings from the  begin- 
ning t o  t h e  end. 
WHEN COMPARED TO SIMILAR CASES, CONSIDERING BOTH THE CRIMES 
AND DEFENDANTS INVOLVED, THE DEATH PENALTY IMPOSED ON APPELLANT 
IS EXCESSIVE AND DISPROPORTIONATE TO HIS CRIME AND CONSTITUTES 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT I N  VIOLATION O F  THE EIGHTH AMEND- 
MENT TO THE CONSTITUTION O F  THE UNITED STATES. 
The Eighth Amendment t o  t h e  United S t a t e s  Const i tu t ion re-  
q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e r e  " s h a l l  not  be ... c r u e l  and unusual punishments 
i n f l i c t e d . "  The b a s i c  underlying concept of t h e  Eighth Amendment 
i s  t h a t  a pena l ty  must "accord wi th  t h e  d i g n i t y  of man... This  
means t h a t  t h e  punishment be n o t  exces s ive . "  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 9 6  S.Ct. 2621, 49  L.Ed. 2d 859 (1976) .  "An excess ive  
penal ty  i s  i n v a l i d  under t h e  Cruel and Unusual ~unishments  Clause 
'even though popular  sentiment may f a v o r '  ( i t ) . "  Id .  a t  331, 
an t e ,  a t  173, 182-183; (Marshall,  J . ,  d i s s e n t i n g )  . For t h e  pur- 
poses i n  i s s u e  a t  b a r ,  t h i s  has been i n t e r p r e t e d  t o  mean t h a t  t h e  
pena l ty  cannot be d ispropor t iona te  t o  t h e  crime involved. 
The Idaho l e g i s l a t u r e  wisely included a safeguard aga ins t  
excess ive  pena l ty  i n  c a p i t a l  cases  when d r a f t i n g  t h e  mandatory 
review p rov i s ions .  Idaho Code S 19-2827 ( c )  ( 3 )  provides t h a t  w i th  
regard t o  t h e  sen tence  t h e  Supreme Court s h a l l  determine: 
"Whether t h e  sentence of death  is  excess ive  o r  dispro- 
p o r t i o n a t e  t o  t h e  penal ty  imposed i n  s imi la r  cases ,  
i cons ide r ing  bo th  t h e  crime and t h e  defendant ."  
I 
This  sa feguard  i s  t h e  procedure through which t h i s  Cour t  re- 
views each death  sen tence  t o  ensure t h e  death  p e n a l t y  i n  Idaho  i s  
n o t  imposed i n  a  c a s e  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  t o  t h e  cr ime.  I n  o r d e r  
t o  a s s e s s  each d e a t h  p e n a l t y  i n  t h i s  manner, it i s  s t a t u t o r i l y  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  compare t h e  d e a t h  p e n a l t y  a s  imposed i n  t h e  c a s e  a t  
b a r ,  i n  l i g h t  of a l l  r e l e v a n t  f a c t s  of t h e  c a s e ,  wi th  t h e  same 
f a c t o r s  cons ide red  i n  imposing t h e  u l t ima te  sen tence  i n  s i m i l a r  
c a s e s .  It is  r e s p e c t f u l l y  submit ted  t h a t  when comparing t h i s  
c r ime and t h i s  defendant  w i t h  o t h e r  cases  r e s u l t i n g  i n  t h e  d e a t h  
p e n a l t y ,  t h e  i n e s c a p a b l e  conclus ion  is  t h a t  impos i t ion  o f  t h i s  
b b  
sen tence  r e s u l t s  i n  c r u e l  and unusual  punishment t o  Gene F r a n c i s  C=> 
S t u a r t ,  i n  v i o l a t i o n  of t h e  United S t a t e s  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  w 
-z 
I n i t i a l l y ,  it shou ld  be p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no t r u l y  )-s 
I b b  
" s i m i l a r "  c a s e s  t o  compare i n  Idaho. While o t h e r  s ta tes ,  most F 
n o t a b l y  C a l i f o r n i a ,  have exper ience  wi th  murder by t o r t u r e  con- 
v i c t i o n s ,  t h i s  i s  a c a s e  of  f i r s t  impression f o r  t h e  Idaho Supreme 
Court.  There fo re ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  compare cases i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  ex- 
c e s s i v e n e s s  of t h e  d e a t h  p e n a l t y ,  it i s  necessa ry  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  
few, b u t  i n c r e a s i n g l y  r e c e n t ,  c a p i t a l  cases  of  a d i f f e r e n t  n a t u r e  
i n  Idaho.  A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  a s t u d y  of t h e  murder by t o r t u r e  cases 
o f  o u r  s i s ter  s t a t e s ,  a l though n o t  b inding h e r e ,  i s  h e l p f u l  i n  
d i r e c t i n g  t h e  p roper  focus  of cons ide ra t ion .  
The f a c t s  of t h i s  u n f o m u n a t e ,  s e n s e l e s s  d e a t h  a r e  w e l l  
enumerated e lsewhere  i n  t h i s  b r i e f ,  and w i l l  n o t  be  b e l a b o r e d  
h e r e .  Turning t o  the ci rcumstances  of  r e c e n t  d e a t h  p e n a l t y  c a s e s  
i n  Idaho,  S t a t e  v. S ivak ,  Idaho I P.2d (is - 
-- 
sued August 1 5 ,  1983, op in ion  No. 118) b e a r s  c l o s e  s c r u t i n y .  
Sivak was convic ted  o f  t h e  b r u t a l  murder of Dixie Wilson, an  
a t t e n d a n t  a t  t h e  gas s t a t i o n  where Sivak had p r e v i o u s l y  worked. 
M s .  Wilson was r e p e a t e d l y  s t a b b e d  and s h o t ,  whi le  b e i n g  s e x u a l l y  
molested.  She was t h e n  l e f t  t o  d i e .  Although t h e  gas  s t a t i o n  
was robbed,  Sivak a p p a r e n t l y  h e l d  animosity toward M s .  Wilson 
and had c a l l e d  t o  i n q u i r e  who would be working on t h e  n i g h t  of  
, t h e  murder.  
The c a s e s  of  Thomas Creech should  be looked a t  n e x t .  I n  1 
S t a t e  v. Creech, 9 9  Idaho 779, 589 P.2d 1 1 4  (1979) ,  and S t a t e  v. 
Creech,  Idaho - ( i s s u e d  May 23, 1983,  ' - P.  2d t& C=, 
Idaho Supreme Court  No. 14480 and 15000) t h e  dean of I d a h o ' s  dea th  w 
row w a s  conv ic ted  of murdering a t o t a l  o f  t h r e e  p e o p l e ,  and sen- -4 w 
t e n c e d  t o  dea th  t w i c e  ( a l though  one was subsequent ly  v a c a t e d  i n  k b  333 
l i g h t  o f  Woodson v. North C a r o l i n a ,  428 8 .S .  280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 
49 L.Ed. 2d 944 (1976) ) . Creech'  s murders a r e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by 
Y cold-blooded,  methodica l  a c t i o n s .  Creech k i l l e d  two men who gave 
him a r i d e  whi le  h i t c h h i k i n g  i n  Creech I. I n  t h e  more r e c e n t  case ,  
Creech m e r c i l e s s l y  c rushed  t h e  s k u l l  of a  f e l l o w  inmate w h i l e  con- 
f i n e d  i n  t h e  maximum s e c u r i t y  s e c t i o n  of  t h e  Idaho S t a t e  Peni ten-  
t i a r y .  
I n  S t a t e  v.  L i n d q u i s t ,  9 9  Idaho 766, 539 P.2d 1 0 1  ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,  t h e  
d e f e n d a n t ,  i n  an e f f o r t  t o  a c q u i r e  insurance  b e n e f i t s ,  s h o t  a  
p r e g n a n t  woman s e v e r a l  t i m e s  and f i n i s h e d  h e r  o f f  by c lubb ing  h e r  
t o  d e a t h .  I n  S t a t e  v .  Osborn, 102 Idaho 4 0 5 ,  631 P.2d 187 (1981) , 
t h e  de fendan t  s h o t  a  co-worker f i v e  t imes ,  and e x t e n s i v e l y  b e a t  
I 
he r ,  before  depos i t i ng  h e r  p a r t i a l l y  c lo thed  body alongside a 
road. This b r u t a l i t y  was t o  s i l e n c e  t h e  v i c t i m ,  who th rea tened  
t o  inform on t h e  defendant f o r  a previous robbery offense .  
S imi l a r ly ,  i n  S t a t e  v. Gibson, Kootenai County Case Number 
F 2 9 4 7 0  (1983) and S t a t e  v. Parad is ,  Kootenai County Case Number 
F 29468  (1983) , t h e  co-defendants were convic ted  of  t h e  c a l c u l a t e d ,  
cold-blooded murder of  a woman who had witnessed them beat  h e r  
boyfriend t o  dea th .  
I n  S t a t e  v. Needs, 9 9  Idaho 883, 591 P.2d 1 3 0  ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,  t h e  
defendant was convicted of murdering h e r  husband, who was found 
decapi ta ted ,  s h o t ,  repeatedly  stabbed,  p a r t i a l l y  burned, and with- 
ou t  arms. The defendant had threatened t o  k i l l  t h e  vic t im,  and 
was h e r s e l f  a p rev ious ly  convicted murderer. This maniac w a s  
spared t h e  dea th  pena l ty  only because t h e r e  w a s ,  a t  t h e  t i m e ,  no 
v a l i d  first degree murder sentencing s t a t u t e  i n  Idaho. 
Against t h e  background of t h e s e  d i s g u s t i n g  crimes a g a i n s t  
s o c i e t y  we must compare another,  t h e  case  a t  bar .  It has never  
been contended t h a t  appe l lan t  i s  innocent of  a l l  wrongdoing. To 
t h e  con t r a ry ,  t h e  defense has admitted on numerous occasions t h a t  
Suar t  i s  a d i s t u r b e d  ind iv idua l .  H i s  involvement i n  the  dea th  of 
Robert Miller evidences d i s j o i n t e d ,  abnormal, c r imina l  behavior.  
Yet t h i s  i s  a unique case.  Robert Mi l l e r  d ied  from a blow t o  t h e  
s o l a r  plexus a r ea .  It i s  t h e  defense ' s  f i r m  b e l i e f ,  as  it has  
been from t h e  beginning,  t h a t  t h i s  f a t a l  i n j u r y  was not a product  
of t o r t u r e ,  bu t  of misguided at tempts t o  d i s c i p l i n e ,  gone t r a g i -  
c a l l y  awry. 
Because the re  was a complete lack of i n t e n t  t o  k i l l ,  t h e  
prosecut ion was forced t o  charge murder by t o r t u r e  i n  o r d e r  t o  
seek a convict ion f o r  f irst  degree murder. Under t h a t  c r ime ,  
t h e r e  need only be shown an i n t e n t  t o  t o r t u r e ,  not an i n t e n t  t o  
murder. The prosecution was succes s fu l  i n  persuading t h e  j u r y ,  
through a witness parade of former wives and g i r l f r i e n d s ,  t h a t  I 
S t u a r t  had an i n t e n t  t o  t o r t u r e .  The testimony of t h e s e  wi tnesses  
was s e n s a t i o n a l ,  but  highly suspec t  and l a r g e l y  uncorrobated.  It 
i s  permeated w i t h  a l l e g a t i o n s  of events  which occurred,  i f  a t  a l l ,  
i n  t h e  presence of only t h e  accused and h i s  accuser,  t h u s  impossible 
t o  con t rove r t .  
A l l  we know f o r  sure  i s  t h a t  Gene S t u a r t  h i t  Robert M i l l e r  
and then  rushed t h e  dying c h i l d  t o  t h e  h o s p i t a l .  I t  i s  c e r t a i n l y  
c h i l d  abuse. I t  i s  undoubtedly manslaughter. I t  i s ,  by t h e  j u r y ' s  
v e r d i c t ,  murder by t o r t u r e .  But does it compare w i t h  t h e  b r u t a l ,  
cold-blooded, methodical s l a y i n g s  o f  t h e  o t h e r  Idaho cases  r e s u l t -  
ing i n  t h e  death penal ty?  Objec t ive ly  it cannot. Gene S t u a r t  
d i d  n o t  wantonly k i l l  i n  t h e  methodical s t y l e  of Tom Creech. 
I S t u a r t  d i d  no t  murder i n  co ld  blood,  
and w i t h  contemplation,  a 
1 wi tnes s  t o  a previous crime as d i d  defendants,  Osborn, Gibson, 
l and Pa rad i s .  Nor d i d  S t u a r t  b r u t a l l y  mut i la te  a v ic t im i n  t h e  / 
manner o f  Needs, Lindquis t ,  and Sivak. The crime was no t  committed 
i n  connection with  a monetary goa l ,  as  per  Sivak and Lindquis t .  
However reprehensible  and r epu l s ive  t h e  beating dea th  of  a 
I 
t h r e e  y e a r  o l d  c h i l d  admit tedly  i s ,  it i s  no t  on t h e  same p l ane  
J a s  t h e  depraved,. heinous murders it must be compared t o .  Gene 
F r a n c i s  S t u a r t  shou ld  s u f f e r  f o r  h i s  crime. But t o  punish  h i m  
by d e a t h ,  i n  t h e  manner i n  Tom Creech and Lacey Sivak,  i s  d i s p r o -  
p o r t i o n a t e  and excess ive .  I t  i s  n o t  i n  accord  wi th  t h e  d i g n i t y  
of  man. 
A c a s e  w i t h  shock ing ly  similar f a c t s  t o  t h o s e  a t  b a r  w a s  
dec ided i n  C a l i f o r n i a  i n  1976. A Los Angeles County ju ry  found 
Cheryl S t e g e r  g u i l t y  of f i r s t  degree  murder by t o r t u r e .  S t e g e r  
had caused t h e  b r u t a l  d e a t h  of h e r  t h r e e  y e a r  o l d  s t e p d a u g h t e r .  
The d e a t h  was caused by a s e v e r e  trauma, b u t  t h e  c h i l d ' s  body was 
"covered from head t o  t o e  wi th  c u t s ,  b r u i s e s  and o t h e r  i n j u r i e s ,  
most o f  which c o u l d  on ly  have been caused by severe  blows." I t  b rn 
was a p p a r e n t  most of  t h e  i n j u r i e s  were s u s t a i n e d  i n  t h e  l a s t  month Clb 
o f  t h e  c h i l d ' s  l i f e .  People v. S t e g e r ,  16 Ca. 3d 539, 1 2 8  Ca l .  -4 w 
Rptr.  161,  546 P.2d 665 (1976).  
'a 
The C a l i f o r n i a  Supreme Court reduced t h e  sentence  t o  second 
degree  murder by f i n d i n g  t h e  b e a t i n g s  admin i s t e red  by d e f e n d a n t  
were a misguided,  i r r a t i o n a l  and t o t a l l y  u n j u s t i f i a b l e  a t t e m p t  a t  
d i s c i p l i n e .  The c o u r t  po in ted  o u t :  
" C h i l d - b a t t e r i n g  i s  a crime u n i v e r s a l l y  abhorred by 
c i v i l i z e d  s o c i e t i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  when i t  r e s u l t s  i n  
d e a t h .  Y e t  o u r  r e v u l s i o n  i s  based n o t  so much on t h e  
means o f  k i l l i n g ,  as on t h e  r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  a  defense-  
less ,  i n n o c e n t  l i f e  has  been des t royed .  I f  defendant ,  
i n s t e a d  o f  r e p e a t e d l y  b e a t i n g  h e r  s t e p c h i l d ,  had f a t a l l y  
s h o t  h e r  once  i n  t h e  head, it could  n o t  be claimed ser- 
i o u s l y  t h a t  t h e  shoo t ing  would be any less s u b j e c t  t o  
d e t e r r e n c e  o r  any l e s s  moral ly  o f f e n s i v e  than t h e  b e a t -  
i n g  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  case .  Yet t h e  s h o o t i n g  could n o t  b e  
c a t e g o r i z e d  as murder by means of  t o r t u r e .  Nos can 
d e f e n d a n t f  s conduct  h e r e ,  however d e p l o r a b l e  it appears  
t o  be." 
While t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  d e c i s i o n  i s  i n  no  way binding on t h i s  
c o u r t ,  it i s  i l l u s t r a t i v e  of  one c o u r t ' s  a t t e m p t  t o  r e c o n c i l e  a 
h o r r i b l e  and t r a g i c  d e a t h  w i t h i n  t h e  boundar ies  of a c i v i l i z e d  
s o c i e t y ' s  laws. I t  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i l l u s t r a t i v e  due t o  t h e  s i m i -  
l a r i t y  o f  f a c t s  and because a murder by t o r t u r e  conv ic t ion  h a s  
never  been reviewed i n  Idaho. The a p p e l l a n t  submits t h a t  a  com- 
p a r i s o n  o f  t h e  c a s e  a t  b a r  w i t h  t h e  d e c i s i o n  i n  S teger  and t h e  
v a r i o u s  Idaho d e a t h  p e n a l t y  c a s e s  mandates a  conclus ion  t h a t  the 
p e n a l t y  of d e a t h  i s  e x c e s s i v e  and d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  as t o  Gene 
F r a n c i s  S t u a r t .  A s  such,  it i s  i n  v i o l a t i o n  of  t h e  Eighth Amend- 
ment ' s  p r o h i b i t i o n  of c r u e l  and unusual  punishment. 
VII 
UNDER THE UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE CASE AT BAR, 
THE SENTENCING COURT'S FAILURE TO USE THE JURY IN THE SENTENCING 
PROCESS DENIED APPELLANT A JUST AND FAIR SENTENCE UNDER IDEALS u; 
ESPOUSED I N  THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. 
T h i s  c o u r t  h a s  r e c e n t l y  h e l d ,  i n  two cases reviewing t h e  
i m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  d e a t h  p e n a l t y ,  S t a t e  v. Sivak ,  Idaho, 
P. 2d ( i s s u e d  August 1 5 ,  1983) , and S t a t e  v. Creech,  
Idaho 
r -  P.2d ( i s s u e d  May 23, 1983) , t h a t  
t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  and Idaho C o n s t i t u t i o n s  do n o t  r e q u i r e  a  j u r y  
t o  impose t h e  u l t i m a t e  sen tence .  I n  S i v a k ,  t h e  c o u r t  s a i d  t h a t  
" judge s e n t e n c i n g  shou ld  l e a d  t o  g r e a t e r  c o n s i s t e n c y  i n  s e n t e n c i n g ,  
which i s  one o f  t h e  u l t i m a t e  g o a l s  i n  t h e  c a p i t a l  sen tenc ing  
scheme. " Q u o t i n g  from P r o f f i t t  v. F l o r i d a ,  4 2 8  U.S. 
S.Ct. 2960 ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,  reh .  den. 429  U.S. 875,  t h e  c o u r t  s a i d  " ' a  
t r i a l  judge i s  more exper ienced i n  s e n t e n c i n g  than  a  ju ry ,  and 
t h e r e f o r e  i s  b e t t e r  a b l e  t o  impose sentences  s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  
imposed i n  analogous ca se s  ' " . 
While t h i s  d i c t a  has l o g i c a l  persuas iveness ,  t h e  problem 
i n  t h i s  i n s t a n c e  i s  t h a t  t h e s e  are no analogous ca se s .  Because 
t h i s  c a s e  p r e sen t s  t h e  f i r s t  murder by t o r t u r e  conv i c t i on  b e f o r e  
t h i s  c o u r t  f o r  review, and because  t h e  i n t e n t  t o  t o r t u r e  was 
proven a t  t r i a l  on t h e  b a s i s  of uncorroborated tes t imony i n  t h e  
n a t u r e  o f  p ropens i ty  ev id ence ,  it i s  urged t h a t  a p p e l l a n t  shou ld  
have been  sentenced by a  j u r y  o f  h i s  pee rs .  
The t r i a l  c o u r t  no ted  i n  s en t enc ing  the  defendant t h a t  a l -  
though t h e  evidence p r e sen t ed  by wi tnesses  as t o  d e f e n d a n t ' s  p r i o r  e 
c3 
bad conduct  was p o t e n t i a l l y  un t rus twor thy ,  t h e  ju ry  had a s se s sed  C,a 
43 
t h e  c r e d i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  w i t n e s s e s  and determined t h a t  on t h e  whole b k  
the  w i t n e s s e s  were t r u t h f u l .  The j u ry ,  a s  t h e  c o u r t  p o i n t e d  ou t ,  bp. 4 
i s  n o t  r equ i r ed  t o  enumerate t h e  c r e d i b i l i t y  of each i n d i v i d u a l  
w i tne s s .  The courtwent on t o  l evy  t h e  death  pena l ty .  The obvious 
q u e s t i o n  t h a t  a r i s e s  i s  wheather o r  no t  t h e  ju ry ,  had t h e y  been 
charged wi th  t h e  du ty  of  s e n t e n c i n g  Gene w ran cis S t u a r t ,  would 
have imposed a  sentence  o f  d e a t h  based upon t h e  c r e d i b i l i t y  of 
t h e s e  same wi tnesses?  The j u r y  heard those  w i tne s se s  t e s t i f y .  
The j u r y  f u l f i l l e d  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  of  determining c r e d i b i l i t y  f o r  
pu rpose s  of conv ic t ion .  Y e t ,  it i s  a l l  t oo  p l a i n  t h a t  conv ic t ion  
and s en t enc ing  a r e  e n t i r e l y  d i s t i n c t  processes ,  r e q u i r i n g  e n t i r e l y  
d i s t i n c t  cons ide r a t i ons  and b a l a k i n g .  
C e r t a i n t l y  t h e  t r i a l  c o u r t  l i s t e n e d  t o  t h e  same tes t imony  
and can form an independent  assessment of c r e d i b i l i t y .  But a s  
J u s t i c e  Huntley p o i n t e d  o u t  i n  h i s  d i s s e n t i n g  opinion i n  Creech 
(adopt ing  by r e f e r e n c e )  , "because t h e  d e a t h  p e n a l t y  i s  'so pro- 
foundly d i f f e r e n t  from a l l  o t h e r  p e n a l t i e s , '  ... t h e  Eighth  Amend- 
ment a l s o  demands i n d i v i d u a l i z e d  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of t h e  p r o p r i e t y  
of t h e  d e a t h  s e n t e n c e  i n  every  c a p i t a l  case ... In  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  
t h e  jury  i s  i n d i s p e n s a b l e  i n  e n s u r i n g  t h a t  s o c i e t y  does indeed 
seek r e t r i b u t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  de fendan t .  .." 
It i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  jury i n  t h i s  c a s e  would have f e l t  
s t r o n g l y  enough abou t  t h e  c r u c i a l  w i t n e s s e s '  v e r a c i t y  t o  impose 
t h e  dea th  p e n a l t y .  It  i s  e q u a l l y  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  same j u r y  
@ 
would have, a l t h o u g h  conv ic t ing  de fendan t ,  wavered i n  imposing C3 
dea th  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  such tes t imony.  T h i s  i s  a  concern t o  be W 
4 
reckoned w i t h  i n  l i g h t  of  t h e  Xi-ghth Amendment import w i t h  t h e  
" d i g n i t y  of man". A s  J u s t i c e  Huntley s t a t e d  i n  t h e  Creech, d i s -  CD 
s e n t ,  " t h e s e  concerns  a r e  even more compel l ing  where l i f e  s t a n d s  
immediately i n  t h e  balance".  
It i s  r e s p e c t f u l l y  submit ted t h a t ,  under  t h e  p e c u l i a r  f a c t s  
of t h i s  c a s e ,  Gene Franc i s  S t u a r t  should  n o t  have been sentenced 
by t h e  t r i a l  judge,  bu t  r a t h e r  by a  j u r y  o f  h i s  p e e r s ,  r e p r e s e n t -  
i n g  r e l i a b l e  communal va lues ,  and c a r e f u l l y  weighing t h e  c r e d i -  
b i l i t y  o f  uncor robora ted  wi tnesses  i n  t h e  s e n t e n c i n g  p rocess .  . 
V I I I  
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED I N  W F U S I N G  TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER BY TORTUm. 
Appel lan t  r eques ted  t h a t  t h e  j u r y  be i n s t r u c t e d  on t h e  
l e s s e r  inc luded o f f e n s e  of second degree  murder by t o r t u r e .  To 
t h i s  t h e  c o u r t  r e f u s e d .  I t  would seem c l e a r ,  n o t  only  i n  sound 
l o g i c ,  but  based upon a  subsequent d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  d e c i s i o n  i n  
t h e  S t a t e  o f  Idaho, t h a t  a lesser o f f e n s e  o f  second degree  murder 
by t o r t u r e  does e x i s t .  
1 It appears  t h a t  Idaho Code 5 18-4001 r e q u i r e s ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  
, 
suppor t  a c o n v i c t i o n  f o r  f i r s t  degree  murder by t o r t u r e ,  t h e r e  
! 
i must e x i s t  an i n t e n t  t o  t o r t u r e  wi th  a s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t  t o  cause  
s u f f e r i n g .  Without a  f i n d i n g  of s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t  t o  cause  s u f f e r -  
i n g ,  a  jury  would be  ha rd  p ressed  t o  f i n d  i n  f a v o r  of murder i n  
t h e  f i r s t  degree .  Indeed,  a  r e c e n t  Idaho D i s t r i c t  Court d e c i s i o n  fi 
m 
r e f l e c t s  such a  f i n d i n g .  The c a s e  of S t a t e  v. Matthews, Case w 
No. 11074, Ada County, J. Schroeder  (Memorandum Opinions and -4 
+f. 
Order ,  f i l e d  March 2 ,  1983) involved a  murder charge  brought  &b- a3 
under  Idaho Code 5 18-4001. There t h e  c o u r t  found t h a t  t h e  
tor ture-murder  s t a t u t e  r e q u i r e d  a  f i n d i n g  o f  s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t  
t o  cause  s u f f e r i n g .  However, t h e  c o u r t  a l s o  found t o  e x i s t  a  
lesser inc luded  o f f e n s e  of second degree  murder by t o r t u r e  when 
t h e r e  a r e  a c t s  o f  extreme and prolonged b r u t a l i t y  bu t  a f a i l u r e  
t o  prove  a  s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t  t o  cause  s u f f e r i n g .  
One must admit  t h a t  t h i s  case  d e a l s  w i t h  a  n o v e l t y ,  t h e  
tor ture-murder  cha rge .  However t h e  r e a l  problem a r i s e s  when 
t h a t  nove l ty  i s  a p p l i e d  a s  a  s o l u t i o n  t o  what s a d l y  i s  becoming 
a n  i n c r e a s i n g  phenomena i n  our  s o c i e t y ;  c h i l d  abuse. I n  e f f e c t  
t h a t  i s  what i s  b e i n g  done he re ;  applying t h e  tor ture-murder  
s t a t u t e  t o  s t e m  t h e  a c t i o n s  of  c h i l d  abuse. I t  i s  hard  t o  p o i n t  
t o  a s i n g l e - o v e r r i d i n g  cause  o r  reason f o r  c h i l d  abuse.  How- 
e v e r ,  it i s  arguable  t h a t  i n  t h e  v a s t  m a j o r i t y  o f  cases c h i l d  
abuse  may n o t  be t h e  end r e s u l t  of an i n t e n t  t o  k i l l ,  o r  an  
i n t e n t  t o  t o r t u r e .  These though t s  may be t h e  f u r t h e s t  t h i n g  
from t h e  mind of  t h e  abuse r .  I n  those  i n s t a n c e s ,  t h e  t o r t u r e  
murder charge may n o t  be t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  means t o  c o n v i c t .  
The abuser  acts f o r  r easons  unknown, b u t  n o t  w i t h  t h e  
s p e c i f i c  i n t e n t  t o  t o r t u r e  o r  cause s u f f e r i n g .  For  t h e s e  s i t u -  
a t i o n s ,  it i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  have a l e s s e r  i n c l u d e d  o f f e n s e  o f  
second degree murder by t o r t u r e .  And, i n  t h i s  i n s t a n c e ,  which 
i n v o l v e d  a c t s  o f  d i s c i p l i n e  t o  t h e  p o i n t  of abuse  o v e r  an ex- 
t ended  pe r iod  o f  t i m e ,  it may weel be w i t h i n  t h e  purview of a 
lesser offense .  A t  l e a s t ,  t h e  ju ry  should have been i n s t r u c t e d  
on and given a chance t o  f i n d  such an o f f e n s e .  
It seems t o  be t h e  w e l l  s e t t l e d  r u l e  i n  Idaho  as i n  o t h e r  
j u r i s d i c t i o n s  t h a t  where t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  r e a s o n a b l e  view of t h e  
ev idence  t o  s u p p o r t  a f i n d i n g  of a l e s s e r  o f f e n s e ,  t h e  j u r y  must 
be i n s t r u c t e d  accord ing ly .  
"The c o u r t  s h a l l  i n s t r u c t  t h e  ju ry  on lesser i n c l u d e d  
o f f e n s e s  when t h e y  a r e  supported by any r e a s o n a b l e  
view of t h e  evidence .  This  c o u r t  on s e v e r a l  o c c a s i o n s  
h a s  cons t rued  t h e  work ' s h a l l '  a s  be ing mandatory and 
n o t  d i s c r e t i o n a r y . "  S t a t e  v .  Lopez, 100 I d a h o  -99, 102,  
593, P. 2d 1003,  1006 (1979) .  See a l s o  Uni ted  S t a t e s  
v. Burffos. 579, P.2d 747  (2nd C i r .  1978) .  
I n  cases  i n v o l v i n g  d e a t h  of  c h i l d r e n ,  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  paren- 
t a l  abuse,  t h e r e  may d e f i n i t e l y  e x i s t  a need f o r  t h e  charge  of 
second degree murder by t o r t u r e .  The evidence  i n  t h e  Fase a t  
b a r ,  be l i eved  i n  i t s  e n t i r e t y ,  may have suppor ted  a  c o n v i c t i o n  
of second degree murder. So, t h e  a p p e l l a n t  was e n t i t l e d  t o  have 
t h e  jury  i n s t r u c t e d  as  t o  such l e s s e r  included of fense .  
THE MANNER I N  WHICH THE TRIAL COURT RULED ON APPELLmTIS 
PFU3-TRIAL MOTION I N  LIMINE PmJUDICED APPELLANT'S ABILITY T O  
ADEQUATELY PREPARF: F O R  PRESENTATION OF STATE'S EVIDENCE AT 
TRIAL. 
To p rope r ly  address t he  d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  which appe l l an t  
was faced concerning the  testimony of a l l e g e d  p r i o r  conduct, 
e n t i r e l y  un re l a t ed  t o  the  death  of Robert Mi l l e r ,  one must 
examine t h e  course  of proceedings s e c t i o n  of t h i s  b r i e f .  I n  
doing s o ,  t h e  c o u r t ' s  a t t e n t i o n  i s  d i r e c t e d  t o  the  hear ing he ld  
11 March, 1982. The purpose of t h i s  hea r ing  was t o  render  a  
dec i s ion  on an e a r l i e r  defense Motion t o  Dismiss t h e  Information,  
based upon Idaho Code 5 19-815A. E s s e n t i a l l y  the  p r i o r  Motion 
t o  D i s m i s s  concerned i t s e . l f  wi th  a d m i s s i b i l i t y  of t h i s  tes t imony,  
and urged t h e  d i s t r i c t  cour t  t o  review t h e  prel iminary hea r ing  
t r a n s c r i p t  where such testimony was used i n  enormous d e t a i l  t o  
support  t h e  Mag i s t r a t e ' s  dec i s ion  t o  bind appe l lan t  over t o  d i s -  
t r i c t  c o u r t  f o r  t r i a l .  
On March 11, 1 9 8 2 ,  t h e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  announced t h a t  de- 
f endan t ' s  Motion t o  D i s m i s s  was denied.  Following colloquy be- 
tween t h e  c o u r t  and counsel i n  chambers, which i s  ind i ca t ed  i n  
t h e  record  of  t h i s  hearing,  defense  counsel  was urged t o  f i l e  
a  Mobion i n  Limine inasmuch a s  t h e  t r i a l  judge ind ica ted  t h a t  
some o f  t h i s  testimony would be pe rmis s ib l e ,  while some would 
not  be allowed, Af t e r  defense counsel had expressed h i s  dilemma 
a t  being uncer ta in  concerning what por t ions  of t h i s  test imony 
would be allowed, t h e  t r i a l  cour t  suggested t h a t  a  Motion i n  
Limine be f i l e d ,  t h a t  add i t i ona l  b r i e f s  be submitted i n  suppor t  
and opposi t ion t h e r e t o ,  and an ind ica t ion  would then be given 
counsel f o r  appe l lan t  a s  t o  what por t ions  of  t h i s  test imony were 
improperly admitted i n  t h e  opinion of t h e  t r i a l  judge. (See 
Transcr ip t  of March 1 2 ,  1982 Hearing, p. 6 ,  l i n e s  11-15). 
The rea f t e r ,  on May 2 7 ,  1982 defendant f i l e d  a  Motion i n  
&a- 
Limine i n  accordance with t h e  d i r e c t i v e  of t h e  c o u r t  on March C D  
11, 1 9 8 2 .  S t a t e d  on t h e  Motion i n  Limine i t s e l f  was t h e  defense b b  
-4 
opinion t h a t  t h e  same w a s  being f i l e d  a t  t h e  d i r e c t i v e  of t h e  t-h 
cn 
Court. 
Following submi6sion of b r i e f s  by counsel  f o r  t h e  defense  
and counsel  f o r  t h e  S t a t e ,  a  hear ing was he ld  on t h e  defense 
Motion i n  Limine on Ju ly  15 ,  1982. In s t ead  of proceeding through 
t h e  t r a n s c r i p t  and g iv ing  t h e  defense a c l e a r  understanding of 
h i s  views concerning relevance of t h i s  tes t imony,  a s  i n d i c a t e d  
a t  t h e  March 11, 1982 hear ing ,  t h e  t r i a l  c o u r t  on J u l y  15 ,  1982 
denied t h e  defense Motion i n  Limine i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  he was no t  
prepared t o  inform t h e  defense t h a t  anything i n  p a r t i c u l a r  would 
be excluded.  (See Transcr ip t  of Ju ly  15,  1982 hear ing ,  p. 9 ,  
l i n e s  2 2  and 23) .  Judge Schwam was c l e a r l y  t roub led  by t h e  
p r e j u d i c i a l  e f f e c t  t h i s  testimony would have upon t h e  tr ier o f  
f a c t  as  w e l l  a s  ques t ion ing  se r ious ly .  t h e  re levance  of t h i s  
proposed testimony. (See Ju ly  15,  1982 T r a n s c r i p t ,  p. 11, l i n e s  
2 ,  3 ,  and 4 ) .  
I t  i s  c l e a r  from t h e  comments o f  counsel  a t  t h e  J u l y  1 5 ,  
1982 h e a r i n g  t h a t  t h e  de fense  w a s  uncer ta in  a s  t o  what p r e c i s e l y  
it would be f a c i n g  a t  t h e  forthcoming t r i a l .  A f t e r  cons ide rab le  
d i s c u s s i o n  concerning t h e  unpred ic tab le  n a t u r e  o f  evidence t o  be 
faced by t h e  d e f e n s e  a t  t r i a l ,  counsel  f o r  d e f e n d a n t  i n d i c a t e d  . 
t h a t ,  i n  l i g h t  o f  t h e  c o u r t ' s  r e f u s a l  t o  d e l i n e a t e  which p o r t i o n s  
of  t h i s  tes t imony would be pe rmi t t ed ,  i n v e s t i g a t i v e  a s s i s t a n c e  
would be needed. (See T r a n s c r i p t  of  J u l y  15 ,  1982 Hearing,  p. 
tth 
12 ,  l i n e s  22-25). The c o u r t  expressed a  r e l u c t a n c e  t o  p rov ide  @3 
t h e  de fense  i n v e s t i g a t i v e  a s s i s t a n c e  a t  t h a t  t i m e ,  however a l l o -  W 
c a t e d  Three Hundred D o l l a r s  ($300.00) i n  t r a v e l  expense f o r  de- W 
Cn 
f e n d a n t ' s  counsel  on August 1 2 ,  1982 a f t e r  d e f e n d a n t  had f i l e d  Wf 
A f f i d a v i t s  concerning t h e  purpose and scope of  h i s  i n v e s t i g a t i v e  
i n q u i r y .  F i n a l l y ,  a t  t h e  conclus ion  of t h e  h e a r i n g  h e l d  J u l y  1 5 ,  
1982, t h e  c o u r t  set t r i a l  t o  commence October 4 ,  1982. 
One need o n l y  review t h e  t r a n s c r i p t  of  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  hear- 
i n g  h e l d  i n  t h i s  m a t t e r  t o  observe t h e  p o s i t i o n  t h e  defense  was 
p laced  i n  a f t e r  t h e  h e a r i n g  he ld  J u l y  15 ,  1982. No t r i a l  d a t e  
had been e s t a b l i s h e d  and defendant  had e v e r y  r e a s o n  t o  expec t  
t h a t  h e  would be  f o r c e d  t o  defend himself  a g a i n s t  a c c u s a t i o n s  
concerning o f f e n s e s  o c c u r r i n g ,  i f  a t  a l l ,  o v e r  a p e r i o d  o f  t e n  
y e a r s .  The p o t e n t i a l  wi tnesses  t o  impeach such  test imony were 
n e a r l y  a l l  ou t  of  s t a t e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n s o f a r  as S h a r i e  Dal ly ,  
Theresa  Jacobson, and Vickie  Nelson were concerned.  S ince  t h e  
most inflamrpatory t e s t imony  was given by Theresa  Jacobson and 
Vick ie  Nelson a t  t h e  p r e l im ina ry  hear ing,  defense counsel  s e a -  
sonab le  expected that much of t h i s  test imony would n o t  be p e r -  
m i t t e d  a t  tr ial .  I n  l i g h t  of t h e  c o u r t ' s  r u l i n g  on Ju ly  1 5 ,  
1982 however, t h e  de fense  was placed i n t o  a  pos tu r e  of uncer-  
t a i n t y .  This u n c e r t a i n t y  was compounded by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a 
t r i a l  d a t e  was scheduled fo l lowing t h e  hear ing  on J u l y  15 ,  1982, 
and on ly  l i m i t e d  i n v e s t i g a t i v e  a s s i s t a n c e  was t o  be given t h e  
de fendan t  who was i n d i g e n t .  
It i s  we l l  s e t t l e d  i n  American Ju r i sp rudence ,  t h a t  b o t h  
s i d e s  i n  any l i t i g a t i o n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  of a  c r im ina l  n a t u r e ,  should  
be p rope r ly  informed a s  t o  what evidence faces  them a t  t r i a l ,  
l ong  be fo r e  t r i a l  commences. This  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  case  when 
ev idence  of a  h igh ly  p r e j u d i c i a l  na tu r e  and extremely inflamma- 
t o r y  t o  t h e  j u r y  i s  i n t ended  t o  be p resen ted  by t h e  s t a t e .  
As t h e  Oregon Court  o f  Appeals s u c c i n c t l y  s t a t e d :  
"Evidence which carries an unusual p o t e n t i a l  f o r  p r e j u -  
d i c e  should be r u l e d  upon p r e l i m i n a r i l y  p r i o r  t o  t r i a l  
i n  the c a s e  o f  s t a t e ' s  evidence..  ." State v. S t an l ey ,  
30 OR. App. 33, 566 P.2d 193, 196 (1977). See a l s o  
S t a t e  v.-hick, 226  Kan. 308, 597  P.2d 1108 (1979).  
For  t h e  reasons  a f o r e s t a t e d ,  appe l l an t  urges t h e  Court  t o  
c o n s i d e r  the  p r e j u d i c i a l  e f f e c t  t h e  t r i a l  c o u r t ' s  d e n i a l  o f  t h e  
de f ense  Motion i n  Limine had upon defendan t ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  ade- 
q u a t e l y  p repare  f o r  t r i a l .  
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRXAL AS GUAR- 
ANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE 
STATE O F  IDAHO. 
On September 10 ,  1982, pursuant  t o  Idaho Code 5 19-3501 ( 2 )  , 
defendant f i l e d  a Motion t o  Dismiss upon t h e  ground t h a t  h e  was 
depr ived of h i s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g h t  t o  a speedy t r i a l  a s  s e t  
f o r t h  i n  t h e  S ix th  Amendment t o  t h e  United S t a t e s  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
and i n  A r t i c l e  I ,  5 13 of t h e  Cons t i tu t ion  of t h e  S t a t e  of Idaho. 
The Motion a l leged t h a t  defendant had been incarcera ted  a t o t a l  
o f  two hundred s i x t y  t h r e e  days i n  addi t ion t o  n ine ty  days spent 
a t  t h e  Idaho Secur i ty  Medical F a c i l i t y  under a mental eva lua t ion  
r eques t  tendered by t h e  defense .  On September 30, 1982 t h e  t r i a l  
c o u r t  summarily denied t h i s  defense Motion, without a formal show- b b  
03 
i n g  o f  good cause f o r  t h e  de lay  on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  s t a t e .  
t-r, 
Idaho Code 5 19-3501(2) reads  as follows: 
"WHEN ACTION MAY BE DISMISSED - The cour t ,  un l e s s  good 
cause t o  t h e  con t r a ry  i s  shown, must order t h e  prosecu- 
t i o n  o r  indictment t o  be dismissed,  i n  t h e  fol lowing 
cases  : 
(2)  I f  a defendant,  whose t r i a l  has not been postponed 
upon h i s  app l i ca t ion ,  i s  n o t  brought t o  t r i a l  w i th in  
s i x  months from t h e  d a t e  t h a t  t h e  indictment o r  inform- 
a t i o n  i s  f i l e d  wi th  t h e  cou r t . "  
Un t i l  Ju ly  15, 1982, no t r i a l  da te  had been s e t .  Not u n t i l  
August 30, 1982 was t h e  p lace  o f  t r i a l  publ ic ly  e s t a b l i s h e d .  A t  
no t ime during these  proceedings d id  defendant eve r  make a request  
f o r  continuance of h i s  t r i a l .  The only motion which conceivably 
would have delayed t r i a l ,  and which was f i l e d  by t h e  defendant ,  
was t h e  Notice of I n t e n t  t o  Rely on t h e  Affirmative Defense of 
Mental Disease o r  Defect f i l e d  December 4 ,  1981. As  defendant 
had n o t  been examined by a s t a t e  p s y c h i a t r i s t ,  defense  counsel  
reques ted  and an order  was en t e red  on February 11, 1982 f o r  t r ans -  
p o r t a t i o n  of defendant t o  t he  Secu r i t y  Medical F a c i l i t y  a t  t he  
Idaho S t a t e  Pen i t en t i a ry  f o r  purposes of conducting a  mental  
eva lua t ion .  Defendant spent  n i n e t y  days a t  the Secur i ty  Medical 
F a c i l i t y ,  r e tu rn ing  t o  Clearwater County on May 13, 1982. De- 
f e n d a n t ' s  Motion t o  D i s m i s s  on t h e  b a s i s  of  a  denia l  of h i s  
r i g h t s  t o  a speedy t r i a l  s e t  f o r t h  a  per iod  of i nca rce ra t ion  
w e l l  i n  excess of s i x  months a f t e r  the  f i l i n g  of t he  informa- 
t i o n ,  d e s p i t e  s u b t r a c t i n g  t h e  n i n e t y  days defendant, spen t  a t  
t h e  Idaho Secu r i t y  Medical F a c i l i t y  i n  Boise. 
This cou r t  has  held  t h a t ,  when a  c r imina l  defendant h a s  made 
* 
a  prima f a c i e  showing t h a t  h i s  r i g h t  t o  a  speedy t r i a l  has  been C-3 
v i o l a t e d  under Idaho Code 5 19-3501, t h e  burden i s  then c a s t  upon W 
-4 
t h e  s t a t e  t o  show "good cause" f o r  the  delay.  S t a t e  v. Hobson, 
99 Idaho 2 0 0 ,  579 P.2d 697 (1978).  See a l s o  Olson v. S t a t e ,  
92 Idaho 8 7 3 ,  452 P.2d 764  (1969). 
Appellant  does not  suggest t o  t h i s  cour t  t h a t  s t a t e ' s  coun- 
s e l  w a s  respons ib le  for any d i l a t o r y  conduct and does n o t  wish 
t h e  cou r t  t o  garner  t h i s  impression. Under I.C. 19-3501, however, 
t h e  s t a t e  must make a  showing o f  good cause f o r  t he  de l ay ,  once 
a prima f a c i e  showing of a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of t h i s  Code Sec t ion  i s  
presen ted  by t h e  defendant. This  was n o t  ordered and i n s t e a d  
defendant ' s  r i g h t s  t o  a  speedy t r i a l  a s  guaranteed by t h e  Con- 
s t i t u t i o n  of  t h e  United S t a t e s  a s  wel l  as  the  Cons t i tu t ion  of 
t h e  S t a t e  of  Idaho,  was denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Appe l l an t  cannot  argue s t r o n g l y  enough h i s  f i rm b e l i e f  t h a t ,  
from t h e  ve ry  o u t s e t  of t h i s  m a t t e r ,  h e  w a s  p laced i n  a  l e g a l l y  
un tenab le  p o s i t i o n  t o  adequate ly  and e f f e c t i v e l y  defend h imse l f  
a g a i n s t  t h e  s t a t e ' s  charges .  From t h e  t i m e  o f  f i l i n g  of t h e  
o r i g i n a l  Complaint,  u n t i l  s en tenc ing  i n  t h i s  m a t t e r ,  a p p e l l a n t ' s  
f a t e  was s e a l e d  and i n  f a c t  dec ided by t h e  media and p u b l i c  
op in ion  in f l amed  the reby ,  wi thout  any of  t h e  s u b s t a n t i v e  proce-  
d u r a l  s a f e g u a r d s  given t h e  c r i m i n a l l y  accused by t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  I& 
Ca 
o f  t h e  United S t a t e s  and of  t h e  S t a t e  of  Idaho.  
)4 
Based upon t h e  foregoing A u t h o r i t i e s ,  and t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  4 
t-L 
t o  t h e  f a c t s  o f  t h e  c a s e  a t  b a r ,  a p p e l l a n t  s t r enuous ly  u r g e s  t h i s  Cn 
4 
c o u r t  t o  v a c a t e  h i s  conv ic t ion  e n t e r e d  by j u r y  v e r d i c t  on October  
1 4 ,  1982, and o r d e r  a  new t r i a l ,  p e r m i t t i n g  only  t h a t  evidence  
which i s  l e g a l l y  d e f e n s i b l e  and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  p e r m i s s i b l e  t o  
be used by t h e  s t a t e .  
I n  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  a p p e l l a n t  r e s p e c t f u l l y  r e q u e s t s  t h a t  
t h i s  m a t t e r  be  remanded t o  t h e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  f o r  f u r t h e r  pro-  
ceedings  i n  accordance w i t h  t h i s  c o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n  based upon ' 
t h e  f a c t s  and l a w  as s e t  f o r t h  above. i' 
DATED t h i s  day of 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I ,  Robert  E. Kinney, At to rney .  f o r  Appe l l an t ,  hereby c e r t i f y  
t h a t  on I t h e  7 day of September, 1983 ,  I se rved  a  copy o f  t h e  
fo rego ing  A p p e l l a n t ' s  Br ie f  by m a i l i n g  a  t r u e  and c o r r e c t  copy,  
pos tage  p r e p a i d ,  
O f f i c e  o f  t h e  A t t  
Bo i se ,  Idaho 8370 
t o  Mr 
orney 
1. 
Lynn 
Gener 
E. Thomqs, DuQ Attorney Genera l ,  
atehouse 

APPENDIX 
The fol lowing pages a r e  t r u e  and c o r r e c t  photocopies of 
newspaper coverage given a p p e l l a n t ' s  t r i a l  by t h e  Lewiston 
Morning Tribune,  a  d a i l y  newspaper w i th  i t s  o f f i c e s  a t  Lewis ton,  
Idaho and which c i r c u l a t e s  commonly in t h e  Moscow, Idaho a r e a .  
Add i t i ona l l y ,  t h e  fo l lowing inc lude  phatocopies of coverage 
given a p p e l l a n t ' s  t r i a l  from October 5 ,  1982 u n t i l  October 1 4 ,  
1 9 8 2  by t h e  Dai ly  Idahonian, a d a i l y  newspaper p r i n t e d  and 
c i r c u l a t e d  i n  Moscow, Idaho. 
-- - 
Lewiston Morning Tribunway, October 5, 1982 
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k Jury selection resumes 
in Stuart murder trial ', 
By David Johnson 
of the Trlbune 
MOSCOW - Jury selection in the Gene 
Stuart murder trial will resume at 9 a.m. 
today, w ~ t h  prosecution and defense 
attorneys attempting to choose a 12- 
member panel from a group of some SO 
prospective jurors. 
Stuart, a 31-year-old auto-body repair 
man from Orofino, is charged with firsr- 
degree murder by torture in connection 
with the Sept. 19,1981, death of 3-year-old 
Robert Miller, the son of the women with 
whom Sruart was living. 
According to the criminal corrlplaint, 
which was read to all prospective jurors 
in Second District Court here Monday, 
Stuart allegedly caused the bliller c t~~ld ' s  
death. An autopsy, according to testl- 
mony a t  the preliminary hearing last 
November, showed that the Miller boy 
died of internal bleeding from a severe 
blow or blows to the abdomen. 
A change of venue from Orofino to Mos- 
cow was granted earlier by District Judge 
Andrew Schwam after Stuart's attorney, 
Clearwater  County Public Defender 
Robert Kinney, contended that pre-trial 
publicity would make it impossible to 
assemble an impartial jury at Orofino. 
h n e y  speculated that a jury may be 
selected today. He and Clearwater Coun- 
ty Prosecutor Steve Calhoun carefully 
questioned prospective jurors through- 
out the day Monday. 
, m~nal  matter there. Both the pro- 
secution and defense have investi- 
.gated circumstances not only sur- 
. rounding the Miller child's death, 
but also involving Stuart's past. 
The trial is expected to last ab- 
. out two weeks. 
. . B o t h  Kinney  and  Calhoun 
. .warned the prospective jurors that 
the trial may be "highly emotion- 
al." They questioned each person 
about  the i r  feelings on child- 
rearing and discipline, corporal 
Schwam dismissed two p r~spec t ive  
women jurors for cause. One woman said 
she had received information about the 
case through the news media, talked with 
her mother-in-law about thewatter and a t  
one time had formed an opinion about 
Stuart's innucence or guilt. The other 
woman &id she was uncertain whether 
she could cope with the kind of evidence 
that is expected to be brought out at the 
trial and remain unbiased. , 
"Much of the evidence may be un- 
pleasant," Calhoun warned each prospec- 
tive juror questioned. . 
Kinney last week moved that the jury, 
once assembled, be sequesrered. Schwanl 
denied that motion, but hasalreadya~lrno- 
nished all prospective jurors ro not dis- 
cuss rhe case or read or listen to any news 
accounts about the trial. 
Sruart appeared in court wearing a pin- 
striped gray suit and sat at Kinney's side 
throughout the questioning Mollday. Kin- 
nay repeatedly asked the pl-ospective 
jurors whether they agreed that Stuart, 
unless he is proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, must be considered in- 
nocent. All the jurors questioned said 
they would wait until after both the pro- 
secution and defense rested their cases to 
form any opinions about the evidence. 
Clearwater County authoritibs say the 
Stuarr case has involved. the most exhaus- 
tiveinvestigation ever conducted in a cri- 
See Jury, Page 68 
punishment, marital relationships, 
child abuse and physical violence. 
Most of the jurors questioned said 
they favored corporal punishment 
a s  a "last resort" and all said they 
had used it on their own children at 
one time or  another. 
In order for Stuart to ,be con-. 
victed of first-degree murder, the 
prosecution must prove that the 
defendant tortured the Miller boy 
and that death resulted, according 
to Idaho law. 
Lewislon Morning Tr lbune ,Wednesddy  Oclooer 6, 1982 
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Nurse tells 
of efforts 
... t o  save boy 
By David Johnson 
01 y* Tlcbun 
M O S C O W - T + S I I ~ U ~ ~  tn the 
Geno Rnncis S t u n  murder 
trial k y a n  Tucrdry t n . S c m d  
Dirtrict Court here with a reg. 
intered nurac idenl~fyiny the 
dcie~ldant a s  t l ~ e  I I U ~  who 
brought n "Ufelers" 3.ywruld 
Ruben Miller to the rmrryency 
r w n l  ut Orufinu's Cl~urwater 
Vulley Hospitd un Seyt. 19. 
l 9 B l  
Stunrc, a 31-ycnruld auto 
w y  rrpatr man frotn Oruflno. 
w charsed with murder by tur- 
lure i l l  co~~necltun with t l ~ r  Mil- 
ler child's death. He ullr~erlly 
#truck Ihe buy rrpcatrdly. 
a ~ r t h n y  to tllr crimitral cum- 
plaint. 
"1 heard rumrbody yclling 
and shaking the dmr. trying to 
yet in," u i d  Jesar hlrchlicty, u 
reyivtsrsd nurrc whu raid he 
wra wurkinp in the rcslrlrutury 
rl~ernyy secttun uf thr l~osytlal 
wlrui S l u n  rrrrvsd, cacryiny 
llsc hllller cltild In t~ba -tta... 
hlechJii~d dsrW!bsd lire 1%)' a! 
r cat . rl!':.: znJ7imp.- -' 
tr~!rmorly came shonly 
r f l r ~  a 12-memltrr jury, madr 
up ut f ~ v c  men and seven 
I romcn,  r;arselac~ed to htarrht  c a s t .  Oncnlmandawomanmlw were ch~rscn asrllernate jurors. 
"Thr rvidence is puing lu be 
i unplrasant, but it ir e~~idence thrl must be considered." Clrsrwatrr County Proriecutur Steve Culhoun told the jury dur- 
fender ii;n;rt K~nnry reserved I I t ~ r  oprnag comments for laler 
i In lhr  lrtal 
I Calhoun lold lhe jury that he 
m'~li call more than a dozen wil. 
nrrrer in htseffon lopruvethat 
S tuan  had a htstory of abuslvc 
behavior toward others and that 
hc intended to torture the htiller 
child. One of the srtnesses uVill 
be Roben kfiller'r mother, 
Kuthte Miller, usho was Ilving 
w ~ t h  Swart a t  h e  rime of the 
child's dmth. 
The trtal IS being held in Mor- 
cow after Second Dinr l c~  Judge 
Andrew SchuUam ordered a 
change of venue from Omfino. 
Kinney m o ~ c d  lor the venue I change on grounds Lha1 il w3nuld 
be impossible to sssemble an 
impanla1 jury within the cir. 
Tribune. The Trlbune nnd I several other n e w  organta-  
rions gave enensive co\'erage 
ro Scwn's p r e l i m ~ r y  hearing 
bn November. 
I jnnes  ohjectcd to the trial i bring hkd in Moscow, since !he Tribune circulrtes here, but Schwam maintained that a jury could bt found. Jurv selection 
ultimarely lasred jist one m d  ! one Wf.da)*c. with Ihc jurors 
! taktnp then wth st 2:lS p.m. 
T unrde! 
, In add~tion lo Mechl111g. 
Colhtrun ullcd nurrr hlar? Ijay 
( ' 0 1 1 ~  d>a mltncs$. ('ullr u*asulrc# 
oq duty at Clcbrwirter Yrllr). 
ln.$p.ta: H-11rn Stubrl hrblught 
Y;:icr child to thc e m r p c n  
cy room. 
MecNing testified that he. 
Cone m d  other hospitsl staff 
members tned In vain for some 
30 to 40 minutes to revive the 
Millerchild. Hesaid he checked 
for pulse and other \ital signs, 
but found none. He also n l d  the 
boy had a number of bruises. 
including some 20 small. round 
bruises on his chesr. Mechline 
said ' there were additional 
b ru tes  on the boy's right h p  
und his forehead. 
l lndrr  cross examination by 
Knnry. M r c h l l n ~  said Stuan 
was " v r p  demanding and very 
scnrrd." He  satd Slvhrl 
apprsred to k wnccrntd about 
the child and kept demandine 
that the emergeocy toam staff 
do  sometlung. 
Kinney questioned Mechlmg 
enens~vclg about the boy's v11. 
al signs. Mcchling uud thar a! 
no time did he find any sign or 
lile. He said that after the child 
was pronounced dead, he tned 
to get a temperature from the 
body but no temperaorre reg- 
istered on tha lhermomcter 
CIlhoun told the jury dur~ng 
his opnlng sta!emenl that thc 
stale will prove that S t u n  used 
various m a n s  of severe 
punishment to d~sclpl~nr  The 
Miller bos.includrng spankings 
and cold shnu,ers. The prosecu. 
Gene F r a n c i s  Stuart 
tor ratd a pathoiogisl who con- 
ducted an auropsy on the child 
M.III testlh, thar the bog dted of 
~nternal  blecd~ng frorr a tom 
Itver caused bga severe blow or  
blows totbe abdomen by a blunt 
object. 
According to Idaho law, the' 
prosecurlon must prove thal 
Sruan tonurcd the Miller child 
m d  thar dwth  resulted Much 
of the state's case is expected to 
rrvolvc around Ihe Last three 
wltncsrcr Olhoun mid he will 
call. They arc two of StuarI'a 
former W I I ~ C S  and a 11r.e-in girl- 
f r~end .  The three women. 
Sfuad 
From 18 
Calhoun told !he jury. will pro:.ide 
testimony that provrs h a t  Stuar: 
had a history of ablis~ve bcbar.ior 
and intended to torture the cht:d. 
The women all restifred almust 
one year ago at  Stuart's prelimin. 
ary hearingin Orofino. E n n a y  en. 
tercd a continuing objection at  the 
rime. contending that the tesri. 
moor was irrelevml and Immate- 
rial to the e g e .  The debate In- 
volves a questlon of law and will' 
probrbly y u i r e  that Scbuam 
make r ru l~ng  on whether he will 
&a the women to rectify. 
Schwarn has rdmonishtd the 
htmra not to read or listen to any 
n w r  reports on the nial  or  to dis. 
cuss tbe case with anyone until af. 
tertbey deliberate. The nirl ir ex- 
pected m l a n  two w e b .  
See S tua r t ,  Page 68 
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Women testify thi; 
By David Johnson (e/r 
O! tne T~~wnc 
M OSc'OW - The prosccuaon rested r?scaw Fndayex.enrnf rn the Gene Frrncls Stuan mcrder trial after 
four wcmen testrf~ed that they were rlc. 
trrns of repealed physlcai abuse by the d r  
Iendanl 
"Ee htt me when I was pregnant rn the 
abdomen." s6;d Sharie Sruan'r f l n t  
u-i.'t 
" H e  pbrc me wn;: he called r-sons (for 
:he i-er:;ze.'. but to me. rhere were no 
re2roxr ' s+:d I:uan's second wde. Vviu 
Sr!scn. 
"When t c n c  eel$ mad or loses his tern- 
grr. YOU .:elf aun't know whz: he's Korng to 
do o r  what he has planned for you," wid 
Theresa Jacobson, who lived m t h  S t u n  
for about three months. 
The founh De lo ruSaon  . t 4 -  
lied that Shrurasrrul ted and mpa!heri. 
an auto body shop at  Orof~no. 
Stuart. 31, is charged ui th f i r s t d e g m  
murder by tonure in connection ~ 7 t h  the 
S e p ~  19. 1981, dealh of tbrcc-yur+ki 
Robcn Miller of Orofino. S t u n  struck cbe 
child repeatedly. according Lo the criminal 
complaint. Sman  was livlng ai th the boy's 
mother. Jbthie Milkr. a t  the rime of L e  
death and had assumed a parental mle with 
the child. 
The testimony from rhe four women 
contends Clearwater County ~rosecuto; 
Steve Calhoun, is critical to show Stuart3 
propensin' forviolenceandisdlnctly IkLLr- 
8 ) . 3 I.! . 7. ... ,a:,,. 
. ' b  "*.;nj. ,-
ed'm the d e f e n b t ' s  d;pd intebtion ro 
t o m r e  Chc MiUcr boy. 
Defame attorney RobeR Rinney.&wev- 
er ,  has objected to- the testimony on 
grow& t lutirispejudickland~tdiM. 
ly linked to the cb i ld ' rdu tb  . . 
Second District Jndge Aadrew Schurm. 
in an aKempt to closely monitor the kind of 
fcsrimoay entered into evidence, in. 
svucted the jury of seven women and five 
men to consider the testimony only a s  it 
may relate toSNm's  intcationsat the rime 
of the boy's dcsth Schwam,ihboun m d  
f i n e s  held many private mnfermces 
throughout Friday's p m w h g s  in an 
apparent effort m head off any testimony fhat may have fallen outside the scope d 
the judge's m s m c t i a s .  
- 5 h c d e f e a t e  is scheduled to begin its 
'L. 
1 d;dn'! ):mu whar tc do '' 
Jhco5t:~nrr ;~;rdsrreral  s lceed 
inr;dtnrs a! ybyrtiil c>use at 
5:uun'r h;r.:r $!I? said hc once 
:-.vG :<* re:.:'\e &: :nlr8ulerrrne 
c r i  ,st f ; ~  nr:rr?d rcrru:rzed her 
wrrt : h r i ; :  rt otner :imrc 
D2r;r.i one incrdtnt. Jacobson 
:OIL! r * t  y ~ .  Sman cst  clo;hrng 
c[T a: i r r  u.::f. e t!!lchrr k9ifc On 
rnc.:ne:~~~?:c>.rhcSrid. he tried 
!c I:..:,.: te: i: : iake. 
EC . ~ ~ ~ . - Y r ~ Y r ~ n c i  :e~:.::g.?le. 
; -- c, : : -  .' ..- ;.;if '.7L..' .. ;oc~.,sO~ 
s-.- :yr 'L:? ~ ' c z r :  neid kc? 
u:;,,r 27.:: T.EI :r.:j~ h e ~ i r  10 fi:: 
u.:::. u2.r: " ;: !.e :cler;red her 
..-- -.-.. . 
. . . . . - . . 
"He stood Up and m i d  'MY 
mother doesn't evm love me.' " 
Jacobson Said. 
Under cross examination by 
Kinney. Jaeobsoo said S[usR sl id  
he threw her in the W e  I0 "so~CI 
me up." 
Nelson said Ihe beatings ahe 
rook from Sruan hegan about 
tfrree weeks after the)' were mar- 
ried and became m "every-cnhcr- 
day" occurrence. She testified Lhat 
she sell has several scars and 
'chrpped teeth" from the b6rrings. 
She raid S w a n  poked her in the 
chest with hrs !inger, choked her. 
knocked herrothe f lwrand struck 
her rn the face with his fisrs. 
K r l m  said Swan heal her lor 
smoking. watching teierision or 
raking show,ers without hrrn. Once 
ar Ch.rimncs, she said. Sruan bed1 
her b e u w e  she had received a set 
of lufigrge from her parents 
D u ~ n g  one incident. Nelson 
.-id. Sun locked her two-year- 
old d ~ u c h i c r  in rhe bathroom lor  
. .~ne-ho;rr. "- be'&,& 
the living rmq'' .she dd. wbUe 
her daughter cried from the bath- 
mom. She uud S n m t k k e d  IU the 
~OUSC d m  and ddrr't,slbwher 
m move 
"I ended up urinadrr on my 
KK." Nelson .aid, 
t a r s .  
& in; 
At that potnt in the tesamony, 
~ . lhoun ,  shaken h r m a d ,  asked 
for a recosa, which Sch* 
granted. 
Nelson resumed her terdmony 
minutes later describing Yet 
anorher alleged incident when she 
&d Snur t  Imocked her out and 
m e  woke. find& hcssclf tied in 
bed &be w u  pmgMOt arid S N a n  
was m d d l i n g  her on the bcd. :he 
all be over won." Nclroa said - 
S n u n t h e n  covered herfaceMtha 
pillow and began h r m g  her in the 
abdomen. She said he would sttikc 
he r  several ames, then uke Ihe 
pillow away and revive her uirh a 
wet washdortr. 
"Then bead cry " Nelson raid. 
and resume s&g her in the 
abdomen. 
AS with the other romm.  
&atn u k e d  Neison why she 
urntinued to stay ~ i t h  SCYILrL4'Af 
fim. ir unr because I loved b m  
. 
pfcaicvf. bp.': she rri4 _,, -, 
>-?NtLoo a h  reatlfiaibthls% ) 
shown in photographa d t b e  d a d  ? . 
Miller daild's body matched the 
kind she nrnrined duriDg butings 
rmm shta* *- -- - -- - 
Kimey, o. a o s s  +&fnq 
asked a l l  of the women a b o u t ~ t  
discrepancies beween their f e d -  
mony Fri&y and the han~cript, 
f m m  the p re l iminq-  h d g  one 
year 190. In wh a%, the womm 
said they had had a year to think 
about what hagpened m d  they 
adhered to their nial ?stimW. 
Smart again rcmauied rllent 
throughout the p m d n g s ,  but 
during at  least one recess Nl'r~ed 
around and carried on a m v r r s l -  
tion with people in the audience. 
are at 9 a.m. T U ~ Y .  h e ;  told tepor- 
t e n  he's "still thinkine" about whether 
he'll call Stuan to the wimess rund in hit 
own defense. He +d he may a l l  as i n m y  
as six other witnesses. 
W y  testified tbat s h e a v r i c d s n u n a t  
the age of 17. She estirmted that 
their t h m  yeamof marriage.S~lanpbyd- 
d y  abused her  more tban M rimer She 
uid he snuck her abut the h e a 4 ~ a n d  
back, poked her in the chest with his finger 
and "UtuaUy choked the r. n u t  day  after he hit mc. 
he'd cry," Dally raid. Asked by W o r n  
why she remained with Stuart. DDUy said 
"At that nme in my life 1 loved him. I had 
two cluldren and I was youngandinnocenL 
See Stuati trial, Page 3 A  
raid. . 
"Gene war Ulrc he w u  in a nee 
~ e d d  I could luveifIwu11ed to, 
but I vun't going to take his baby. 
~e kept uying it m ' t  h u h  it will . 
4 
=83 David Johnson -, 
'4 th Trlbune 
* MOSCOW - The central lagal qucrtfun 
h t  may decide the fate 111 accured 
-3urderer  Gene F r s n c ~ s  Stuart surraced 
-WednesZay durinp the second day of trial 
f esdmon? here and lerl the pro$ecution ; :-Mssessins its srraleFy- 
. Smart. 4 3l.year-old autn hady repair. 
* :man from Orofino. is charged with first. 
-degree murder by torture In connr:llcn 
:&th the Sepr. 19.1PEI.death oi  3year-old 
-Roben Ylller. 
: Much of the prnsecst~on's ;are, ar out- 
-lined by Cldaru-atrr Cour:: Prw:e.-ctar 
: Steve Ca:h?un dur1r.f htr cfcciny: ?:rte. 
' 
' men1 to the jury, w~l i  sulnF cr, lyl.;imony 
: about Stuart'salle@ed s h l s ~ v e  benz~ iu r in  
: +e part The frs1iZ:ony. Ch!ttlun t i ~ l i  :he 
ean to torture Miller boy? 
jury. will suppurt the rtate's c0nlen;iun 
that S:uart Intended lo torture the M~ller 
hoy, and demh resulled 
But Clearwater County puhlic defender 
Robert Klnney ahjecled \Vednesdny 
when Calhoun beean quesl ionln~ Knrhle 
hfiller. the dead chiid's mother. about 
alleged abuse she ausrbined at Sruart's 
hands. 
finnev labeled the testimony 
..lrrelev'ant" because it had no direct link 
to the ihild's dea!h. 
District Judge Andrew Schivam, after 
l~slenlng to argcmenls b! tach attorncy 
outs~de- the presence of the jury, sus- 
talneC K~nnry's objesriun Schu-am then 
rz;cr*ttd th.?! CBlhounI~r?i c!?pnceo(ail 
cv::cnce Cirbctly'!inktd :o tile .\lilIer 
child's death before atternp1t;;p to in:ro- 
duce tot imon? almed or pru\.ing Stuart 
I 
intended lo torture the ho).. Schuim -id 
he would then rule agaln dn whethec m 
allow the testimony 
Berore the defrndunt c m  be convicted 
of  first-degree murder, Idaho law re- 
quires that the prosecution prove thal 
Stuart intended to torture the Miller boy. 
Calhoun told Schwam that p a n  of 
Kathie hllller's testimony and the lesti. 
mony of tu-our Sluar: s former r i r c s  and 
a live-in pirllriend IS critical to cstab- 
lishing the Intent re torture. \ilithout the 
testimony. Caihuun iontends. there 
uould be little lo dtlfdrrnliatc between 
'abuse versus an emot~onal outbreak." 
Kinney ha$ mnln~alnerl since the pre- 
limtnary htarinp alno?l  a !.car ago that 
the state lacks ev~dence to suppon rhe 
torture charge. A l  one point in the p r r  
limtnar). hearing, herno\ed that Stuart be 
Legality stif Ips - .  testimony ,I .. ' ' 
boundovcr todistrict c o u ~ ? o n a c h a r g e ~ f  
manslaughter, not ILrat-degree murder1 
The motion was denled by Maglntnte  
Ralph Haley. 
In other rrlal testimony Wednesday 
Lewlston pathologist Roben Uhak told 
the jury that the Miller boy died of Inter- 
nal bleeding from the Uver. uused.by a 
revere blow o r  blows to the abdomen by a 
blunt nbject. 
Roben Rears, a Clearwater County dbd 
pury sherill at the time of the child'$ 
d u t h ,  also testified that during three In- 
terviews he conducted with Stuan, the 
defendant admitted to disciplining. 
Robert Miller with spankings, rtrikinm 
the boy on the side of the h a d  with the 
back of his hand and uslng his flnger to 
poke the child In the chest. 
Calhoun. earlier in the day, Lntroducsd 
. . 
four pho1o;raphr of the 'bUlIer boy'r 
body showing varl0ua b ~ i a e s  on the 
head: #boulder, chest, b c k  and buttocks. 
The  jury of flve men, seven women and 
rwo I l tcmate# was allowed to view the 
photoam ha but od'y a f t e r  a lensthy re- 
view of tga ~ i c t u r e s  by Schwam. who d* 
pled iotmdualon of flve other photo- 
' m p b a .  Kinney ohjcued . to showlog tbe j u q  
( h o ~  have an  photognphs, "lnflarnmatoq" saying Impact. (hey would 
"Thrr panlcular case, by its very nr-  
 re, Is volaflle." Klnney u id .  
K.thle Mlller told the jury that she met 
Shtarc in June or  July of 1960. They 
moved in together on Sepl 20 1980. By 
mid-Ndvunber. Miller said. sde decided 
See Stuart l'rf.1, Page 88 
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to move uut 
"At the time. I thought he (Stuart! was loo strlct with my 
son.' hliller said She said she and 
Stuart had a storm? relatiunship 
and that she matted in and out 
rcreral times. She said Roben MU. 
ler  carried a vnriet) of bruises 
tnrou@houl tnr tame she lived wlth 
5:csrl. Sbe s a d  Stuart seemed to 
h!r.&:.r h.8 t hr,rhp:&natlon forthe 
l-ru!se' and thrr a: one time he 
E L I . T : - ! c ~  thur ne uas  too strict 
,,..'L.. .  C C  DL1 
)It:l;.- .'.:l::rf ~sexpecledto rake 
t!,r sr..:nc!.! ?:and apaic loday 61 9 
- .  
.. . .  , .  
cow after  Schwam granted a 
change Of venue. Kinney had r c  
quesred the venue change ma- 
tending Ihst SNM could &t r e  
C ~ ~ V C  a f l t r  trial in Orofino. where 
the case hasamacted much public 
attention - . . . .. . . .. . 
It is aot clear at  this p o h t  
whether S N a R  r i l l  lake the stand 
In his own defense. The dcrendaor 
has remalned quletly seated b c  
side his artorne? throughout the 
proceedings. taking notes and on 
occllsion conferring with Kinney. 
The maxlmum pmalty Tor first- 
degree murder bv lorturr is dl?mrh 
Prosecution wins dispute 
in Stuart murder trial , 
By David J o h n s o ~ l  
a1 Ilu Titbum 
M L)SCOW - The prureculrun it1 tJlc (;enc C'rasci, Ltullrl alul; de r  trial scureJ u ~rl(nificu~Ir 
leyitl vtstury Thurduy and begull tu un- 
fold the cuntrovsrviul rvidence that Wrll 
anetnyr to pruvt that the delendunt in- 
tumded to torrum three-year44 Ruben 
Miller. 
An Orullno wunw,  who asked thl~t 
her narrlr nut be publistred, rr scheduled 
to take the wtcctrss standnr 9 a.m. luduy. 
She mr the first of rcverul women ex. 
pectrd to testify pbuut Stunrt'r allcycd 
pt'opel~uily Sur v~olence. 
District Juilye A~rdrrw Schwutn 
opened the dour lor the evrdrncc wbrn 
h r  ruled that the jury of seven wonten 
urtd rive tnen rnay cunridcr such testi. 
many but uttly as it pcrtarns to Stuurt's 
alleg;d .'ntorivc ur intctlr to torture" the 
hlilier buy. 
Stuurt's atlurrley. Clwrwuter Cuuuly 
uublrc dclblder Robrrr Krrmcy, hus ub. 
jc%cd mutlbc rratmruny frumthi  wuttrm. 
cutrtcnding I( IS "pr.e~u&cial, intmulr 
riul" vrld nut directly lrnked tu the 
clrilJ's death. 
Rubcrt hliljer died Sepl. 19. 1981, of 
intel.rwl bleeditta [tuna the Itver, caursr] 
by a severe biuw ur bluwr tu the ubdu 
men with a blunt object, accurditry tu a 
patholugrst wlw cuttductzd an  llutupsy 
I he hnv 
atcdtg tu ratrsfy u " ~ d r s l P " i n d i l w l i ~ \ .  
Scl,wurrr whrrtcd the j u u r r  I&! vrlne 
uf tltc ~EII~IIIuII)' wall be "heuvdy.hdcn 
wttlr etnutiun." He rdvisrd the p r l e l  to 
'.view crtusully the possible v t l v c  uf 
the rceurrrs"  when such l w l l ~ Y  U 
etttered tnto evidmce. 
. Robert Miller's mother. Kiilhie Miller, 
completed her tesumun Ttrursday. 
uonw of it beins offcredlro the jury 
underSchwam's strict guidelines fo rde  
termldtrg Stuan'r inlcnl a t  the t i m e d  
.the buy's denrh. 
Accordirrg to Idaho Lw. Ihr pnrrocu. 
uon murt prove that Stuart,31. tnteded 
tu torture tltc child and b a t  death w- 
riulted. Several rcvious w~lnerrcr  hnve 
certified rhvt $uurt brought a "linlp. 
pale and I~feless" Ruben Miller to the 
emergency room ut Clenrw&ter Valley 
Huspital t'ffortn 10 revive the buy. 
huwrver, tarled. 
h t h i e  hiiller, who wns Irving wtth 
Stunrt at the ttme of her XIII'LI Jeuth. 
trsttl'ied Thurr.da)* rnontir# that shurtly 
af ter  the hoy ivus pruoounsrd d r d .  
S r u r t  uskcd her if rhe  would cume see 
hinl in jilrl. She ulsu testified tltrl :In 
rrvarul u~~i l s lu r#s  she rr1~rIrcd huI1rC 10 
Imad Kuhcrr Miller hruircd and injured. 
S l~eu idS tu~! r t  gavcthecl l t ldculd~h~l) .~  
e r s  US dtii~tplirr~ U~UI  tr~ade the h y  
adhere to strict t rblr  mar t t r s .  She ruid 
slre fuutrd Ltrutres ua the boy's herd, 
back, burlocks, penis v l~d  chcul, us welt 
us r rilve~~-rlolkr r u t  glee2 of hut' 11118. 
-, . . . . - - - ,
Stuart ac~utdurp lu tbc criIIllnal cuIII- 1 p ~ m t ,  a i i c g ~ d ~ y  atruck 111r child rev*. . Sea Stuart. Pztgl: 3A 
i " From 1A 
sinkg frurn 111s Iread. were y ruhb ly  lrsr t h n  one yrnr 
Miller a l ~ u  wur slluwsd by uld uud had been cuu86d by a 
Schwam to testily abuut alleged "dtrrst bluw." 
acts  of violcnce nyuInsr her by St111 ro take the wrttlru stand fur 
Sluarl. She *aid she h d  msrirmed theprusccutiu~r a re  twouTStuan'x 
dinrr-sized bruises on bcr uheur, furrner wives und a l ivr in yiri- 
similar to tllube fuund un her r s t  f r ~ s n d  All tlrrce trbttlird at the 
ut ter  his Jeuth. Sltc wid Sruurl prtiitemnury Imcarit~g une ywruyu ,  
urused the bruisd by yukmrrg her under u slurrdrrtg ob~,!cstiutr 1:rurtm 
wrtlt hrs Citrgcr. Duru~y urte Kitrney. The wurtrcn. Cull&wt~ uld 
' ullercal~u~r,  rlrr =id. S t u n  the Jury durrrry Iris uperring s t u t r  
purhcd her uuuuiat u living rwr r k n t ,  wilt dcrcribe how Stuart 
d w r ,  rcmovrd hcr y h s * ~  and Ierrorraxl IILSIII with "bsutiuy al. 
~ ~ r r l l l l c d  tiis Itst ir~tu the wall nral ter beatlug niter hrulisp." 
to her  fuct Kittncy. duritrg mile prelmmrtu~ury 
"lle lull rnc thut'r lluw susy Ire h w n r u .  ubjected r r  cutcdly !u 
cuuld ~nuvemy ~roselrunturteside tlrr tvstirrtoray, iumrrt~rt;g thvt 11 
u l  rng fuce to the uther," Millcr wur p~~cjudicrvl a t d  tut  relaled to 
u t d ,  talklrrg m r quiet vuice, her thu Mrllcr b y a s  denth. 
hilads trcnrbling thmugh t n u l  af nut k l rwam llas rubd ;hat the 
he r  tesliruuny. She surd Stuart a lw nutnbrrur maidmrlsulnllcged viu- 
Chukcd her a ~ t d  urte l ink  t r ia l  to Icnl belruviur by Stuart upun the 
at~uff  u ciy&rrtte un her hcud. Millcr.LNy JI e ~ e l l t r ~ l  tutlre IIU~C'$ 
Uuritrg Ltcr utre.yeur-lurry relu. case vtrd lltc dcfe~tdust's purl br- 
Iturtship wttll Stuart, Miller ucid lti~vwr could tc ut least "clrcultr. 
alle left him urr three diflcretct stwttiully" lrakcd tu t11e buy's 
occurions bcwusr o i  (ti. viulcnl death. Hrwtid 111s jury will luve tu 
bslwviur. Asked by Cilltruun why ultimatdy mukc t h t  decisidn. 
nlrc always wrttc buck. Mtllsr said, Stuart Lr rrnraitlrd urthunted 
"Ueeaurc L luved him and 11s &I- thruul(ltwt the procerdirtps, rir- ! 
wuyr c r r d  urd convitli~rl zrmc thnt trny quietly h i d e  Kinney, lukirtg ; 
we o u l d  work thitlgb uut." n q w  and cwml'crriuy wlth hts 
Miller's sirtar, McUy McCrur- rtrurnsy routinely. The audience I 
key, also LcrtrFLa T b u r A ~ .  tell. a t  Lht trirJ, raurll at first, has be- 
urg thcjurythatrhe~wbrui*rPau gun to yruw as I& p r u r i c ~ w t h ~ ' ~  
Ruben Miller on reverd occn. mure c r i t i u l  evidence bsginr to  
. *ion$. unfold. 1 
Anda rvdiuloyst. Dr. Louis M b ,  It is dwbtful  thrl U e  prosecu- I 
r s r t i f t d  [hut x-rays tukeu uf the tiun wtll wrnpletc it* u s e  t d a y .  \ 
Miller alrild's left a m  un Ihc niyltt Thetrwl will not r u m s  until next I d hrs durth rhuwrd two-fructurad Tve*iry.. M u n u y  beu~p a Iayul 
bonsr. Ilk wid the f r r c tu ru  M i h y .  I 
8A La!+'lslon Tribune ~udnrtsaay.  Oct. 13, 1982 
Stuart 
o manslaughter ; Stuart 
Tucrduy tu bcgtll chpylriy away a1 the From IA 
prurccutiu~t's use ,  a l ~ u r l j  reverul Wlt- Whlllutc w ~ d  Ooll hlcliuwell. b t b  ncsrc l  i ~ l c i u d u ~  5iunrt'a leuther, sir- . Wuudeuvi,lc, ,varh,. oscow - C L ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  ~~~~~t~ tcr. ~ a l ~ . r ~ r ~ e r ,  ncpbcw, a fvrlucr girl- ! 
puClicdefcnderHu(,cr[ Kuulcy frlcrld and twu fellow vurkcn.  All the "IUJn "" I' liye. Lesttfld lal 
witr~eraes t r r t i f~sr l  t lwl they never ruw 1 ? ~ u ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ? ~ ~ ~ $ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l ~  
or h u r d  Stuan abusing anywe. 
n. I~.~I.OI~ wu in  s ~ r p  c a n i n r  1 w ~ ~ $ ~ ~ ~ $ ~ ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ! ~ ~ ; ~ ~ ;  
10 the stnle'n witncsres, ninny of whunt , 
said Stuan,mu!tn.l~  be^^ r luycd ; L$~$~rlller ,.el,n, 
the wocnen m lux l ~ f e  m d  admmtrtered 
severe reprimandr to the hiillcr child. ! lr"irlcd lhal sle 
Scunrr war Iivlnu wrtb llle boy's owlher. 
Kulhic Mlller, a1 the llnle of the cllild's 
doach and had rrrumed a varenlal role. 
"Ho (Stuan) never bccdme phyhlcxl.' 
patr- He was very u n r l y  ... We were happy. I 
W'UY bappy ' l ~ t d  Maureen Shale of OW 
finw wtlu h r d  dlc  and Stuart hut! dr: , 
velopul a "clwe" rrlnlrP~rshlp Lllat end- 
r d  just paur l o  when Stuicri and Knthle 
SW Slur,?, i d y -  HA' 
or othcrr. 
Stuart's aidlrr. Suban Stuurt u l  
Kuoakia, de.ci.iLed Ircr brutlur i lr 
"pretty strccl" will, r . l ~ ~ l d ~ ' s ~ ~ .  Lul 
nor abusive. S u w l 5 l w n  svld alas 
knew sevrrul uf tlrc IVUIL-11 III 
Slunl.t':, Iris, rrlslurli~tg Kurlric h l d  
Icr. but $Ire lrdd IU lir~rwlcJl;c *I 
the dc lc~~dan t  rlru~lrry ~ l r r  wutuen 
Slw suid aI~c orlce tuta a r e  uf 
Robert M i l k r  fur  lltrcc or iuur 
days aud suw nu br-uk,ra ulr fbc 
buy's body uibcr t h ~ ~  a iew urr hia 
luwar lego: appurerlrly ~rruaed by 
fullluu duwn durllly play. 
Ou crusr exitnttlurlturt. Cultultluurr 
h r d  all uf lhe delc~t.~! $vllnsrrcs. 
except Stuart's t l~ull lcr. i l~apcir  
111c piclurcs uf 111~. ~ E A J  Aiiller 
child lhut hnve beell ~ ~ l l e r u d  lrllu 
evideacc. hll u l  t l u  u1tr1crac.ir84 
i l ley wuuld bc "rurprrrcd" IV IICU~ 
llrai tl~r bruirer UI lllc Irdy wcl c 
caused by Stuilrl. 
"He (Srwrl) i~ 2 b ~ ~ r c ~ l l y  o w  
pcrsu~r." M~Uuwe l l  r l i J  
S u m  Slusrl SVIU 11cuplc ultslr 
tuld hcr Itml $sue SIurrl rvrr a 
"hell ul'u guy 
Stuvr.1'~ u~ulllcr. I)ur.ullry Sl&rl 
uf Strtea, tcrr~f jcd L*.rrfly uCuul 
Jurne plrwrc culls rliv r errcivcd lor 
Gcne t'rurn V lck~  Nrl,ur~. Slrc ~ l s u  
told ~IIE jury that .IIC l u d  IWI 
rotscd her suu i r l  u rl,.rsl ~IIVIIYII. 
n10111. 
"I wuul&r't GOI.IJL.~ 11 IUU 
rir icl." $L u t d .  ('~llaoua a,LcJ 
i h 1  Uuvutl~y S l w n  rcrar;rm rrdil. 
able Sur ~ r i b l e  rcbullul Iebli- 
nwny l r l s r  in 114: lrd. 
S t u n ,  as he Ius  tlttvuglruul ILe 
r t ~ t i r e  trial, rctnuined c ~ b n l )  rw- 
ted during trdtieluuy 'I'lrraby, rV- 
fcr Lie t i u l  was rcc~sscd, he war 
alluwal to u l k  brrkfly wir!tfrhtdr 
m d  relstivsr. c w c l r u ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ y  IU. 
b r s c u  unJ s~~ t i l es  bul'urc being 
re lunled a che b t v h  Cuusly Jail. 1 
The ;rial, now six day, old, re- 1 
uumu s 9 a.m. t d a y  wrrh murc 
deirnrr 1dUmuny. 
striking boy 
with his fist I/ 
By David Johnson 
Qi ma Tr(bun 
OSCDW- GEIU FrancL Sturn  t ~ t l f i e d  
W d w u h y  that he d l rdp l ind  3-YW. 
o l d R o k n M ~ l l c r  with r h ~ p d 0 f 0 u U p  1 
~ h s  bay a ~ m o ,  u p r t q w  y w n g  h e r i w ,  j 
~ B u t o o t . h ~ r f r ~ r u u r u l  1 
lrir him It was Uke r rr- . 
n6.t action rud hr fell 
b c k w r r d  a td  I cauyh( : 
him," s l w n  W I ~ .  
Some t h r g  buliri b 
t t r .  HotFn bllll$:r L Y  
. . 
Gens 'stua& d w d  in thc cnlcz'rency 
munr qf .(lrollno'r 
Clenrwrttr Vrlle). kusprtyl Whfrc Shorr l u d  
! bmuyllt i l ln~.  T l ~ e  buy 4ted. ~ C I ; ~ ~ J I I I  10 un aUIQ : y ~ . o e a e d  liver. n u a f b l  adryprc 
Lower b l o ~ s  frulll il L ~ I I I ; ~  uu~sCt. 
"li wnr M lnrranu~neovr chin ' i l k  Irl~idcnt). It 
war urer a s  f u t  r s  it trbYpCIIJ:~ s t u n  to14 t ~ i e  jury durlug rhr clrth &oy of IC~~;IIIUOI)-  t4i t& Irral. 
Stuart. a 3l.vcn;.-olil autd bndr rewrr olhn Irurll 
~ ro l ino ' i s  c&ryr'd wilh Itrrt-dcfrm nirrurr  by 
t u ~ t u r c ~ ~ c u ~ u ) e c u o ~ ~  will; me Nillsl...hil;l'j J w l h  
T1.t prulc;u4ttutr aild delcnbe ru>tc.l t l ~ e ~ r  u a s r  
late Wsdsesday bflerrhuon nlld l a u i  dyu~tae l~ l s  
we exyeutcd by Irwn I&y. 'I'nc ;*is would t11cu : 
yu lu the jury ul rc\,en a r m  arid rit.c H-VU,CI~. ' 
itudrt 's ulluracy, C la l~wale r  Caiunlr. publr.. dc. 
lrrtdrr Hubert Kllltle).. hra u l~s rdy  l v i J  lior jury : 
tltnt Ite will ask tlicrn lo rcr1;:rr & vcrdrir dl' JUI. 
druulricr, cuc\tri~d~iry thal hlr cilunc dlrl nut irliuid 
-. -. -- . - -
S w  Sturn, Pay* 6A 
- 
. * 
8~ Lewlslon Tribune-Thursday. Gcl. 14. 1982 See Stuart, P.lc26 3h I 
Stuart 
-.  I - . . *  , 
-.". - From l A  j 
?.:to hurt the Miller boy. 
.. , . 
-. : Clearwater County Pmreclllor 
'; Steve Cirllwun, however. contends 
that Sluan ffltentionally tortured 
. Robart Miller to ratilrfy a "sudutlc 
A'.bliiratlon" and rhat d u t h  r e  
< -!."s","n. w e a k g  the Lhrrr.piece, ;; g n y  suit md blue tle he's worn 
e v e n  day d the trial, spoke in a 
~ ~ j q t  slwir voice while on the 
w j q p  s m d  oppurin to choke 
.> kE)r tcdrv'when he tal t td  about 
- .  e YlUer child': death. 
$,A[ Iome p p t .  I pup& him, 2 .  . 
.r in the belly, S tuan  srrd under 
:. , qou examination by Cdbowz 
\ .  spurt was living w ~ t h  the MlUer 
. - 
. I b y ' s  mother. Knthte Miller,rt the 
. - rime of the child's dwth  and had 
:.> psumerl a parental role. 
.. Earlier Tuesdny. .Spobne 
p$ychmtrist Robert Wenler ruti- 
fied chat Stuart hap a "wmpuldve 
., perronality" a d  suffers fmm an 
,"intermincut explosive disorder." 
. 
Uaac's pore,  Wrn le r  ruled out, in 
birophuon, the torture allegation. 
'.UI can't see it M b W ,  t o n w  
T o m e  ia a deliberate lntent to 
or barm somebody over 1 
... I can't see mL 
said rhul Stuart knew what he w u  
&in# when he rrrruek the boy md 
. h e w  thedrffetence betwwn right 
: and wrung. o u t  the psychiatrirr 
- raid Srrurl'r "behavior would no( 
. - - - -  ~- ~ 
, hurt m v a n ~ "  
; TiG&o testified about blr re 
! latlo~hips wlth several women in I &ia life,. including two f o r m S  
8 . wiver, two Uvr-in girllrienda m d  ! aunther w u m n  he dated. hll the 
: wunlen had testified that Stuan . - ~ - . .  
.: : b u r  them w many o c u r ~ o o i ,  pok- !. inu them in the chest mnd ~viktnD 
! thLn with his ria%. Stuart refuted 
: .d the testimuny, trlting the jury 
that must of what the women raid 
never happened. 
'I have never m my life punch& 
a women." S u u n  ~ l l d  
Stuan, however. told the jury 
thal Jurine the week pnor to 
Roben Miller': d u t h  ,he had 
u u s e d  many of the brurses that 
appeared on thcdurd child's body, 
"I had been thruruung to glve 
hrm r hrrd rpalrkiog fop a long 
time imtedd of the MO o r  rtuoc 
swat# , d I did,''SCu+rt Wid 
S w n  d d  he had u d  
w m e  of the a d  bru*es on the 
boy's chest by poking rhe child 
with hr finger. 
"I didn't think I war p&ng him 
hard enough to cue brwscr," he 
u i d S t w n  nidhemdKathiohiiI- 
lcr had a g r d  to give the boy so@ 
mowerr as discipline, rather thaa 
spankiagr He said he gave Rokn 
nvo mld ahowera and ffichie Aill- 
ler gave her  son ane. 
S w n ,  who war described by 
prychiatrist Welzler k( r &cc- 
tiodst, vaid that when he first met 
Roben Miller rhe boy w u  unruly. 
"It Ww Wrc h e 0 e v q h . d ~ ~  did. 
pline r t  dl," SUun aid He sriD 
that when he dlrsiplined thc boy, 
he got down on one knee md 
looked the child in rhc eye, to k 
"on hia Ievd." 
Tbst'r the w:nve he had 
assumed St- ~ i r i  the d lv  ha 
~ l N C k ~ < b e ~ w l l h ~  fist. H e ' d  
there w u  no visible sign of injury 
af ter  the incident. In fact, he a i d  
Hoben furirhed u h  his lunch 
and S t u t  w r  thechibfm bed fo r1  
routine nap. 
Ahout one an6 one half b u r #  k- 
ter. S t W  d l  he went in to check 
on tho chlJd 
"He w u  ell scrunched up 
r g W t  the hudbaard like be WM 
trying to crawl t m g h  a ~ h w  
w u  vomlt eve~ywbcrs," Shlnrt 
d d  He a d d  he picked the cbUd 
up, barhad hlm. blowdriedhin luk 
and kid him buk down on the 
child3 bed. Thca  Stuan u l d  he 
went to a nearby morel to c ~ U  
Karhie Miller ,who waJ wurkmgr 
und told her  thal Robcrr war rtck 
When he returned horne. Rot& 
w u  cmwllns on the bed. SCUM 
Ad He k i d  he pickcd the chlld up 
md u r r i e d  him into hia and 
Knchie'r mom. 
"When 1 La~d him down, I nked 
how he felt and he said 'pretry 
ood.'"ituartsaid.Buthccaidhe 
Lresced w b r  wunded like un o k  
8uucuoo in the bay's thmat. b hm 
riled ul perform mouth-rdrnouq 
ccawc:rauon, S w n  = i d  ' 
"I exhaled into hi8 mouth,' he 
raid. But che boy's stomach rosa  
S o s t v a n  %id hepushed thechild'm 
u o n u c h  down with hi# hand "The 
second time 1 did h t ,  rll lrlnda of 
green a d 1  c u n e  out of his mouth 
Md mae. t a d  when 1 saw tbrr. I 
Just picked him u p  and headed to 
the horpicsl" St& said. 
ICnrhia U e r  and several of the 
other  women in S n w ' s  Ule wept 
throughout S W a  tutifnony. 
W o u n  d e d  IClthie Miller 
and Vlckl Nelron, one d S W a  
t m m e r  wivu ,  for  rebuttal t u d -  
.mnny. MUler q a i n  told the Jury 
d u t  Strun poked her h the chM. 
h v i n g  bruuu, ,and, d u u m e d  
once to hat her  wrth hu. iiaL 
Nelron, strug ling to check her 
unotiona, rulcfrmed he r  corller 
testimony t&tStuarrbur  her bru- 
u U y  many umw. 
"Gene struck m e  with hia fists 
on many. m y  occurionr. He  
almost always ielt bruises on me." 
N e b  said Asked bv C h u n  . . - ~ .  - 
why sbe reported only coup led  
the bulings to police. Nelson 4. 
"Tbcy alwryr  cold meir wudc ivU 
uunir md what they told me Is 
lhr t  rhcy redly couldn't do my- 
thin@ unlesa be killed me!' 
D u v l c t  Judge Andrew Schwrm, 
e l b u n  and Kinncy mU be lorntu- 
Wing jury LutrucUoru Ihls ruom- 
h g  and. the jury ha5 been in. 
m c t a t t o  m n v m u t  ~ ~ : ~ ~ a . r n .  0 0 0 0 0 2 5 1 today. 

defendant C I ? ~ S  ~ r n  ur uraGu L r u a u  , ,,- J 
LDA m k l , ~ n l  I Q ~  (r 
Thc child w.s dead when Stu.h iirlved. reruscltation e f fo rb  I became highly $el&-4 jumrr Tuedsy r f t e m n :  
Gtne St&, told Clearwrtcr Valley b c  Floyd and otber emtrgmcy rwor mpkiow aboul t(bc orlglnrl of (hc a m t i  "R.W M i r .  (hc.mther or h mild. ail1 1 wulcmeqwrOOm 'IDrtcnhe htrd "kers attsnpced to &re hbn r l th CPR acne d dutb md about pmribk cblld k bere to W l f .  C~Ulam aid.  "Sbell 
I ~lll&bodyofh-yurold-1y& 
~ d ~ f ~ a b ~ I ~ ~ u * ~ ~  a m . "  ( e n U y I h t ~ m t h i m t S u n l o n d ~ f i e d  
h r l n g  c m u a r t n l ~ t i o n .  Wwse rl- *ling him 1 b ~ t  a p r  k f o m  tbe murder 
; kr d k  a t u r n w e  prio* c p ~  00 me vg$ I5 I -Robs( wy mmed Plmd about Daot -, 
cbc mr * maw me be . -11. romd bruius aa (be boy., &d mi rn to twi~ilvc the boy .nd if .Ira latify bdng pllmd 
1 
.&stifid in Mowms C0d.y. 
.,, him r6tupn, bm ibc Gsa hb bat- and Dnder hlsmin durhrg *e d- tMH -4- ~t aoud b m w  lmmd by k. %sari -11 ad .CW 
pt on lhe boy's chat." Dr. John Floyd u!d loN lo the orIwmorrtbcehWrbdy. of ddenec mnmltted by Mr. Stun  a F)ofls clll to tbc -tcr &tp m m  f&l .Ime paedum -MN~," a w n  #rid. 
" amversaurn ' la. heriff w y  after p&mncing boy h d  mtgM haw a d  h i *  or bum. F b d  
. SIY.rt dlKlp,,iacd Roben mmenw room. 
"He lStuPrtl 'b, pLiag him,'" lead lo ( intdqcc rrmnlcr charges aptnd W i  t h t  bt u w  lk b m k  before the 
I 
taW the murC &$lr lot impdm Slwn .nd lo the kIowoa trial before a bry medico bqan W i  with Un boy. 
pd;hrg him In the chest wl(h his lon?fingcr, j 
,,,, m , , , y ~ t c d l o U e P ? .  d f i ~ t m n m t d ~ w u n m ~ ~ r i i ~  &is ml. -. h g i n d t k ~ s e s i s a p e d e d ~ o  .n hlcr in tk - 
= v e = ~ n k ' y . . n d * * * ~ ~ - . ~ ~ ~  
ald in oullinhg Kathy Mtlkr'a tertimony for 
jolla.'. 
Fw was Ibt . '~yrici.n *r& ol .. . *ri actad uid'dcmndtd 1h.1 p x e m t i o a  bslded by ~le.mlcr ~amtr befun. 
.wino hmpiWvr anymey - lhe cmvtury roan d W  and nomu help RPfftltor S!@w QlbmY. f l i  1tUmPt Rt bmtbgs dnwe Mlller to move out d b t  S ta r t  W u b  ~ ~ r c d  Mil- lhe home rk dm& rHh %an on 1.~0 o@ 
- =zz, zz ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A $  yz*%&$$&ety h Pa lo b t h  with -tic ad bbi-i e r s r i w ,  C1lhimn uid. H-r, tbc two kud 
the .,umprnduleltss,, body ol UucN1d ia was prabbly rppmpriPk,p what was hap  k.-6 arlmi~(ing UL child's 4uh. rremclkd and w m  Uving bgtscr a: the p i n g , "  Floyd mid. But dur* the Cabnm sumwed u p b h P U  for tk ncaty lime d h a  nn'a death, he mid. 
a m .  
. . 
I ~here ' l l  be other children, defendant told Miller . - . 
By Jim Wright 
irnmed~~I?ly nfler the dealh 01 her ion. 
i;zneSluar( lold Kathy hlillcr ghat they could 
npl married and haw other rhildnn and 
asked her if she'd VISII him In jail. Hiller 
lest~ried in Second Plslrict Court t h y .  
Smart. 3U. o on trial tor the alleged 
murder.bv.tnrture k~lling of :I-yearsld 
Robert ~ i l i e r  the boo a1 h t h y  Miller, *'hen 
thev were livlne w~lh Stuen in Orolino Sepl. 
:9 IMO. 
Iltten pduang l o  compase hendi .  .Wler 
sornt much oi ;his rnomng recounting the 
even& leading up lo the death of her sa. She 
hmke Ints lean while dew:iblne her mretlrig 
lributcd !he injuries (o accldenu or dir~plin- 
inpi. she told the Larnh County jmy of five 
Hiller sald thal she seldom saw bv son ila- 
dressed . but on w e n t  cccasioru not id  
bruising on his bUttCCks. paris and h a d  md 
mce d i m v e d  a "silver doliar-rue" pa& 
of hair mning from his head. 
However. Miller testified thal she never 
saw S t u n  abuse the chlld by jabbtng hlm in 
the chesl witb his forefinger. an act 
Clearwater Counly Rmrmtor Steve Calhoun 
hnpes to prove indicat~ve of Stuart's 
"sadlsllc" tendencies. 
Calhoun must convince (he jury tha: St& 
ln~cnded to torture Un child by acts such Ir 
poklng h m  to secure a fintdegree murdu 
mvimion. 
with Stuarl at the Clearwater Valley Hospj&l 
shnrtlv alter lhe deau of her son. 
He Inld me Lhal Ihiws would be all right. 
%ut we could sllll pet married and we could 
hare other children." Xillw wid. "Then he 
asked me if I'd come and see him in jail. 1 
told him Uul they wuuldn't put him In iaU for 
putting hrulsrr :found by docton\ on Rnb- 
hie's chea. out he said 'ves. they wlil."' 
Lnler, alter he had heen arrested and 
,ailed. Sluan denled brulsinq the child's 
chest. Miller .said. 
Miller testified lhat on j t ven l  occasiOIU 
she had returned home from work to find her 
wn brulsed and injured. Stuart. \Pho *a5 
renerallv tune alone with UK child. at- 
m& and seven women. 
Mlller said on two masions she returned 
htlmcfrom running errands to find the)-year- 
old cold. bkue and shivering lrom cold 
showers administered bY Stuarl aller the 
rh~ld wet ha pants or dt&eycd -me order 
S l u n  had lakm over all care and brthlng 
ni lhe child for lear that he m~ght become a 
..sasy" il atlcnded lo by a woman. Miller- 
said. He also lorced the child to eat with 
strict. peculiar manners alllkr .=Id. . 
..Once he p ic id  up his Iork with the w m g  
hand and C i e  supped him on the head with 
hi fork." Miiler said. 
e--4~ .';-d-- .~fc>.';Z7W*- 7 - x--vv-- L"C1 - - -. 
Stuart may take stand in own defense 
- Jacobson sald that in anolbtr lighl Stuart bruised and b a t t e d  body of Robert Miller. 
She later teatified thlll 15 to 10 moli, mund 
h i m  lound on the bog's cbat -1Ched 
lhme Stuart would lea* m her c h l  alter 
patlng her with hls lorelinger. 
When askcd why rhe returned lo Stuart 
alter leaving him m r n l  Umn. Nclm mid. 
"At Ant it was because 1 loved himand ktff 
It au because 1 was afraid of him ... 11 LooL 
me a whale y u r  (b gel awajlmm him) but 1 
finalb dl4 li." 
Defense ~t lorney,  Robert Kinneg of 
Omrim. limited his examination of fie 
r n m  to details d the incidents Uy 
rCeounted and qaesths aimed r l  testing . 
(heir mmories abnut heir lCStimOnY iU 
preliminary h~aI%'tgS. 
Kinney. toM lhls m r s p l p r  that he has 
not pei decided If he'll place his client on the 
witness &nd. He dld wy he will can four or 
five defense witnascs. 
beean smashine her klmclaea. Ihtn best her 
a d  cut off he; cloches wkh; butcher knife. 
Stuart allowed her to d m  and leave lhor Francis ShlPrt d l  begin W y  mmnlng 
*th an o a n i ~  stakmeni from his atlomq home. but d r a m  hcr  Luck at knife-point 
and &shed her do& away two more times 
Morr letting her leave. she ttnlfied. 
Vickl Nelson: tbe slate3 Anal witness. told 
Lhe pry that Stuarl began hating her two 
weeks after UHIt marriage In 1978. The 
beatings. which included puncher to Ihe lace. 
- - - .. cholring and kicking as well as rharp Jabs la 
year& Oror* rpto body Ule chesl wilh his faretinger. we= ad. 
Star( b 01 h mu*-bY-m ministered Muse she smoked dgartttes. 
ol2-wrold R o M  MUkr, h l  much of h w a W  television m lmk d o w e n  without 
state's testimony k e s d  a put him. Nelson safd. 
mmsnlIc rrlrtlomltb, rhicb C o b  bops "He gave me what he said were turona. 
will cmvinrr Ule jmy UIllSllr~rl inladed k t  b m e  there were no rtnbau." Ndxm 
tortnrr k.$ild Lo MW bl?, om " ~ ~ ~ c  m~d.  "He'd ten me a lot of the Ume that he 
l a d s r l s .  was beating mt k o u x  he knew 1 wanted lo 
' , . pracntb% ~ ~ a l k d a ~ o f l ? ~ r b 1 k  -. Oae LbeLrtd- lQm him knuse  he ma kallng me." 
to btifv wu Jd, rho Nelsnn mid she left Stmarl after f m r  
, w,.,., jb. t.60ul wally lbwd mmths d mrr*e .ad b 
. ba rbne tbrg w e n  IW togetha tn the bc''i" 
Sa lUe  a m  N d m  r b  dcacrlkd m incidml rhm 
J* l& & b(.b j q  dnvt Stuarl 1orkrd htr 2-yeardd dau&tcr h a 
- & - h t  s t u d  once Luthmom and wwld not olbw herb M the 
k a m e  a t  a p r t v  m d , d m e  ha a 
warby LLc. rkrt be'& her inb  h 
wata and hdd h a  had mdci rht 
mrtcd m l M n g  water. 
- Y m q ~  oat b v i n g  me bmwe you're ad 
ran& olll of (his Wc I'm golw to kill 
pa." J.E& quoled Slnarl a t  ~Jtng .  
J a c o b  aald Stturl cvmhun7 lel he5 W 
lmm Lhe water and lold her "my m o h r  
dosn't cvm love me." 
dmt w wc1l. 
Clearwater Coune ~nnccolm Steve 
C.lham Ihrfshed lk hctc'r m e  Ltc F*Y 
a f l q m n  aitcr. lhree and r b l f  hgr of 
M i -  from &adom. pollcc Investigatmr 
and former w i v u  and rid fri& of the 31. 
Drug hearing set for Mc 
An Ocl. 27 prrlimlnarl h r h 8  d a b  
bcen xt lor a Mmcm-am couple chamed 
with pannsion and mmulecturing marl- 
juam alter a police n Y  or ffieir home 
child nut for nine or ten Mrs. While fhe chlld 
r r t n m e d  in the bathroom. Stuarl beld 
Nelson d m  on a couch aod forced her to 
urirute in htr clothes nlher than k t  btr use 
a hilet. she a id .  
RoLh N e l m  and Jacoban broke inla lean 
during (heir testimony and court was me, 
xd In allow them lo w a i n  fhelr cornpornre. 
Nelson became virlbiy agitated cmd could 
nol speak when abwa phntagraphr af Un 
Wednesday. 
The corm date for Dean  ord dm KM. U. I 
rml FAka F n w  King, 24. of 3M6 ~lnville 
Road. was se t  a t  a Second District I 
Magidrate Cwr( pmbabk cauw hearing 
held n u d a y  mornlng. 
Second Oistrlcl Magirlnk Robert F d h  
l O o C  
''Fo, .,,er girlfriend says Stuart fgvc 
threatened, intimidated her 
By Jim Wright 
j A ~mtr gir- 01  an Francis s t u f i  
testffled Friday that S m r t  threatened hp 
kith violence. intimidated her 8nd fomd her 
Lo luve us wlth blm in the oIILce of the 
Omfino bodyshop where he mrked. 
.StuarL 31. Is om Lrl.1 In k w  lor the 
murda.b?.-tortmr dulh of 3 y u r d d  Robcrl 
Mllkr. the con of 8 w a n  wlth whom he was 
tiviug in Orofno kart year. 
! The former girlfriend. Dclma Strong. u id  
she had a shod but "serious" romance with 
Smart a leu' rnmtbr W o n  he moved in with 
KaUlie Miller and b a  gouq urn. 
S m r t  thrulcned her. pulled her luir and jahbed her in the chest seven1 limes dunng 
t4e relaUmuhip Slrong =Id. 
Stuart urually ston& the arpunmts over 
trivial matlen. and the defendant seldom 
used phvsical violence. Stmnn said. 
"lt.wir morr intimidallon ihrn an.chlng." 
Stmng told t k  huh Count!. jury of live men 
&rung mid sbe eventually stopped seeing 
Stuart and movea away tmm Oe apanmenl 
bulldine wkre they bo(h Irved b u s t  01 h e  
Intimidation. 
"I wwldn't k alone with him Lben." tbe 
woman said. 
ShorIi? after she stopped rreing Stuart. 
Strung said she went w UIC O r o l ~ ~  body shop 
. Under cro+runmilmtion from d d u u e  at- 
- Robert K b q .  Strmg u ld  Uut she 
dlbn'l npwi l b e ~ l  usaplt out 01 fear Lbe 
d i n  would not bci~cve her and thrl Suurt 
iniihl bnn bu. 
Strong L one of four m e n  clrpected to 
lcnify #bout thcIr past rrtrlMNhips rith 
Stuart in the p r s  b e l a  the death d Lbe 
Mliler boy. 
Clearrater County Prosecutor Steve 
Calhoun has said the w m t  WUmnny is 
crucial to the N L e ' s  aMitr to p m w  thrt 
Stuart tortured the boy to death In keeping 
with h i  lay-rt.nding "vdinlc lmdaclo."  
The ro le  mun prove Uut Sloafi lnladed 
to twnnc UH ch~ld to secure a lusldegrce 
murder m ~ c l l o n  and a pouible death 
MIl.?nm. 
Stuart was charged with the murder after 
he arrived at the a-lv Vkllq Hospital 
in Omfm with the lifelea body 01 the 
bruised a d  battered t h n e g u r 4 d  in hit 
arms on Scpc 19. 3981. 
Kathic Miller. the mother of the boy. 
testified Thursday that Sturn often lelt 
bruises on her chert by pdmg her with his 
fore(inttr. S t u n  a h  threatened her and. on 
one mawon slammed h ~ s  llrt agatnst a wall 
n u t  lo h a  had  and told her ~t would be easy 
to mm*r her mse to theother side of her face. 
where he worked to ask il he c o ~ l d ~ ~ ~  
m e  monev he owed her 7
:. AIVnu,qh frindlv at lint. S b r t  became 
arm when lbe two were alone in Ule shop's ; 
ofltn. Strong said. 
,. :'He l d e d  very. u e i y ~ . " S ( m n g s a i d  I 
. - ~ d  s e n  this lark w o r e  a d  1 was very j 
Mghtmed." 
The woman sald she lned to leave lhe shop. ' 
., bul stopped when Stuarl told he "go ahead 
$-.and try to make anin lor it. You won't makc 
I1 " 
... 
Stuart blocked the door out of Ule office. 
forced her against a wall and besnn leclurlne 
her "In a rsnltng lone' while "Uuowtng ex. 
m e l v  mntmlled karate klcb and hits that 
missed me -just barel!.." Swmq anid 
., "He had me touUy domina(cd. he was , 
; totally in eontrd and I uas totally afraid and 
:he knew It." SLmng wid. '.He told me Uutl  
didn't kmw wbat term was." 
: ' Breaking into l ean  oo the wlirras stand. 
Strong said Stuarl forced her to have sexwith 
him in the o f f i e  and then suddenly became ' 
Mendly and let ber KO. 
I Attorney: Stuart guilty of manslaughter only -. , +, 2 / p ~ -  
By Jim Wrlght . . - 
Gene Francis  S tua r t  i s  guilt7 01 
aynslaugher in Ihe beat* death of 2-yur- 
dd 'Robert XtilLr but did aat inLcntirmlly 
tortwe Ibc boy. defuue attotaey Robert Kin- 
my ?Id a La@ Covnty jury today. 
"I m not gotng to submit to yw that a 
crime has mt occurred." Kimey rdd Lhe 
jury of tive mea and seven women in blr 
mminn stalemeal. "What Fm s u n n e t h ~  is
mdher; a S w k a n  paycbi.ulsI who u- 
lmicRdIdminjill.Mdnvenlrrlnfframd 
I r i a d c w b o a r l l i r r M t b a ~ a b a d  
~ . a d r d i s l l c h h r v i u g i n n h y s ~ r  
former wives ard girlIda&. Kimey aib 
Spokane psychiatrist Robcrt We(rLr alIt 
w u y  h t  strnrt a ~1yur4  wm w 
rrpliimro sullen imm an "intcnnlLltnt ex- 
dudinn hir own - ch.1 drives him 0 seek 
w o w  in bu Ute 11 crucial to the Itrtc't 
ability to pmve t h t  Shud  irr(endcd to tor- 
uueule b o g t o . d c r t h a n d n d  lmfolRd 
guilty of mdegree murder and made nub- 
t a  to a wrtibk da th  MMce. ,-- 
Kinney kgan preSStiw hi# wi lno ta  Lhlr 
mc&ng with a v i d  Wihide. a SutUc-area 
h k  b d i  n(h both Robertmd Kalhle M U k  
and that he wticed no W y  pmMems 
"It was me, btg happy hmily as fu o 1 
was W U N k  said. 
Clearwater County Prosecutor S t e n  
Calham s h a d  W i i d e  I a n  pholognpb of 
UK breried tad battered body 01 tbe Millu 
boy d m q  emu uunmtioa. 
" U ~ ~ a e t o t i D d o u t L h t C e D c S ~ r ( l p  
fllcccd tbore bruires. muld you k mr- 
nnled?'?' Cahm uked. 
I 'There war mme a re lahaeu .  and I'm wiairntsa to the death. Kinnq said. ' W e d  out. f h c a w i r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ j u r ~  a&hg you to appnuch this as criminal Kinney also told the jumn Uut be wlU dl WWde also said (ht Sinart visited hlm at  W&y aftarman. neglianm.:' K i n e  said. "Alter ~rr~mt ina  dght wllnesxr who wi l l  tmW that tbn 
I 
I 
..I 
i 
1 
Stuart. who ia  charged with l i rs tdegm tuh~. I murder by tonun. wiu uke the nuess Katbie Miller. mother o i  r* &boy, . CALDWELL Idaho IAFI - The late of in effort to ~ Y Y  w i ~ r n a  t1.iarg11id01- I i rland Lo 11x9 his life hi-m and to ulk Sluart's two l o w  wivu and tm, former IrapperCIaudeL. D . l l u J r . . ~ c ~ e d o t f ~ -  inf n;r(cmmU by attornem €Or both lid-. 
- i i a W t  hudiiciplinin5 ulthesun af KatbieMlt girl friends lestified lart week that Stuui d c f m e  murder in tbe8ooting duhd two 
.i , .. I kr. with whom he lived in Orofum in lS1. beal. abused. and In one case. raped ihcm Ihha  game wrrdCIS. mpg be placed in the fkfmre attornqs todily called 1- more 
- ' Stuart will testify Wednsday alkmoon dunng their relationship wl(h him. hamis of a 3rd Districl Cavt Jury today. witnesses u.ho testified they had had .~nplea- 
ind will be the last defense witness. K i ~ e g  The testimony rboul SW.N. allegedly Ju&c Edward Lode directni tk 10- . sin! fnnwnun with Bill Poye. oae o[ the 
=id. Sht delendmt will k p m &  by hi$ sadistic and Jbusive nature toward the ~ M I I .  twoman p d  (o raport at  8 a.m. III two &in I d . & ,  Pirh and G m e  aftlcers. 
&at th; state's evidence.dw mtGw ibrt prteeiim that hc ern never a~hh. . .  which &t humd F e d  her m their hane during 
' ..y& I aould k.- ~ l b ~  .nrm.. 
Mr. Stuart was a sadistic nun, that (be oDIS b d t  UP frustnlh,"  m e y  said. day. I h e S ~ u r t t r i a l l r ~ h e ! d i a Y ~ w  
s u e ' s  evidence dou not ahow (hrt he in- . Wekitzhr's evalwtim of Uu dcfeadent rtn' . "I1 waa quite mnnal. I never aaw my kclmc ~ u ( ~ ~ ~ ~  Laded b (orturc anyone rad that rm- sng be a u d n l  to the jury's uadcntpndiug of the - pmblcmc." WUhide mid 6t S W  and - d prchi.l pmadiag by & MOTP . 
guting that the tragedy of Sept I9 (is11 did . HBtr h d ' i  YP to the death d Robeti MU- N C ~ O ' S  rd.uonrNp. As a h  mttfhl that 
not happen a1 the hand, of r dementd l a  and the m m c t  evduatio. of& Info- bc a& Stuart - enally enwl irr a d  aat d lw* - .. . lair aiil O- *- 
~ a n .  tioo to be riven by ~ h u r t .  d o  a (he on~, wind~= to g . ~ n  - to ~ O W  den- Wk - .. 
Stuart denies accusations . he ... . hit women + 
- , . .. 
beit t h  and p r ~ b a l q i a l i y  abused lhae 
'.I have oeva  in my llle punched a 
woman." Slwn lold the L t r h  County ~uvd 
five m a  aQd Yew -. 
Stuart of Odmo, u cm (rul b M- for 
r sep IS, lml. bar~ly durn of syeudd 
Rokr l  Miller. 
Dduue t u o n r y  R o w  Kinney admrW 
m r  on kw. b u i r k  uw jury G~RUE 
1 venbc( of muulruth(er nrbcr lbrn 16. 
f m t d e g r r  mu* &ma xught by tbs 
State. 
T ~ C  SO* mtmdr that s u n  is a sadist 
who tonured Ur boy lo death lor hi, o w n  
picasurr md h u l d  come under UK first: 
d e g m  murder -lute wbich c n n i a a  par*- 
ble d u b  m k m .  
Clearwater County Prosecutor Steve 
Glboun last week ulled five womm wba 
d m  t ~ a ~ ~ c d  that s&n b t  ud a d ' "  .em rb.riq a S ~ O *  iburb. ~tuut nld; 
&an far UlUe a no mva a. ScluttuldbemDucdaWrcaexhtotbe 
~k emrndr the ta tLrmrj  d (bc him-v .ad "fli&i r U-haa rad b a n d  
d (be roo d b W M U k r .  r i m  rtpa be rsr .Iw hddiru her hud underwater. Stun ILh.' 
l ~ n q  s O d i  ~mrurd: "No SIC. I did mt" 
K)nmhrsohrkaredhrrtlmrcoaab Jacobronlulw~tnuncdthalScct.r(tnd 
tempid: t o  oeutrdlzm Qq women'# meethreatacd herr t tba W e a n d t n d d  
Ca(Mmy4 Lhepufe laaatkrdotbeadf~aoo(ber  
SWn tnlrfi be m w  hft Sbvl a l l y .  hlr Ir-t firs ma, with his flat M did rplnk her foc 
..-UL a wihd hrr tbcir- .. sun rdmltted that be smashed m e  
nrge 10 y u n  *a Lmpromedby&eohrmrt&r~hedc~nst 
h U y  rcr(lflei hat week that Sttun olku bOme da rm.w l nador 
polrcdberudplndrdberbcwalch~ ~~bcr tdcnndLhm-ber r tcb*  
ldevium w mhn( crprdtec . -.-. 
" ~ b c  ydkd someth4  to tbe effect d "I JI-Y-QI~ au* body rep~l- c,,,ld lurtuU (- Ibe colu+cd 
said he did oat try In dmm Therev 
h&m. a former glrlfrimh a a lake near aWm*tt lo Ihe porn( 
Saatt* u Bc tcrtrflad last we& chougM hs'd t ~ . "  Sbnnd "So 1 grabbed 
Jacobron b d  hcom "&mr drunt" a1 1 a butehV Wfe mt d a dnwer and brndcd it 
party aod had 4anugtd ~ . h m t l b a r e  a d  to&... hand*finL.ad l oMhr lopabead  
hhncedlbearl@mca.lialrlo -ru-'@"mIcr"'&fwLbr I f w e  
r ib to tatfly klore lbe defense r u t r  
SLurr t '~  teatinmy ru pnccded by that d 
Sp=+am pychutrut Robert Wetzler, wka q. 
.mud Stuart after his armst. 
compliwe pa0a.111~ A i d  w-h to, 
"benave g n m l y  out d p q m r h  to  oI 
ather slmdatwu" We* uld 
Stuarl's pemculity duDi-2~ oexl hbo (Q 
' l a e  emvd a d  karm angry In phydcd 
way harm Ibal to poplc cau cow W e W  damage rpcd toprcwrt~ or 
Homer. S b v n  do4 not nrlfnfrun am. 
jo rdr rader ru&asamcnta ld l rurdru  
fully aware of neht and nung a! the m e  d 
me Miller child's death. Welder =Id. 
I Prosecutor 
Aec~ucd mu.-dera Gene Fmdr Stuart 
c o ~ c ~ o u s l y  degraded. tortured asd 
d o m h t d  people m bL We to make up for 
hb own insecurity md evmUlally tortured to 
d u b  2-vur-aid Roben Miller. fleurarter 
County &uv Steve CILbam suQ W y .  
"Kr. Kinmy I the defoue attorney I u M  la 
his opening stalemcntr I h t  the state IS wing 
to mint a d m  aboul Mr. Stuart." Calhwn 
said in clming arpvmenu Wore the jury. "1 
view that differently. We've presented La~b 
about'Yr. Sluart ard Mr. Stuart printed his 
o m  pictun in the evidence Lbrt we've 
presented. in the pictures of Be bruised a d  
says Stuart's hsecurity led to torture 
4/14/t-a- 
' bl1;rcd  bod^ of bkrt Milla.* 
S t u n .  31. of ~ m ~ i m .  war a d  of t l n ( b  
degree murder by tortun aft,% the Sep( 19, 
t981. beating dath  of the cbiId. abo w u  tb. 
m o f a  woman w i r ) r a h o m h e r u l W i  
umtml and ~unched blrn in th stomach aad 
vanked hrm. The &M died la lu that a lw-  
mm t m  lntnml blcedlng fmm a tom Uva. 
Defense attornev Robert Kinner i 
Wednday a d m i ~ ' ~ ~ n ' s p u l t ,  bu  ;fat 
~l~ehe)uydLuhC~residanrtofudhu 
climt ~ ~ I l t v  of manrlluhtcr nth tban tbe 
mare Kri& fideg& mllrda charge. 
The defensa eon- that S m r t  did not ID- 
t e n d ~ W I a l n ~ t h e t q M b u t ~  
"Thc evdmce +ha torture slld pain and a 
livlng bell Wt Gene Fnncfr S b r t  plL 
Robert Miller thqk" C;ibtm srid "~Au-s 
mlrLr Stuart did mt  m M  to k 9  xobect 
Mllhr. that's not a quatroa h m  He muted 
lo keep IMlUsrI and tba. people nroucd 
tpm Awe. Xc went to great pama to keep 
' i  
themlrwndrroheemld-Lhemlo 
make up for hi¶ mm la# d KcPnQand 
mali ty (Lna." 
c s ~ ~ ~ t h c ~ o d i w  
behere a delemc py8chuhist rho tcatihd 
t f u t s ~ d i d a o ( m t m t t o h u t t h e ~  
when h 
"I can't bcllcsa fhpr Uut'r mt cutmm 
senre." C.lhnm Wld th J-
The jumn, wm have h op- of f* 
Stuart innoce&, g u r l ~  of f l n t d e g m  
mmder. ~ n d 4 c g r e e  mwda O r  VoluDbn 
or tmol~mtazy mam*upbta. rere t p X t d  
to b 4 m  deUkCElioDI Lhlr If- If* t]a 
defuue r ebsmg s t a r r m e t  
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! 
vs. ) PETITION FOR REHEARING 
GENE F R A N C I S  STUART, 1 
Defendant-Appellant, 1 
) 
j 
. . 
COMES NOW, GENE FRANCIS STUART, the above named defendant- 
11 appellant, by and through his attorney of record, ROBERT E. 
KINNEY, and herewith petitions this Court for Rehearing of the 
Decision on Appeal rendered May 3, 1985. 
This Petition is brought pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
42, Idaho Appellate Rules, . 
DATED this day of May, 
I/ PETITION FOR REHEARING - 1 
ROBERT E. -KINNEY 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true and'correct copy of the 
foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING, was mailed, postage prepaid, 
k!! this 3 0  day of May, 1985, to the following person: 
LYNN E. THOMAS 
Solicitor General 
Attorney Generals Office 
Statehouse 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
& 
ROBERT E. KINNEY 
PETITION FOR REHEARING - 2 
-I i ROBERT E. KINNEY Attorney at Law P.O. B o x  2260 Orof ino, Idaho 83544 Telephone: 476-5781 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ' 1 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
VS. 
1 SUPREME C O ~ R T  . . NO.:: . .:.( * 14865 
1 MEMORANDUM.. :I.N : SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FO:R. .~REHE.~~RING 
GENE FRANC IS STUART, 1 
Defendant-Appellant , 1 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
I I In Petitioning this Court for the opportunity to present I I additional argument in support of his .Appeal, Appellant is fully 
llcognizant of the enhanced burden we must now assume. Ten 
assignments of error were presented and argued at length in our 
initial appeal. After lengthy and laborious consideration, 
lltbis Court has affirmed Appellant's conviction and the subsequent 
11 imposition of the Death Penalty. 
.. 
At this stage of proceedings, w e  cannot and will not attempt 
llto reiterate issues presented earlier. After a lengthy review 
11 of the Opinion of this Court entered May 3, 1985, and assisted by 
R N L I  A T  L A W  
M A I N  STREET 
.o. n o x  zzac 
NO, l n A ~ o  11 MEM~RANDUM IN SUPPORT OF I1 PETITION FOR REHEARING - 1 
ROBERT E. KINNEY 
A t t o r n e y  a t  Law 
P.O.  Box 2 2 6 0  
O r o f i n o ,  I d a h o  83544  . 
T e l e p h o n e :  476-5781 
I N  THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
/ P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t ,  1 SUPREME COURT NO.  1 4 8 6 5  
! 1 
I I 
I ! 
I !  VS. 1 M E M O R A N D U M  I N  SUPPORT O F  
! i PETITION FOR R E H E A R I N G  
I G E N E  FRANCIS STUART, / / ) 
I '  
i I D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t ,  1 I I 
I N T R O D U C T I O N  
ii I n  P e t i t i o n i n g  t h i s  C o u r t  f o r  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  p r e s e n t  1 I 
~ I a d d i t i o n a l  a r g u m e n t  i n  s u p p o r t  of  h i s  A p p e a l ,  A p p e l l a n t  is f u l l y  
I '  
( ! c o g n i z a n t  o f  t h e  e n h a n c e d  b u r d e n  w e  m u s t  now a s s u m e .  Ten  i 
! I  
j !  j 1 I a s s i g n m e n t s  o f  e r r o r  were p r e s e n t e d  a n d  a r g u e d  a t  l e n g t h  i n  o u r  1 
! I  
l l  i n i t i a l  a p p e a l .  A f t e r  l e n g t h y  a n d  l a b o r i o u s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  i 
1 1  
i '  
i i t h i s  C o u r t  h a s  a f f i r m e d  A p p e l l a n t ' s  c o n v i c t i o n  and t h e  s u b s e q u e n t  i 1 i 
i i i m p o s i t i o n  I .  o f  t h e  D e a t h  P e n a l t y .  
I .  
I1 A t  t h i s  s t a g e  o f  p r o c e e d i n g s ,  w e  c a n n o t  a n d  w i l l  n o t  a t t e m p t  I I 
i I I i ' t o  r e i t e r a t e  i s s u e s  p r e s e n t e d  e a r l i e r .  A f t e r  a  l e n g t h y  r e v i e w  i ! I  
I IT  E. ICIKNEY 
H N E Y  AT L A W  
M A I N  S T R E E T  
0.  8 O X  22.0 
NO. IDAHO (3644 
478..7.! 
i ! o f  t h e  O p i n i o n  o f  t h i s  C o u r t  e n t e r e d  May 3 ,  1985 ,  and  a s s i s t e d  by j ! i 
I i I i I 
MEMORANDUM I N  SUPPORT OF 
' P E T ~ T I O N  FOR REHEARItdE - 1 
.I 
I I t h e  b e n e f i t  of! h i n d s i g h t ,  A p p e l l a n t  f e e l s  s e v e r a l  d i s t i n c t  a r e a s  
! e x i s t  w h i c h  w a r r a n t  a d d i t i o n a l  b r i e f i n g  a n d  a r g u m e n t .  T h e  
1 
l l p o i n t s  w e  w i s h  t o  a d d r e s s  o n  r e h e a r i n g ,  a n d  u p o n  w h i c h  o u r  
I I P e t i t i o n  is  f o u n d e d ,  a r e  set f o r t h  b e l o w .  
RP E. K I ~ X T  
N N B V  AT L A W  
* * I N  STRECT 
D. *OX 2260 
10. I D I n O  #I644 
478-0781  
I N  ITS  REVIEW OF THE SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT 
TRIAL TO WARRANT A J U R Y  INSTRUCTION A N D  SUBSEQUENT CONVICTION O N  
A M U R D E R  B Y  TORTURE CHARGE, THIS COURT OVERLOOKED THE S P E C I F I C  
LANGUAGE OF THE AMENDED INFORMATION WHICH (1) CONFINED THE 
CHARGES TO THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 1 9 , 1 9 8 1 ,  A N D  ( 2 )  RENDERED 
IMPROPER A J U R Y  INSTRUCTION PERMITTING A FINDING OF GUILT 
IRRESPECTIVE OF PROOF OF INTENT TO CAUSE SUFFERING. 
] [ e v i d e n c e  t o  t h e  j u r y  c o n c e r n i n g  a l l e g a t i o n s  o f  a c t s  c o m m i t t e d  by 
i 
/ i A p p e l l a n t  a n d  a g a i n s t  t h e  d e c e a s e d  w h i c h  o c c u r e d  p r i o r  t o  
A p p e l l a n t  f i r s t  c o n t e n d s  t h a t  t h e  l a n g u a g e  o f  t h e  A m e n d e d  
/ I  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 ,  1 9 8 1 .  T h e  c h a r g i n g  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  A m e n d e d  
I n f o r m a t i o n ,  upon w h i c h  h e  s t o o d  t r i a l ,  p r e v e n t e d  s u b m i s s i o n  o f  
I  I 
/ I ~ n f o r m a t i o n  r e a d  a s  f o l l o w s :  
T h a t  GENE FRANCIS STUART of  O r o f i n o ,  I d a h o ,  on  o r  a b o u t  
t h e  1 9 t h  d a y  o f  S e p t e m b e r ,  1 9 8 1 ,  a t  O r o f i n o ,  i n  t h e  
C o u n t y  o f  C l e a r w a t e r ,  S t a t e  o f  I d a h o ,  t h e n  a n d  t h e r e  
b e i n g ,  d i d  t h e n  a n d  t h e r e  u n a w f u l l y  a n d  f e l o n i o u s l y  
k i l l  a human b e i n g  w i t h  t h e  i n t e n t i o n a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  
t o r t u r e  t o  s a i d  h u m a n  b e i n g ,  t o - w i t :  T h a t  t h e  s a i d  
GENE FRANCIS STUART d i d  s t r i k e  a n d  h i t  ROBERT MILLER, a 
h u m a n  b e i n g ,  r e p e a t e d l y  w i t h  t h e  i n t e n t  t o  c a u s e  
s u f f e r i n g  o r  t o  s a t i s f y  s o m e  s a d i s t i c  i n c l i n a t i o n  o f  
t h e  s a i d  GENE FRANCIS STUART, t h e r e b y  i n f l i c t i n g  g r e a t  
b o d i l y  i n j u r y  upon ROBERT MILLER a n d  m o r t a l l y  w o u n d i n g  
ROBERT MILLER, f r o m  w h i c h  w o u n d s  t h e  s a i d  ROBERT 
MILLER, a t h r e e  ( 3 )  y e a r  o l d  b o y ,  s i c k e n e d  a n d  d i e d  i n  
t h e  C o u n t y  o f  C l e a r w a t e r ,  S t a t e  o f  I d a h o ,  o n  t h e  1 9 t h  
d a y  o f  S e p t e m b e r ,  1 9 8 1 .  
A s  n o t e d  b y  J u s t i c e  B i s t l i n e ,  A p p e l l a n t  o b j e c t e d  a t  e v e r y  
o f  t h e  p r o c e e d i n g s ,  f r o m  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  h e a r i n g  t h r o u g h  
/ b r i a l ,  t o  a n y  e v i d e n c e  o f  e v e n t s  w h i c h  a l l e g e d l y  o c c u r e d  p r i o r  t o  
I I 
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I 
S e p t e m b e r  1 9 ,  1981 .  The S t a t e  e l e c t e d  t o  c h a r g e  t h e  d e f e n d a n t ,  I I I a s  t h e  f a c t s  i l l u s t r a t e d ,  w i t h  c o m m i s s i o n  o f  a  h o m i c i d e  o n  o r  I 1 1  a b b u t  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 ,  1981.  I I /  M o s t  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  a m e n d e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  u p o n  I 
I I added) T h i s  C o u r t ,  i n  c o n s i d e r i n g  p r i o r  C a l i f o r n i a  p r e c e d e n t  
w h i c h  d e f e n d a n t  s t o o d  t r i a l  c h a r g e d  A p p e l l a n t  w i t h  t h e  
i n t e n t i o n a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t o r t u r e  w i t h  t h e  i n t e n t  t o  c a u s e  
s u f f e r i n g  o r  t o  s a t i s f y  s o m e  s a d i s t i c  i n c l i n a t i o n .  ( e m p h a s i s  
( ) a c k n o w l e d g e d  t h a t  a  m u r d e r  by t o r t u r e  c h a r g e  m u s t  b e  s u p p o r t e d  by / 
1 
I !  p r o o f  o f  " i n t e n t  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  t h a t  t h e  v i c t i m  ! 
I ( s u f f e r t ' .  (May 3 ,  1 9 8 5 ,  O p i n i o n ,  p a g e  6)  P e o p l e  C a l d w e l l ,  279  
I 
P. 2d 5 3 9 .  I n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  c l e a r  l a n g u a g e  o f  t h e  a m e n d e d  
I 
I n f o r m a t i o n ,  t h e  T r i a l  C o u r t  i n s t r u c t e d  t h e  j u r y  t h a t ,  " i t  s h a l l  / 
r 
I I a l s o  b e  t o r t u r e  t o  i n f l i c t  on a  human b e i n g  e x t r e m e  a n d  p r o l o n g e d  / I I 
I l a c t s  o f  b r u t a l i t y  i r r e s p e c t i v e  - o f  p r o o f  - o f  i n t e n t  -- t o  c a u s e  I I 1 1  s u f f e r i n g "  ( J u r y  ~ n s t r u c t i o n  No. 1 8 )  ( e m p h a s i s  a d d e d ) .  I I 
I i I A s  n o t e d  by J u s t i c e  B i s t l i n e ,  t h i s  I n s t r u c t i o n  r e l i e v e d  t h e  j , I! j u r y  f r o m  a n y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  f i n d  p r o o f  o f  i n t e n t  t o  c a u s e  1 i 
l l s u f f e r i n g .  I t  a l s o  p e r m i t t e d  a  f i n d i n g  o f  g u i l t  i f  t h e  j u r y  1 j .. 
, * 
I 
f o u n d  e x t r e m e  a n d  p r o l o n g e d  a c t s  o f  b r u t a l i t y  t o  h a v e  e x i s t e d ,  ! 
I 
l d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  s u c h  a c t s  were n o t  c h a r g e d  i n  t h e  Amended  I I I 
I / I n f o r m a t i o n ,  n o r  s u p p o r t e d  by a n y  r e a s o n a b l e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  1 i 
e v e n t s  w h i c h  o c c u r e d  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 ,  1 9 8 1 .  A p p e l l a n t  r e a d i l y  1 I 
I 
a c k n o w l e d g e d  a t  t r i a l  t h a t ,  on S e p t e m b e r  1 9 ,  1 9 8 1 ,  h e  p o k e d  young  : 
I 
~ I R O B E R T  MILLER i n  t h e  c h e s t ,  s p a n k e d  h i m ,  a n d  s t r u c k  t h e  b l o w  , 
I 
KT E. KINNET 
O N L Y  A T  L A W  
**IN STREET 
/ j  . . 
0 .  . O X  22W I 
0 .  t o  4 4  MEMORANDUM I N  SUPPORT OF 
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I 
>aaaT E. xxxmsr 
l T O l N L Y  A T  L A W  
1.1 M A 4 N  S T R E E T  
P.0. -0% Z160 
ORINO. I D A H O  SSSd4 
47cl.s7*t 
( / c o n s i d e r e d  b o t h  a t  t r i a l  a n d  on  A p p e a l ,  w a s  n o t  A p p e l l a n t ' s  I I I a c t i o n s ,  b u t  h i s  s t a t e  o f  m i n d  o n  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 ,  1 9 8 1 ,  t h e  d a y  
l l t h e s e  a c t s  w e r e  c o m m i t t e d .  . A s  t h e  T r i a l  C o u r t  i n d i c a t e d  on  1 
I I p a g e s  449-450 o f  t h e  T r i a l  T r a n s c r i p t ,  a n d  q u o t e d  b y  t h i s  C o u r t  i 1 i n  i t s  May 3 ,  1 9 8 5 ,  O p i n i o n  a t  p a g e s  11-12: 
". . . i n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e ,  t h e  P r o s e c u t o r  m u s t  
c o n v i n c e  t h e  t r i e r  o f  f a c t  t h a t  y o u r  c l i e n t  was e n g a g e d  
i n  a  c o u r s e  o f  t o r t u r e .  And p r o d u c e d  t h i s  c h i l d ' s  
d e a t h ,  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n t e n d i n g  d e a t h  b u t  o n l y  
i n t e n d i n g  t o r t u r e  . . . And s o  t h i s  c a s e ,  t o  a  g r e a t  
e x t e n t ,  is  g o i n g  t o  t u r n  upon wha t  t h e  j u r y  t h i n k s  was  
g o i n g  o n  i n  y o u r  c l i e n t ' s  m i n d  d u r i n g  t h a t  i n t e r v a l  
when  h e  d e a l t  w i t h  t h i s  c h i l d  . . . I' 
I ! A s  n o t e d  a b o v e ,  a l l  p a r t i e s  w e r e  a w a r e  t h a t  t h e  c h a r g e  i n  [ I i 
l q u e s t i o n  c o u l d  o n l y  be  s u p p o r t e d  by a s h o w i n g  o f  i n t e n t  o n  t h e  I 
I 
r / I p a r t  o f  A p p e l l a n t  t o  c a u s e  s u f f e r i n g  o r  t o  s a t i s f y  s o m e  s a d i s t i c  1 
I / i n c l i n a t i o n .  I I n d e e d ,  t h i s  e l e m e n t  o f  i n t e n t  was c o n s i d e r e d  by i I lithe T r i a l  C o u r t  t o  be s o  i m p o r t a n t  t h a t  i t  a l l o w e d  a d m i t t e d l y  i 
I / / i p r e j u d i c i a l  e v i d e n c e  t o  be p r e s e n t e d  a t  T r i a l  c o n c e r n i n g  e v e n t s ,  j I 
/ / u n r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  crime c h a r g e d  o r  t o  i t s  v i c t i m ,  a n d  w h i c h  i 
/ / a l l e g e d l y  o c c c u r e d  a s  d i s t a n t  a s  t e n  (10)  y e a r s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  d a t e  I 
I I I o f  ROBERT MILLER'S d e a t h .  J u r y  I n s t r u c t i o n  Number  1 8 ,  w h i c h  i 
/ / o b v i a t e d  a n y  n e c e s s i t y  o f  a f i n d i n g  o f  i n t e n t  t o  c a u s e  
I I I s u f f e r i n g ,  i f  e x t r e m e  and  p r o l o n g e d  a c t s  o f  b r u t a l i t y  were f o u n d  1 1 )  t o  h a v e  e x i s t e d ,  w a s  e x t r e m e l y  i m p r o p e r  g i v e n  t h e  s p e c i f i c  1 ! / I  l a n g u a g e  o f  t h e  Amended I n f o r m a t i o n .  1t i s  e q u a l l y  i 
I ! 
a p p a r e n t  t h a t ,  i f  s u c h  i n t e n t  n e e d  n o t  be  p r o v e n ,  t h e  p r o p r i e t y  1 
I 
i 
o f  a l l o w i n g  a d m i t t e d l y  p r e j u d i c i a l  e v i d e n c e  f o r  p u r p o s e s  (1 
I 
I 
i 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING - 4 
I I c a u s e  s u f f e r i n g  n e e d  n o t  b e  p r o v e n ,  i t  c a n n o t  b e  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  I 
I I p r o b a t i v e  v a l u e  o f  t h i s  e v i d e n c e  o u t w e i g h e d  i t s  h i g h l y  
I I p r e j u d i c i a l  e f f e c t .  1 
W e  s h a l l  n e v e r  know w h e t h e r  t h e  j u r y  v e r d i c t  i n  t h i s  c a s e  
I I w a s  p r e d i c a t e d  u p o n  a  f i n d i n g  o f  i n t e n t  t o  c a u s e  s u f f e r i n g  on  t h e  
p a r t  o f  A p p e l l a n t .  I n s t r u c t i o n  Number  1 8  i s  a t  v a r i a n c e  n o t  
I I o n l y  w i t h  t h e  L a w , b u t  w i t h  t h e  e v i d e n c e  a n d  t h e  c h a r g e  f o r  w h i c h  
A p p e l l a n t  s t o o d  t r i a l .  I I I i I f e e l  c o m p e l l e d  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  t o  c o m m e n t  c o n c e r n i n g  my I I 
i l f a i l u r e  t o  o b j e c t  t o  t h e  J u r y  I n s t r u c t i o n s  g i v e n  by t h e  C o u r t  a t  i I I t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  T r i a l .  T h e  m a j o r i t y ,  i n  t h e  O p i n i o n  o f  t h i s  1 
/ ( c o u r t  e n t e r e d  May 3 ,  1 9 8 5 ,  c o n c l u d e d  r a t h e r  s u m m a r i l y ,  t h a t  
I : 
1 ) " i n v i t e d  e r r o r "  i n  a c c e p t i n g  t h e s e  I n s t r u c t i o n s .  I n  o v e r  n i n e  
9 y e a r s  o f  p r a c t i c e ,  I h a v e  n e v e r  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  o r  c o n s c i o u s l y  1 
c o n d u c t e d  a  t r i a l  w i t h  a n  A p p e a l  i n  m i n d .  I n  a  m a t t e r  t h i s  I 
/ I g r a v e ,  t o  d o  s o  w o u l d ,  i n  my o p i n i o n ,  b e  m o r a l l y  a n d  e t h i c a l l y  1 
I 
I l i rnproper .   his T r i a l  was  t h e  m o s t  e m o t i o n a l  and d i f f i c u l t  I h a v e  I 
l j e v e r  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n .  I c a n  o n l y  a t t r i b u t e  t h i s  o v e r s i g h t  t o  1 
! 
I f a t i g u e  and  t h e  p r e s s u r e s  of  t h e  m o m e n t .  T h r o u g h  t h e  c l e a r  1 
i 
I i g l a s s  o f  h i n d s i g h t ,  w e  a l l  l e a r n  f r o m  o u r  m i s t a k e s .  I  a s s u r e  / 
I 
! I t h e  C o u r t ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  I d i d  n o t  i n v i t e  e r r o r  i n  t h i s  o r  a n y  / 
n~ B. Knnmr 
I N E Y  AT L A W  
M A I N  CTRLKT 
0.  DOX l.0 
NO. l D 4 H O  SlS44 
47S-S?.( 
I 
THIS COURT E R R E D  I N  CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED A 1 
FINDING B Y  THE SENTENCING JUDGE OF STATUTORY A G G R A V A T I N G  I 
CIRCUMSTANCES S U F F I C I E N T  TO J U S T I F Y  A SENTENCE O F  DEATH.  i 
! 
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I I I d a h o  Code S e c t i o n  1 9 - 2 8 2 7  r e q u i r e s  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  t o  I I r e v i e w  t h e  T r i a l  C o u r t ' s  f i n d i n g s  o f  a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n  
\ I a n y  c a s e  i n  w h i c h  t h e  D e a t h  P e n a l t y  h a s  b e e n  i m p o s e d .  A t  l e a s t  
I I o n e  s t a t u t o r y  a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e  m u s t  b e  f o u n d  t o  e x i s t  I I beyond a  r e a s o n a b l e  doub t .  I n  t h e  c a s e  now b e f o r e  t h e  C o u r t ,  t h e  
s e n t e n c i n g  J u d g e  f o u n d  t w o  ( 2 )  o f  t h e  t e n  ( 1 0 )  a g g r a v a t i n g  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  s e t  f o r t h  i n  I d a h o  C o d e  S e c t i o n  1 9 - 2 5 1 5 ,  t o  h a v e  
b e e n  p r o v e n  b e y o n d  a  r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t .  A p p e l l a n t  r e s p e c t f u l l y  
c o n t e n d s  t h a t  t h i s  C o u r t  e r r e d  i n  c o n c l u d i n g  t h a t  t h e  e v i d e n c e  
/ / u t i l i z e d  by t h e  T r i a l  C o u r t  s u p p o r t e d  s u c h  a  f i n d i n g  b e y o n d  a  
r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t .  
The f i r s t  a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e  r e l i e d  upon by t h e  T r i a l  
C o u r t  a n d  s e t  f o r t h  i n  I d a h o  C o d e  S e c t i o n  1 9 - 2 5 1 5  ( f )  ( 5 ) ,  
r e q u i r e s  a  f i n d i n g  t h a t  " t h e  m u r d e r  ( b e )  e s p e c i a l l y  h e i n o u s ,  
I I a t r o c i o u s  o r  c r u e l ,  m a n i f e s t i n g  e x c e p t i o n a l  d e p r a v i t y . "  The 
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  S u p r e m e  C o u r t ,  i n  P r o f i t t  - v. --- F l o r i d a ,  4 3 8  U.S. 2 4 2  
( 1 9 7 6 ) ,  n o t e d  w i t h  a p p r o v a l  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  " e s p e c . i a l l y  
h e i n o u s ,  a t r o c i o u s  o r  c r u e l " ,  u t i l i z e d  b y  t h e  F l o r i d a  S u p r e m e  
C o u r t  i n  S t a t e  v .  D i x o n ,  2 8 3  S o .  2d 1 ( F l a .  1 9 7 3 ) ,  w h i c h  
----- - ----- 
d e f i n i t i o n  was s u b s e q u e n t l y  q u o t e d  w i t h  a p p r o v a l  by t h i s  C o u r t  i n  
S t a t e  - v. O s b o r n e ,  1 0 2  I d a h o  40.5, 4 1 8 ;  6 3 1  P. 2d 1 8 7 ,  2 0 0  ( 1 9 8 1 ) .  
[ T h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  a s  f o l l o w s :  
ERT E. 
3 R N B Y  AT L A W  
M A I N  STREET 
" w h a t  i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  b e  i n c l u d e d  w e r e  t h o s e  c a p i t a l  
c r i m e s  w h e r e  t h e  -- a c t u a l --- c o m m i s s i o n  o f  t h e  c a p i t a l  
f e l o n y  w a s  a c c o m p a n i e d  b y  s u c h  a d d i t i o n a l  a c t s  a s  t o  
s e t  t h e  c r i m e  a p a r t  f r o m  t h e  n o r m  o f  c a p i t a l  
f e l o n i e s  -- t h e  c o n s c i e n c e l e s s  o r  p i t i l e s s  crime which  
i s  u n n e c e s s a r i l y  t o r t u r o u s  t o  t h e  v i c t i m . "  ( e m p h a s i s  
added )  
..O. .OX 1160 
INO, IDAHO ass44 
6?S-a7a$ 
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l A N L Y  AT L A W  
M A I N  STILES 
'.O. .OX 1160 
INO. IDAHO eS.44 
A 7 0 - 6 7 m I  
The a c t u a l  c o m m i s s i o n  o f  t h e  o f f e n s e  c h a r g e d  i n  t h i s  c a s e  
o c c u r e d  w i t h o u t  d o u b t  on  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 ,  1 9 8 1 .  T h e  p h y s i c a l  
l l e v e n t s  w h i c h  o c c u r e d  t h a t  d a y  c o u p l e d  w i t h  A p p e l l a n t ' s  own 
I I a d m i s s i o n ,  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  h e  s t r u c k  ROBERT MILLER w i t h  a  blow t o  I I t h e  a b d o m e n ,  p o k e d  h i m  w i t h  h i s  f i n g e r ,  a n d  s p a n k e d  h i m  o n c e .  ( 1  ROBERT MILLER d i e d  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  b low t o  t h e  abdomen a l o n e .  
( ( W h i l e  t h e  s t r i k i n g  o f  a  t h r e e  ( 3 )  y e a r  o l d  i n  t h i s  f a s h i o n  i s  
I I u n q u e s t i o n a b l y  a  b r u t a l  a c t ,  t o  f i n d  a n  a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e  
a c t u a l  c o m m i s s i o n  
--- 
t h e  c a p i t a l  o f f e n s e  m u s t  h a v e  b e e n  
accompan ied  by a d d i t i o n a l  a c t s  which would s e t  t h i s  crime a p a r t  
f r o m  t h e  norm o f  f e l o n i e s ,  a s  t h e  s a m e  i s  d e f i n e d  a b o v e .  The  
e v e n t s  w h i c h  o c c u r e d  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 ,  1 9 8 1 ,  d o  n o t  s u p p o r t  t h e  
f i n d i n g  o f  t h i s  a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e  e v e n  by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e  
o f  t h e  e v i d e n c e .  I f  w e  c o u l d  c o n c l u d e  w i t h o u t  d o u b t  t h a t  
A p p e l l a n t  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  t o r t u r e d  ROBERT MILLER, o r  had  t h e  i n t e n t  
t o  c a u s e  s u f f e r i n g  o r  s a t i s f y  s o m e  s a d i s t i c  i n c l i n a t i o n ,  a  1 1  f i n d i n g  beyond a  r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t  t h a t  t h e  crime was e s p e c i a l l y  
1 1  h e i n o u s ,  a t r o c i o u s  o r  c r u e l ,  a n d  m a n i f e s t e d  e x c e p t i o n a l  
I I d e p r a v i t y ,  would b e  j u s t i f i e d .  J u r y  I n s t r u c t i o n  Number 18 ,  a s  1 1  d i s c u s s e d  a b o v e ,  p e r m i t t e d  a  f i n d i n g  t h a t  A p p e l l a n t  c o m m i t t e d  
I /  t o r t u r e  by extreme and p r o l o n g e d  a c t s  of b r u t a l i t y ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  
p r o o f  
----- 
i n t e n t  
------ 
c a u s e  
----- 
s u f f e r  i n e .  
-------- 
( e m p h a s i s  a d d e d ) .  
1 1  A p p e l l a n t  e m p h a t i c a l l y  c o n t e n d s  t h a t  u n l e s s  s u c h  i n t e n t  i s  made 
I I c l e a r  i n  t h e  J u r y  V e r d i c t ,  t h e  r e q u i s i t e  p r o o f  o f  t h i s  
a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e  h a s  n o t  been  m e t .  Moreove r ,  t h e  a c t s  
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l l a p a r t  f r o m  t h e  norm o f  c a p i t a l  f e l o n i e s  a s  r e q u i r e d  by t h e  
I I s t a t u t e .  Even  a  c u r s o r y  r e v i e w  o f  t h e  e v i d e n c e  d i s c l o s e s  t h e  I I e x i s t a n c e  o f  r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  1 1  ~ d a h o  Code S e c t i o n  19-2515 ( f )  ( 5 ) .  
I I The T r i a l  C o u r t  a l s o  found t h a t  t h e  a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e  
llset f o r t h  i n  I d a h o  C o d e  S e c t i o n  1 9 - 2 5 1 5  (£1 (8), e x i s t s  b e y o n d  a 
I l r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t .  T h i s  s t a t u t e  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  s e n t e n c i n g  
I I J u d g e  f i n d  b o t h  a  p r o p e n s i t y  t o  commit  murder  and t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
l lo f  a  c o n t i n u i n g  t h r e a t  t o  s o c i e t y  on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  a c c u s e d .  
I I I t  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  d e a t h  s h o u l d  b e  i m p o s e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  e l i m i n a t e  I I t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  s i m i l a r  c r i m e s  may be c o m m i t t e d  b y  t h e  same 
I i i n d i v i d u a l  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  I I The a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e  se t  f o r t h  i n  I d a h o  Code  S e c t i o n  
1119-2515 ( f )  ( 8 )  , w a s  r e c e n t l y  r e l i e d  u p o n  . b y  t h i  s C o u r t  i n  
I I a f f  i r m i n g  t h e  D e a t h  S e n t e n c e  i m p o s e d  i n  S t a t e  - -  v. C r e e c h ,  1 0 5  
I I 1 d a h o  3 6 2 ;  6 7 0  P .  26 4 6 3 .  I n  ------ C r e e c h ,  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  . h a d  
I I m u r d e r e d  a  f e l l o w  p r i s o n  i n m a t e ,  h a d  c o m m i t t e d  f o u r  ( 4 )  p r i o r  I I m u r d e r s ,  and o t h e r  murde r  c h a r g e s  were  p e n d i n g  a g a i n s t  him. H e  
llhad shown a  p r o p e n s i t y  t o  commit  murder  beyond a  r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t  
1 I and was "a w i l l i n g ,  p r e d i s p o s e d  k i l l e r ,  a  k i l l e r  who t e n d s  t o w a r d  
l l d e s t r o y i n g  t h e  l i f e  o f  a n o t h e r  . . ." 1 0 5  I d a h o  3 6 2 ,  a t  371 .  
I I A p p e l l a n t ,  h o w e v e r ,  h a s  d e m o n s t r a t e d  n e i t h e r  a  p r o p e n s i t y  t o  
I l m u r d e r ,  n o r  p o s e s  s u c h  t h r e a t  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  H i s  o n l y  a c t s  o f  
I l v i o l e n c e  i n  t h e  p a s t  h a v e  b e e n  d i r e c t e d  t o w a r d  c h i l d r e n  a n d  
,m E. mxlrsT 
1NEY A T  L A W  
1 A I  N STREET 
D. .OX uaa 
women. Were h i s  s e n t e n c e  commuted t o  l i f e  i n s t e a d  o f  d e a t h ,  t h e  
1DAnom*644 
n a - s 7 m t  
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11 v i c t i m s  t o w a r d  whom h e  h a s  e x h i b i t e d  a  p r o p e n s i t y  f o r  v i o l e n c e ,  
l l n a m e l y  women a n d  c h i l d r e n ,  would  n o t  b e  p r e s e n t .  The s e n t e n c i n g  I 
1 I J u d g e ,  a n d  t h i s  C o u r t ,  h a v e  i g n o r e d  t h e  e f f i c a c y  o f  t h e  p r i s o n  I I s y s t e m  i n  d e t e r r i n g  t h e  v e r y  c o n d u c t  f o r  w h i c h  A p p e l l a n t  now 1 1  s t a n d s  c o n v i c t e d .  I 
THE SENTENCING J U D G E  I G N O R E D  THE CLEAR MANDATE OF I D A H O  CODE 
SECTION 1 9 - 2 5 1 6  I N  U T I L I Z I N G  HEARSAY EVIDENCE AS A BASIS FOR 
IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY. 
I I I d a h o  C o d e  S e c t i o n  19-2515  ( f )  s t a t e s :  I i l " ( f )  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  a r e  s t a t u t o r y  a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  a t  l e a s t  o n e  (1) o f  w h i c h  m u s t  b e  f o u n d  
t o  e x i s t  beyond  - a  r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t  b e f o r e  a  s e n t e n c e  o f  
d e a t h  c a n  b e  i m p o s e d :  . . ." ( e m p h a s i s  a d d e d )  ! i I 
! I 
I d a h o  Code  19-2516 p r o v i d e s  a s  f o l l o w s :  1 
I 
" I N Q U I R Y  I N T O  CIRCUMSTANCES -- E X A M I N A T I O N  OF 
WITNESSES.  -- (The c i r c u m s t a n c e s  m u s t  -- be p r e s e n t e d  ~ 
t h e  tes t imony - - o f  - w i t n e s s e s  --- e x a m i n e d  - i n o p e n  C o u r t ) ,  
e x c e p t  t h a t  w h e n  a w i t n e s s  i s  s o  s i c k  o r  i n f o r m  a s  t o  
be u n a b l e  t o  a t t e n d ,  h i s  d e p o s i t i o n  may be t a k e n  by a  
M a g i s t r a t e  o f  t h e  C o u n t y ,  o u r  o f  C o u r t ,  u p o n  s u c h  
n o t i c e  t o  t h e  a d v e r s e  p a r t y  a s  t h e  C o u r t  may d i r e c t .  
No a f f  i d a v i t  o r  t e s t i m o n y ,  o r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  3 
- 
k i n d ,  v e r b a l  o r w r i t t e n ,  -- c a n  b e  o f f e r e d  - t o - o r  r e c e i v e d  
Q - t h e  -- ~ o u r t y o r  a J u d g e  t h e r e o f ,  i n  a g g r a v a t i o n  o r  
m i t i g a t i o n  o f  t h e  p u n i s h m e n t ,  e x c e p t  a s  p r o v i d e d  in 
- -- -- 
t h i s  a n d  t h e  p r e c e e d i n g  s e c i t o n ,  ( e m p h a s i s  a d d e d )  
I I I t  i s  c l e a r l y  t h e  d u t y  o f  t h e  s e n t e n c i n g  C o u r t  i n  c a p i t a l  I 
I I c a s e s  t o  r e c e i v e  t e s t i m o n y  i n  open  C o u r t  c o n c e r n i n g  a g g r a v a t i n g  i I I o r  m i t i g a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  u n d e r  I d a h o  C o d e  S e c t i o n  1 9 - 2 5 1 5 .  
/ / ~ t  t h e  S e n t e n c i n g  H e a r i n g  h e l d  D e c e m b e r  1, 1 9 8 2 ,  t h e  S t a t e  I I I p r e s e n t e d  o n e  (1) w i t n e s s ,  who  w a s  t h e  C l e a r w a t e r  C o u n t y  J a i l  - 1  I 
RT E. KIIWLT 
R N E Y  A T  L A W  
d A I N  E T R E C T  
0.  .OX Z Z M  
'40, I D L H O  .am44 
476-17.1 
A d m i n i s t r a t o r .  H i s  t e s t i m o n y  w a s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  
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d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  h a d  n o t  shown r e m o r s e  w h i l e  
i n c a r c e r a t e d  a n d  a w a i t i n g  T r i a l .  I n  s t r i k i n g  a l l  t e s t i m o n y  o f  
I I t h i s  w i t n e s s ,  t h e  s e n t e n c i n g  J u d g e  d e e m e d  h i s  t e s t i m o n y  
i r r e l e v a n t  and imprope r .  ( T r a n s c r i p t  o f  s e n t e n c i n g  H e a r i n g ,  page  
2 7 ) .  T h e r e a f t e r ,  A p p e l l a n t  was c a l l e d  by  t h e  d e f e n s e  a s  a  
w i t n e s s ,  i n  an  a t t e m p t  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  t h a t  he  h a d  c o o p e r a t e d  w i t h  
t h e  p o l i c e  i n  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of ROBERT MILLER'S d e a t h .  T h e r e  
I I were no o t h e r  w i t n e s s e s  who t e s t i f i e d  a t  t h e  S e n t e n c i n g  H e a r i n g  
h e l d  December 1, 1982. 
A f t e r  t h e  C o u r t  h a d  s t r i k e n  t h e  t e s t i m o n y  p r e s e n t e d  b y  t h e  I /  S t a t e ' s  o n l y  w i t n e s s ,  t h e  d e f e n s e  i n d i c a t e d  c l e a r l y  i t s  
I I u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h a t  t h e  S t a t e  would r e l y  o n l y  upon T r i a l  t e s t i m o n y  11 and a rgumen t  p r e s e n t e d  a t  t h e  q e n t e n c i n g  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  its c l a i m  
t h a t  s t a t u t o r y  a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  e x i s t e d .  T h i s  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  is  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  t r a n s c r i p t  o f  t h e  December 1, 
1 1  1 9 8 2 ,  Hea r ing  on p a g e  2 8  a s  f o l l o w s :  
I I MR. CALHOUN: I n  l i g h t  o f  t h a t ,  y o u r  H o n o r ,  t h e  S t a t e  h a s  no f u r t h e r  w i t n e s s e s .  
THE COURT: Does t h e  D e f e n s e  h a v e  a n y  w i t n e s s e s ?  
MR.  KINNEY: Y o u r  H o n o r ,  i n  l i g h t  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
S t a t e  h a s  p r e s e n t e d  n o  w i t n e s s e s  i n  a g g r a v a t i o n  i n  
a d d i t i o n  t o ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  T r i a l  t e s t i m o n y ,  w e  t e n d  t o  
a l s o  r e l y  on t h e  T r i a l  and a rgumen t .  
A t  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  S e n t e n c i n g  J u d g e ,  A p p e l l a n t ' s  
c o u n s e l  a rgued  f i r s t ,  i n  a n  e f f o r t  t o  p e r s u a d e  t h e  C o u r t  a g a i n s t  
1 1  i m p o s i n g  t h e  D e a t h  P e n a l t y .  ( T r a n s c r i p t  o f  D e c e m b e r  1, 1 9 8 2 ,  1 I H e a r i n g ,  p a g e s  3 4  a n d  3 5 ) .  A p p e l l a n t ' s  a t t o r n e y  a r g u e d  t h a t  
5 R T  E. MY 
Y R N E Y  A 7  L & W  
M A I N  STREET 
-0 .  .OX 22- 
INO. IOAHO U S 4 4  
476-878! 
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l l t e s t i m o n y  t a k e n  o u t s i d e  t h a t  i n t r o d u c e d a t    rial c o u l d  n o t  be  u s e d  f 
l l ~ e c e m b e r  1, 1 9 8 2 ,  H e a r i n g ,  p a g e  4 6  l i n e s  7 ,  8 , 9 ,  1 0 ,  and  11). I 
I 
I I T h e  P r o s e c u t i n g  A t t o r n e y ,  h o w e v e r ,  i n s i s t e d  u p o n  a r g u i n g  
I 
a s  a g g r a v a t i o n  a t  t h e  S e n t e n c i n g  H e a r i n g .  ( T r a n s c r i p t  o f  
I I i n c i d e n t s  a l l e g e d  t o  h a v e  o c c u r e d  a t  t h e  P r e l i m i n a r y  H e a r i n g ,  and  I I I n o t  a d m i t t e d  a t  T r i a l .  ( T r a n s c r i p t  o f  December 1, 1 9 8 2 ,  H e a r i n g  
I I A f t e r  a r g u m e n t s  o f  c o u n s e l  were c o m p l e t e d ,  t h e  C o u r t  / /  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  i t  would n o t  c o n s i d e r  h e a r s a y  ev idence  u n f a v o r a b l e  I / /  t o  d e f e n d a n t  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  w h e t h e r  a  s t a t u t o r y  a g g r a v a t i n g  
I I c i r c u m s t a n c e  h a d  b e e n  p r o v e n  b e y o n d  a  r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t .  T h e  / I I I s e n t e n c i n g  J u d g e ' s  comments  c o n c e r n i n g  u s e  o f  h e a r s a y  e v i d e n c e  a t  I I 11 t h i s  s t a g e  o f  t h e  p r o c e e d i n g s ,  a r e  s e t  f o r t h  a s  f o l l o w s :  I 
I 
THE COURT: I w o u l d  l i k e  t o  m a k e  o n e  comment  a t  t h i s  
t i m e  b e f o r e  w e  recess. T h i s  r e p o r t  d o e s  c o n t a i n  -- a  
P r e  S e n t e n c e  r e p o r t  c o n t a i n s  a  h e a r s a y  s t a t e m e n t  f rom 
t h e  d e f e n d a n t ' s  n a t u r a l  c h i l d .  I am c o n v i n c e d  t h a t  
b e c a u s e  I m u s t  f i n d  any a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e  t o  be 
d e m o n s t r a t e d  b e y o n d  a  r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t  i t  w o u l d  b e  
i n a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  m e  t o  r e s o r t  t o  t h a t  k i n d  o f  
u n c h a l l e n g a b l e  h e a r s a y  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  a n  a g g r a v a t e d  
c i r c u m s t a n c e  . . . When d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o r  
n o n e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  m i t i g a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e  
t h a t  o f  t e n  i n v o l v e s  t h e  c o n s i d e r a t  i o n  o f  n e g a t i v e  
i n f o r m a t i o n ,  n e g a t i v e  t o  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  a s  w e l l  a s  
p o s i t i v e  i n f o r m a t i o n .  B u t  I t h i n k  i t  i s  
i n a p p r o p r i a t e  e v e n  i n  t h o s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  f o r  m e  t o  
c o n s i d e r  d a m a g i n g  n e g a t i v e  i n f o r m a t  i o n  p r o d u c e d  i n  a  
h e a r s a y  f a s h i o n  i n  t h i s  r e p o r t  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  
d e t e r m i n i n g  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  w h i c h  i s  s u p p o s e d  t o  b e  
d e t e r m i n e d  b e y o n d  a  r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t .  And t h a t  is  
t h e  f a c t s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  s u p p o r t  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  
D e a t h  P e n a l t y .  ( T r a n s c r i p t  o f  D e c e m b e r  1, 1 9 8 2 ,  
Hea r ing ,  p a g e s  88 and 89) .  
I I D e s p i t e  h i s  c l e a r  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  n e g a t i v e  h e a r s a y  comments  ] 
c o u l d  n o t  a n d  w o u l d  n o t  b e  u s e d  t o  s u p p o r t  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  
I 
I 
1 
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I I D e a t h  P e n a l t y ,  t h e  S e n t e n c i n g  J u d g e  a c t e d  e x a c t l y  o p p o s i t e  t o  
h i s  own comments.  The T r a n s c r i p t  r e f l e c t s  c l e a r l y  t h i s  c h a n g e  
o f  a t t i t u d e  on t h e  p a r t  o f  J u d g e  Schwam a f t e r  h e  h a d  d e t e r m i n e d  
I I two ( 2 )  a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t o  b e  a p p l i c a b l e :  
"Now, d e f e n s e  h a s  r a i s e d  s o m e  i n t e r e s t i n g  q u e s t i o n s  
w h i c h  I t h i n k  I s h o u l d  a d d r e s s .  D e f e n s e  h a s  r a i s e d  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  much o f  t h e  t e s t i m o n y  w h i c h  g i v e s  m e  
i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h i s  d e f e n d a n t ' s  background was u l t i m a t e l y  
a d m i t t e d  a t  T r i a l  f o r  a  l i m i t e d  purpose .  And d e f e n s e  
I h a s  a r g u e d  t h a t  I s h o u l d  o n l y  u s e  t h a t  t e s t i m o n y  w i t h  
t h e  s a m e  l i m i t a t i o n  f o r  a  d e m o n s t r a t i o n  o f  i n t e n t  on 
t h e ,  p a r t  o f  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  o f f e n s e  i n  
q u e s t i o n .  I d i s a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  d e f e n s e .  And I h a v e  
n o t  l i m i t e d  my u s e  o f  t h a t  t e s t i m o n y .  . . . . And I 
d o n ' t  f e e l  t h a t  i t  i s  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  o r  t h a t  i t  i s  
i l l e g a l  f o r  m e  t o  u s e  t h a t  e v i d e n c e  f o r  a l l  p u r p o s e s  i n  
c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e s e  a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a n d  t h e  
m i t i g a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  I o b s e r v e d  
t h o s e  w i t n e s s e s  t e s t i f y  once  m y s e l f ,  I ,  of c o u r s e ,  r e a d  
t h i s  t e s t i m o n y  a t  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  Hea r ing ,  and i t  would  
b e  u t t e r l y  c r u e l  f o r  t h i s  j u s t i c e  s y s t e m  t o  r e q u i r e  
t h o s e  women t o  r e t u r n  a  t h i r d  t i m e  t o  t e s t i f y .  And I 
w o u l d  n o t  make  a  r u l i n g  t h a t  w o u l d  r e q u i r e  s u c h  a  
r e s u l t .  ( T r a n s c r i p t  o f  December 1, 1 9 8 2 ,  H e a r i n g  
p a g e s  1 8 8  and 1 g 9 ) .  
I I T h e  S e n t e n c i n g  H e a r i n g  T r a n s c r i p t  r e f l e c t s  w i t h  c o l d  
l l a r r o g a n c e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  d e f e n d a n t  was m i s l e d  i n t o  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  
I I h e a r s a y  e v i d e n c e  w o u l d  n o t  be u s e d  i n  a g g r a v a t i o n  o f  s e n t e n c e ,  
[ l a n d  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  t o t a l l y  i g n o r e d  t h e  m a n d a t e  o f  I d a h o  C o d e  
I I S e c t i o n  19-2516 which  d o e s  n o t  p e r m i t  a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
l l t o  be shown o t h e r  t h a n  t h r o u g h  t e s t i m o n y  p r e s e n t e d  i n  Open C o u r t .  
G I V E N  T H E  FACTS OF T H I S  C A S E ,  A N D  THE MANNER I N  W H I C H  
A P P E L L A N T  W A S  SENTENCED, T H I S  COURT SHOULD R E C O N S  I D E R  ITS 
,POSITION THAT S E N T E N C I N G  BY THE J U R Y  I N  CAPITAL CASES I S  N O T  
R E Q U I R E D  EITHER BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF I D A H O ,  O R  OF 
THE U N I T E D  STATES. 
, 
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T h i s  C o u r t  h a s  p r e v i o u s l y  t a k e n  t h e  p o s i t i o n  i n  S t a t e  - v. 
C r e e c h ,  105 I d a h o  3 6 2 ,  670 P. 2d 4 6 3  (1983 ) ,  t h a t  j u r y  s e n t e n c i n g  
i n  c a p i t a l  c a s e s  i s  n o t  r e q u i r e d  u n d e r  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  I n  -- S t a t e  - v. S i v a k ,  1 0 5  I d a h o  9 0 0 ,  6 7 4  P.  2d 3 9 6  
( 1 9 8 3 ) ,  t h i s  C o u r t  h a s  a l s o  f o u n d  t h a t  j u r y  s e n t e n c i n g  i n  c a p i t a l  
c a s e s  i s  n o t  r e q u i r e d  u n d e r  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  S t a t e  o f  
I d a h o .  I n d e e d ,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  i n  - S p a z i a n o  - v.  
F l o r i d a ,  1 0 4  S. C t .  3 1 5 4  ( 1 9 8 4 ) ,  h a s  f o u n d  j u r y  s e n t e n c i n g  i n  
c a p i t a l  c a s e s  n o t  t o  b e  a  r e q u i r e m e n t  o f  t h e  6 t h  A m e n d m e n t  t o  t h e  
I I I t  r e m a i n s  a f a c t ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  o n l y  f o u r  (4 )  s t a t e s ,  I d a h o  1 I i 1 1  i n c l u d e d ,  a d h e r e  t o  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  p e r m i t t i n g  t h e  C o u r t  a l o n e  t o  I I I I i m p o s e  s e n t e n c e s  i n  c a p i t a l  c a s e s .  The  f a c t s  o f  t h i s  c a s e ,  
I I combined  w i t h  t h e  f a s h i o n  i n  wh ich  t h e  C o u r t  s e n t e n c e d  A p p e l l a n t  1 1  on  December 1, 1 9 8 2 ,  i l l u s t r a t e  c o m p e l l i n g  r e a s o n s  why s e n t e n c i n g  / 11 i n  c a p i t a l  c a s e s  s h o u l d  be l e f t  t o  t h e  j u r y ,  w h i c h  i s  i n  a  f a r  
I I s u p e r i o r  p o s i t i o n  t o  " e x p r e s s  t h e  c o n s c i e n c e  o f  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  on 1 I 
WRX E. Emm~r 
31NEY A T  LAW 
M A I N  ETRCKT 
'.O. BOX l.0 
INO. I D A N O  ,1144 
~ i a - s ? o t  
t h e  u l t i m a t e  q u e s t i o n  o f  l i f e  o r  d e a t h . "  - w i t h e r s p o o n  v .  1 
I l l i n o i s ,  3 9 1  U.S. 5 1 0 ,  519 ;  88 S . C t .  1 7 7 0 ,  1 7 7 5  ( 1 9 7 6 ) .  
- i 
As w e  h a v e  m e n t i o n e d  a b o v e ,  t h e  S t a t e ' s  e v i d e n c e  c o n c e r n i n g  
I i k e y  e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  o f f e n s e  c h a r g e d  i n  t h e  Amended I n f o r m a t i o n  i I 
/ / w a s  w e a k ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h a t  o n  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 ,  1 9 8 1 ,  1 
I 
A p p e l l a n t i n t e n t i o n a l l y  t o r t u r e d  R O B E R T  MILLER, o r  t h a t  h e  
i n t e n d e d  t o  c a u s e  s u f f e r i n g  o r  t o  s a t i s f y  s o m e  s a d i s t i c  
-------- 
i n c l i n a t i o n .  T h e  i n h e r e n t  w e a k n e s s  o f  t h i s  e v i d e n c e  w a s  
c o n c e d e d  by t h e  T r i a l  C o u r t  i n  p e r m i t t i n g  a d m i t t e d l y  p r e j u d i c i a l  
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e v i d e n c e  t o  be i n t r o d u c e d  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  of e s t a b l i s h i n g  i n t e n t .  
l l ~ o  f u r t h e r  s u p p o r t  t h e  w e a k n e s s  o f  t h i s ,  e v i d e n c e ,  ~ u r y  )I  I n s t r u c t i o n  Number 1 8  p e r m i t t e d  A p p e l l a n t  t o  b e  c o n v i c t e d  w i t h o u t  
I I a  f i n d i n g  o f  i n t e n t  t o  c a u s e  s u f f e r i n g ,  w h i c h  i n t e n t  h a s  b e e n  
l l c o n s i d e r e d  b y  t h i s  C o u r t  t o  be a c r i t i c a l  e l e m e n t  o f  a n y  m u r d e r  
I I by t o r t u r e  c h a r g e .  A p p e l l a n t  u r g e s  t h i s  C o u r t  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  1 1  l i k l e i h o o d  t h a t  t h e  T r i a l  J u r y ,  wh ich  h e a r d  h e a r s a y  e v i d e n c e  of 
p r i o r  u n r e l a t e d  e v e n t s ,  and  was p e r m i t t e d  t o  f i n d  g u i l t  w i t h o u t  
f i n d i n g  i n t e n t  t o  c a u s e  s u f f e r i n g ,  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  f a r  l e s s  
I I l i k e l y  t o  impose  t h e  s e n t e n c e  of  d e a t h  t h a n  t h e  t r i a l  J u d g e ,  who / I  was p e r m i t t e d  t o  c o n s i d e r  even  more p r e j u d i c i a l  h e a r s a y  e v i d e n c e  
I I i n  i m p o s i n g  s e n t e n c e .  T h i s  e v i d e n c e ,  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  h e a r s a y  
a l l e g a t i o n s  o f  r a p e  and a t t e m p t e d  murder  f o r  which  A p p e l l a n t  was 
n e v e r  c h a r g e d ,  o b v i o u s l y  h a d  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  on J u d g e  Schwam 1 1  i n  h i s  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  d e a t h  p e n a l t y .  T h e r e  c a n  be l i t t l e  
( ( d o u b t  t h a t  t h e  j u r y  would h a v e  been f a r  more  r e l u c t a n t  t o  condemn 
( l a  man t o  d e a t h ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i f  no i n t e n t  t o  c a u s e  s u f f e r i n g  was 1 1  found ,  t h e n  was t h e  T r i a l  J u d g e  who s e n t e n c e d  on t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  
lithe v e r d i c t  w i t h o u t  k n o w i n g  i t s  b a s i s  a n d  upon  e v i d e n c e  t o o  
I I p r e j u d i c i a l  and  r e m o t e  t o  p r e s e n t  a t  T r i a l .  
I n  S t a t e  - v. C r e e c h ,  s u p r a . ,  t h i s  C o u r t  d e f e n d e d  I d a h o ' s  
s e n t e n c i n g  p r o c e s s  i n  c a p i t a l  c a s e s ,  r e a s o n i n g  t h a t  t h r o u g h  
I I J u d i c i a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  b f  a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  u n d e r  I d a h o  
/ I ~ o d e  S e c t i o n  1 9 - 2 5 1 5 ,  " t o  t h e  e x t e n t  p o s s i b l e ,  a r b i t r a r i n e s s  o r  
t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  p r e j u d i c e  i s  a v o i d e d ,  b u t  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  
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I I i n d i v i d u a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i s  n o n e t h e l e s s  preserves." S t a t e  - v. I 
C r e e c h ,  1 0 5  I d a h o  3 6 2 ,  369 ;  670  P.  2d 4 6 3  ( 1 9 8 3 ) .  I n  t h e  
p r e s e n t  c a s e ,  t h e  s a f e g u a r d  e n v i s i o n e d  by t h e  C r e e c h  C o u r t  h a s  
I 
1 1  f a i l e d ,  and  w i l l  f a i l  a g a i n  s o  l o n g  a s  s e n t e n c i n g  J u d g e s  a r e  ( 
I 
p e r m i t t e d  t o  r e l y  upon e v i d e n c e  i n a d m i s s a b l e  a t  T r i a l  i n  i m p o s i n g  
1 1  t h e  d e a t h  p e n a l t y .  Here, J u d g e  Schwam c o n s i d e r e d  e v i d e n c e  i n  / 1 1  i m p o s i n g  t h e  d e a t h  p d n a l t y  w h i c h  h e  d e e m e d  t o o  p r e j u d i c i a l  t o  I 
I 
I l p r e s e n t  t o  t h e  j u r y .  A p p e l l a n t  r e s p e c t f u l l y  s u b m i t s  t h a t  / I 
I I J u d g e s  a r e  n o  m o r e  i n u r e d  t o  p r e j u d i c e  t h a n  j u r o r s .  A l t h o u g h  / 
we have ,  no  way o f  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  j u r y ' s  v e r d i c t ,  ! 
I l I n s t r u c t i o n  Number 1 8  wou ld  h a v e  p e r m i t t e d  e a s i l y  a  f i n d i n g  o f  / 
i 
I l g u i l t  t o  t h e  o f f e n s e  c h a r g e d  p r e d i c a t e d  o n l y  upon  a  b e l i e f  t h a t  I 
! 
l l h e  h a d  c o m m i t t e d  t h e  o t h e r  a c t s ,  a l l e g e d  b y  w i t n e s s e s  t o  h a v e  / 
I I I o c c u r e d  l o n g  b e f o r e  t h e  d a t e  o f  t h i s  o f f e n s e .  I I I I One n e e d  o n l y  r e f e r  t o  t h e  w r i t t e n  f i n d i n g s  o f  t h e  C o u r t  I r I I c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  se t  f o r t h  i n  I d a h o  Code 
I l S e c t i o n  19-2515 ( f )  ( 8 ) ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  w e i g h t  g i v e n  by 
( l ~ u d g e  Schwam t o  t h e  J u r y  V e r d i c t  a n d  t h e  m a s s i v e  e v i d e n c e ,  n o t  I 
/ l a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  J u r y ,  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  p r e - s e n t e n c e  r e p o r t  a n d  1 
I I /  t h e  P r e l i m i n a r y  H e a r i n g  T r a n s c r i p t .  The J u d g e  w r o t e  a s  I 
I 1 1  f o l l o w s :  
The e v i d e n c e  d e m o n s t r a t e d  b e y o n d  a  r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t  
t h a t  t h i s  d e f e n d a n t  a t t e m p t e d  t o  d r o w n  a  woman a s  a  
m e a n s  o f  t o r t u r e  and  t h a t  t h i s  d e f e n d a n t  i n f l i c t e d  
b r u t a l  b e a t i n g s  u p o n  h i s  s e c o n d  w i f e  a n d  r a p e d  h e r  
w h i l e  s h e  w a s  i n  t h e  h o s p i t a l  r e c o v e r i n g  f r o m  a n  
a u t o m o b i l e  a c c i d e n t .  The  d e f e n d a n t ' s  b r u t a l  b e h a v i o r  
t o w a r d s  s o  many d i f f e r e n t  p e o p l e  o v e r  a  p e r i o d  i n  
excess o f  a  d e c a d e  d e m o n s t r a t e s  b e y o n d  a  r e a s o n a b l e  
d o u b t  a  p r o p e n s i t y  t o  commit murder  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  
MEMORANDUM I N  SUPPORT O F  
PETITION FOR- R E H E A R I N G  - 1 5  
I I . . T h i s  C o u r t  m u s t  n o t e  t h a t  A p p e l l a n t  h a s  n e v e r  b e e n  c h a r g e d  I I w i t h  o r  c o n v i c t e d  o f  e i t h e r  o f f e n s e  m e n t i o n e d  by t h e  S e n t e n c i n g  
C o u r t ,  n o r  h a s  h e  e v e r  b e e n  p r e s e n t e d  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  d e f e n d  
a g a i n s t  t h e s e  d h a r g e s .  The o n l y  t e s t i m o n y  t a k e n  c o n c e r n i n g  
I I t h e s e  e v e n t s  was  a t  t h e  P r e l i m i n a r y  H e a r i n g ,  w h e r e  a p r o b a b l e  
l l c a u s e  s t a n d a r d  and n o t  one  of  p r o o f  beyond a  r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t  is  / 
I I u s e d .  I r o n i c a l l y ,  h e  w a s  h e l d  t o  a n s w e r  t o  t h e s e  c h a r g e s  a t  
l l ~ e n t e n c i n ~  and  may v e r y  w e l l  d i e  w i t h o u t  e v e r  h a v i n g  b e e n  g i v e n  
i I t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  p r o v e  h i s  i n n o c e n c e  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e s e  o f f e n s e s .  I i 
1 1  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  A p p e l l a n t  b e l i e v e s  t h i s  c a s e  h a s  p r e s e n t e d  I i 
I l f a c t s  a n d  e r r o r  w h i c h  c o m p e l  a  r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  C o u r t ' s  I I I p o l i c y  t o w a r d s  s e n t e n c i n g  i n  c a p i t a l  c a s e s .  T h e  o n l y  I I I I c o n c e i v a b l e  way t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  s e n t e n c e  i m p o s e d  i n  c a p i t a l  I I 
( I c a s e  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  n o t  o n l y  w i t h  t h e  J u r y ' s  V e r d i c t  b u t  t h e  ! I I f e e l i n g s  o f  t h e  c o m m u n i t y ,  i s  t o  r e q u i r e  t h a t  a s e n t e n c e  o f  d e a t h  1 i 
I l be  imposed by  t h e  j u r y  and n o t  t h e  C o u r t .  
T H I S  C O U R T  S H O U L D  R E C O N S I D E R  I T S  D E T E R M I N A T I O N  T H A T  T H E  j 
DEATH PENATY IMPOSED I N  THIS CASE I S  NOT DISPROPORTIONATE A N D  I N  
V I O L A T I O N  OF THE E I G H T H  AMENDMENT, I N  L I G H T  OF A RECENT DECISION 
OF THE FIFTH C I R C U I T  U.S. COURT OF APPEALS. I 
i I /  The U n i t e d  S t a t e s  C o u r t  o f  A p p e a l s ,  F i f t h  C i r c u i t ,  i n  ( I 
B u l l o c k  - v. L u c a s ,  7 4 3  F. 2d 244  ( 1 9 8 4 ) ,  h a s  r e c e n t l y  h e l d  t h a t  
" t h e  p e n a l t y  o f  d e a t h  may  n o t  s t a n d  i n  l i g h t  o f  [ a ]  j u r y  i I I i n s t r u c t i o n  wh ich  would p e r m i t  t h e  i m p o s t i o n  o f  t h e  d e a t h  p e n a l t y  I I . . . w i t h  o r  w i t h o u t  a n y  d e s i g n  [ o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  d e f e n d a n t ]  t o  ! 
*,,,.-, e f f e c t  t h e  d e a t h  o f  t h e  [ v i c t i m ] . '  . I I I d .  a t  2 4 8 .  B u l l o c k  ------- D I N E Y  AT L A W  M A I N  CTMCET 
r.O. .OX a260 
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I l c o n c e r n e d  a  f e l o n y  m u r d e r  w h i c h  o c c u r e d  i n  t h e  S t a t e  o f  
1 1  ~ i s s i s s i ~ ~ i ,  w h e r e t h e  T r i a l  J u r y  i m p o s e s  c a p i t a l  p u n i s h m e n t .  
I I The  J u r y  w a s  i n s t r u c t e d  t h a t  i f  i t  I I " f i n d s  f r o m  t h e  e v i d e n c e  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  b e y o n d  a r e a s o n a b l e  
( ( d o u b t ,  t h a t  . . . [ d e f e n d a n t ]  d i d  a n y  o v e r t  a c t  w h i c h  w a s  ( 1  i m m e d i a t e l y  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  o r  l e a d i n g  t o  i t s  c o m m i s s i o n ,  w i t h o u t  
I I a u t h o r i t y  o f  l a w ,  a n d  n o t  i n  n e c e s s a r y  s e l f - d e f e n s e ,  b y  a n y  
I lmeans,  i n  any manner,  w h e t h e r  d o n e  w i t h  o r  w i t h o u t  a n y  d e s i g n  t o  
--- -
I I e f f e c t  - t h e  d e a t h  of s a i d  [ v i c t i m ] ,  t h a t  t h e n ,  and  i n  t h a t  e v e n t ,  -- lithe s a i d  [ d e f e n d a n t ]  is g u i l t y  o f  c a p i t a l  murder  . . . " B u l l o c k  
v .  L u c a s ,  743 F. 2d 2 4 4 ,  a t  247.  ( e m p h a s i s  a d d e d ) .  Il- I I The U.S. C o u r t  o f  A p p e a l s  i n  B u l l o c k ,  r e l i e d  h e a v i l y  u p o n  
Enmund v. F l o r i d a ,  458  U.S. 7 8 2 ,  1 0 2  S.Ct.,  3368  ( 1 9 8 2 ) .  I n  /I___ - 
Enmund,  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  h e l d  t h a t  t h e  E i g h t h  It --- 
( I ~ m e n d m e n t  f o r b i d s  t h e  " i m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  Dea th  P e n a l t y  on o n e  
I I . . . who a i d s  a n d  a b e t s  a f e l o n y  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  w h i c h  a  m u r d e r  
( / i s  c o m m i t t e d  by o t h e r s ,  b u t  who d o e s  n o t  h i m s e l f  k i l l . ,  a t t e m p t  t o  
I I k i l l ,  o r  i n t e n d  t h a t  a  k i l l i n g  t a k e  p l a c e  o r  t h a t  l e t h a l  f o r c e  
] / w i l l  be employed" 458 U.S. a t  7 9 7 ,  102  S . C t .  a t  3376-77. 
I l A p p e l l a n t  was  n o t  c h a r g e d  w i t h  f e l o n y  m u r d e r ,  a n d  i n  f a c t  
l l k i l l e d  ROBERT M I L L E R .  The  i m p o r t a n t  p o i n t  f o r  t h e  C o u r t ' s  I/ c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  however ,  i s  t h a t  A p p e l l a n t  c l e a r l y  d i d  n o t  i n t e n d  
I I t o  k i l l  t h i s  y o u n g  boy .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  a s  w e  h a v e  m e n t i o n e d  
I l e a r l i e r ,  i t  h a s  n e v e r  b e e n  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  A p p e l l a n t  
i n t e n t i o n a l l y  t o r t u r e d  young RO&RT, o r  t h a t  he  i n t e n d e d  t o  c a u s e  
k 
. 
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suffering or satisfy some sadistic inclination, which Idaho has 
accepted as substitutes for the intent to kill. The Instructions 
given to the Jury in this case permitted a finding of guilt 
without the requisite finding of intent. In the absence of an 
unequivocal finding of intent, and in view of the Fifth Circuit's 
decision in Bullock - v. Lucas, supra., and the decision of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Enmund, supra., imposition of the death 
--- 
penalty in Appellant's case was improper and violative of the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition against disproportionate sentences, 
CONCLUSION 
As all persons involved in these proceeding have recognized, 
this case has been a matter of first impression within the State 
of Idaho. Appellant feels that the grave importance of any case 
involving any capital punishment, combined with the unique 
factors present in this matter, compel the allowance of one 
additional opportunity fo.r us to present briefing and argument in 
support of the issues raised herein. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the undersigned 
respectfully prays this Court 
argument, concerning only the 
for an Order permitting additional 
matters alleged in this Memorandum. 
RESPECT- SUBMITTED 
Attorney for Appe 
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JOHN A. SWAYNE 
ISBN: 1985 
Prosecuting Attorney 
County of Clearwater 
Post Ofice Box 2627 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 
Telephone: (208) 476-561 1 
Fax: (208) 476-97 10 
Deputy: E. Clayne Tyler 
ISBN: 5277 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO, and TOM 
BEAUCLAIR, Director, Idaho 
Department of Correctsion, and 
GREG FISHER, Warden, Idaho 
Maximum Security Institution 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. SP02-00 15 1 
) 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 
) 
) 
) 
COMES NOW THE STATE OF IDAHO, by and through JOHN A. SWAYNE, 
Prosecuting Attorney, Clearwater County, and based upon the accompanying affidavit moves the 
Court for a extension of tirneto file pleadings in response to the above entitled causes. 
Dated this 23 day of December, 2002. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~ s e c u t i n g l s t t a f n e y  
Clearwater County 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF 
TIME TO REPLY - 1 
JOHN A. SWAYNE 
ISBN: 1985 
Prosecuting Attorney 
County of Cleanvater 
Post Ofice Box 2627 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 
Telephone: (208) 476-561 1 
Fax: (208) 476-97 10 
Deputy: Denise L. Rosen 
ISBN: 5277 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO, and TOM 
BEAUCLAIR, Director, Idaho 
Department of Correctsion, and 
GREG FISHER, Warden, Idaho 
Maximum Security Institution 
Respondent, 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Clearwater 
CASE NO. SP02-00 15 1 
) AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 
1 
1 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) ss. 
) 
COMES NOW, JOHN A. SWAYNE, and upon oath deposes and says: 
1. That he is the duly elected Prosecuting Attorney for Clearwater County, Idaho. 
2. That the above reference Motions having been filed in Cleanvater County are his 
responsibility to address, but because of the status of the original case in Federal Court, 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME - 1 
your affiant has been coordinating with the Office of Attorney General, State of Idaho, as 
the Office of Attorney General is handling appellate issues. 
3. That the Motions were filed with the Clerk of Court at 4:46 p.m., August 2,2002 in 
Clearwater County Case No. SP -02-000109 and on December 3,2002 in the present 
4. That the issues raised in SP-02-000109 these Motions are based upon a new ruling of the 
United States Supreme Court that states new law and thus the legal issues are complex 
and are of great import both to the Defendaneetitioner and the State. The issues raised 
in the present case, although known, are factually more complex and require extensive 
time to read, brief, and to prepare an answer. 
5.  That additional time is needed and hereby requested by the State to properly review and 
prepare its Answer or to file appropriate Motions. That your Affiant asserts that the 
complex legal issues involved alone are suficient to warrant an extension of time. 
6 .  Further, your affiant has spoken with opposing counsel who has agreed that an extension 
would be appropriate. 
rd 
Dated this 23 day of December, 2002. 
Clearwater County 
SUBSCRIBED 
,,pt%!';s:9~,, 
-a- w* 
,q8'~ P E RQ ,$04,* No&ublic for t ie  State of Idaho, Residing at 
' % 
* e n & - + =  Orofino therein, my commission expires d7 Id 3 / U u  .: l* 
d 
and SWORN to before me th i sd*  day of December, 2002. & 
No&ublic for t ie  State of Idaho, Residing at 
6  1- 
d o -  
.- 
---.-- 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME - 2 
JOHN A. SWAYNE 
Prosecuting Attorney 
County of Clearwater 
Post Office Box 2627 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 
Telephone: (208) 476 
Deputy: E. Clayne Tyler 
I( STATE OF IDAHO, 
8 
6 
7 
Petitioner, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
) CASE NO. SP02-00151 
) 
) 
) CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Respondent, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
1 
) 
11 
12 
13 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, and TOM ) 
BEAUCLAIR, Director, Idaho ) 
Department of Correction, and ) 
GREG FISHER, Warden, Idaho ) 
Maximum Security Institution ) 
) 
17 11 the MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME, in the above-entitled matter wa 
15 
16 The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy o 
19 following : II 
18 
1 JOAN M. FISHER 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho 
201 N. Main 
Moscow, ID 83843 
mailed, postage prepaid, on the ~4 day of December, 2002, to th 
LAMONT ANDERSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorney General Office 
State House 
Boise, ID 93720-1000 
28 CERTIFICATE OF MAILING I1 
JOHN A. SWAYNE 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Clearwater County 
ISBN 1985 
Courthouse 
P.O. Box 2627 
Orofino, ldaho 83544 
(208) 476-56 1 1 
6ccounty @clearwatercounty.org 
L y, '.- a .  
\ i < i & i  3- -CT-\S\  i 3. .-- 
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Deputy: E. Clayne Tyler, ISB# 5277 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) ~ a s e n o . ~ P ' ! ' ~ - C r l ~ \  
Petitioner, 
VS. 
1 
1 ANSWER TO FOURTH PETITION FOR 
1 POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 1 
1 
COMES NOW, John A. Swayne, Prosecuting Attorney for the County 
of Clearwater, State of Idaho, and on behalf of the Respondent, State of 
ldaho (hereinafter "State"), answers Petitioner's (hereinafter "Stuart") 
Fourth Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as follows: 
ANSWER 
1. Answering Section II of Petition, GROUNDS FOR RELIEF, Respondent 
alleges as follows: 
ANSWER TO PETITIONER'S SUBSEQUENT 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 1 
a. Paraqra~h A of Stuart's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: the 
state denies that Stuart's rights were violated, particularly by 
any bad act or acts on the part of the prosecution. 
b. Paraara~h B of Stuart's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: The 
state denies prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Further state denies that Stuart's pretrial statements 
were obtained in violation of his rights. 
c. Paraara~h C of Stuart's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: The 
state denies the allegations that pretrial information beneficial 
to Stuart was withheld or unlawfully withheld. 
d. Paraara~h D of Stuart's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: 
State denies prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
regarding prior bad act evidence. 
e. Paraara~h E of Stuart's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: The 
state denies that prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
in regard to briefing and argument regarding jury instructions. 
f. Paraara~h F of Stuart's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: 
State denies prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance in 
regards to jury instruction were given on the basis of 
insufficient evidence of murder by torture. 
g. Paraara~h G of Stuart's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: 
State denies prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
ANSWER TO PETITIONER'S SUBSEQUENT 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 2 
regarding jury instructions on lesser included offenses. 
h. Paraura~h H of Stuart's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: 
State denies the prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
by not challenging the murder statute. 
I. Paraara~h I of Stuart's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: State 
denies prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
regarding speedy trial. 
j. Paraara~h J of Stuart's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: 
State denies prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance in 
regard to prosecutorial misconduct. 
k. Paraaraph K of Stuart's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: 
State denies prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance in 
regard to trial by impartial jury. 
I. Parasra~h L of Stuart's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: 
State denies prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel in regards to pretrial proceedings such as the jury 
charging on the law and meaningful appeal thereof. 
m. Parazrra~h M of Stuart's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: 
State denies prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel in regards to recording of chamber conferences. 
n. Paraaraph N of Stuart's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: 
ANSWER TO PETITIONER'S SUBSEQUENT 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 3 
State denies prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel in regards to security measures. 
o. Paraara~h 0 of Stuart's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: 
State denies prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel in regards to plea offers by the state. 
p. Parasra~h P of Stuart's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: 
State denies prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel in regards to any other matter. 
Paraara~h L of Stuart's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: 
State denies length of Petitioner's confinement is cruel and 
unusual. 
2. State does not accept as factual any of Stuart's supporting 
affidavits and denies the allegations thereof. 
3. State admits that Stuart is legally indigent: 
4. State alleges that the petition for habeas corpus is an attempt to 
circumvent the restrictions of Idaho law and that it is in fact a 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 
5. Further, if allegations concerning conditions of confinement are at 
issue, any habeas corpus action is brought in the wrong county. 
6. The state will stipulate that the Court should take judicial notice of 
ANSWER TO PETITIONER'S SUBSEQUENT 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 4 
all prior proceedings involving the parties: 
AFFlRMATlVE DEFENSE No. 1 
Respondent alleges this Petition should be dismissed without hearing 
because it is a subsequent petition filed outside of the allowable time allowed 
for filing Post Conviction petitions. ldaho Code Sections 19-4906, 19-271 9(5), 
and 19-271 9(11) . 
AFFlRMATlVE DEFENSE No. 2 
That Respondent alleges this Petition is filed in a capital case and is not 
timely filed in that the issues raised were known or'could reasonably have been 
known within forty two (42) days after entry of judgment. ldaho Code Section 
19-271 9. 
AFFlRMATlVE DEFENSE No. 3 
That the issues raised herein were not timely filed after they became 
known or reasonably could have been known and the Petition should be 
dismissed. ldaho Code Section 19-27 1 9. 
AFFlRMATlVE DEFENSE No. 4 
That the issues raised in the Petition are issues from the trial and 
should have been raised upon direct appeal or subsequent post 
conviction relief proceeding. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE No. 5 
5. All allegations, claims, and basis for grounds of relief made by Stuart in 
ANSWER TO PETITIONER'S SUBSEQUENT 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 5 
this Petition for Post Conviction Relief are denied by state unless specifically 
admitted herein. Further, Respondent does not accept the factual statements 
supporting the allegations made by Petitioner as complete and accurate and 
reserves right to challenge individual factual assertions. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE No. 6 
That pursuant to I. C.R. 57(b) discovery not be allowed, as there has been 
significant and sufficient discovery and discovery opportunity already provided. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF: 
1 . That this Petition be summarily dismissed. 
2. That this Petition be found to be an unlawfull successive petition and thus 
be dismissed. 
3. That pursuant to I. C.R. 57(b) , that discovery not be allowed 
4. That due to the volume and complexity of the allegations made by Stuart, 
that the State be granted sufficient time to amend its answer regarding 
factual allegations and factual assertions if this matter is not summarily 
dismissed. 
5. For other and further relief as the court deems appropriate, necessary or 
just. 
DATED this &ay of March, 2003. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Clearwater County 
ANSWER TO PETITIONER'S SUBSEQUENT 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 6 
VERIFICATION 
On behalf of the state, John A. Swayne, being first duly sworn under oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the Respondent in the above -entitled 
matter. 
2. That the facts contained in the foregoing answer to Petitioner's 
Fourth Petition for Post-Conviction Relief are true and correct to the 
best of my knowledge. 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
County of Clearwater ) 
I hereby certify that on this - day of March, 2002, personally appeared 
before me John A. Swayne who, being first duly sworn, declared that he is 
representing the respondent in this action, and that the statements contained in 
the foregoing document are believed to be true. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official 
seal on this day and year first above written. 
Idaho; Residing at Orofino, 
Idaho; 
Commission expires: I ZQ/ 2'06L 
ANSWER TO PETITIONER'S SUBSEQUENT 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of March, 2003,l cause to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method 
indicated below, first class postage prepaid where applicable, addressed 
to: 
( ) JOAN M. FISHER 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defenders of 
Eastern Washington and ldaho 
201 North Main 
Moscow. ldaho 83843 
L.LaMont Anderson 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-001 0 
(L) U.S. Mail 
)U.S. Mail 
ANSWER TO PETITIONER'S SUBSEQUENT 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 8 
REMOVED PLEADING OF 
AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
PURSUANT TO ORDER FILED JANUARY 2,2008. 
REMOVED PLEADING OF 
AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
PURSUANT TO ORDER FILED JANUARY 2,2008. 
REMOVED PLEADING OF 
AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR POS'I'CONVICTION RELIEF 
PURSUANT TO ORDER FILED JANUARY 2,2008. 

In the Supreme Court of the State of Id ho 
M ~ L !  i 05 I 
ASSIC~?~TMENT OF SENIOR JUDGE 1 ORDER . . 
RON D. SCHLLING ' 1  + 
The Court, h a w  appmved and designated RON D. S C W G  to temporarily sit with any state I 
court as a senior judge pursuant to Section 1-2005, Idaho Code, with all of the judicial powers of a regularly 1 
qualified justice or judge of the courts to .which he rhay hereafter be asigned; and 
Tbe Court having detemined that h e  follcrwing assignment to Skuior Judge Ron D. Schilling i s  
r m d l y  newssay and will promote the efficient ahhistcation of justice; 
lT B ZIElXEBY ORDERED that Senior Judge Schilling be and &by xs assigned the case set fmth 
below for putposes af any peuding mattem and all proceedings nece- for final dqmeition: 111 
Gene Francis Stwat v. State 
Clmater County Case No. SP-02-0015 1 
IT IS FURTfIER ORDERED that if a comt reporter is not availabk, Senior Judge ScluUing may 1 
order that the p~aoeedings to which he is assigned be recorded by an clectconlc device in lieu of 1 
stenographic m-, w b h  reambg shall constitute the official record of the case. 1 
IT IS F U l 2 m R  ORDERED that the clerk of the d i h c t  court shall file a copy of this order in the 11 
case file and serve a copy upon the parties or their c~msel in the above 'm. 
DATED this Bs dayofJttll~py2003. 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
I, Frederick C. Lvon, Clerk of the Suprere Court of 
the Stata of ldsi?o, d o  hereby certi? xb fr.e above Yn-": is a true ~ h d  CG:.reLUI COPY OI the & co: Rol D. sefanbg, sGOT sub 
J a b n R S k p a A ~ r t i w J u d g c  , . . . . entered in the above entitled cause an& risw on 
stsvon Caylor. md cm.kdmimmw record in my .office. 
Plltrifi. TobidAdmIn. DkOx d me Ccwh . . 
conic KclIcr- dcomf f k v i m  ai of this ~ a ~ ~ r t  1'IS*3 
Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COUT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF C b w A T F R  1~ 
Deputy 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
1 
) 8475 CASE NO. CR81-$W5 
VS. 
) 
) 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 
) 
) COURT MINUTES 
Defendant. 1 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 
1 
Petitioner, 
1 
) CASE NO. SP02-00109 
VS . 
1 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
1 
1 COURT MINUTES 
Respondent. ) 
1 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 
) 
1 - 
Petitioner, ) CASE NO. SP02-00151 
VS. 
1 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
1 COURT MINUTES 
Respondent. 1 
) 
Presiding Judge: Hon Ron Schilling Date: 04/09/03 
Court Clerk Vicky F. Fdrnonson Time: ?Q:15 am 
Attorney for DefendantlPetitioner: Joan M. Fisher & Oliver W. Loewy 
Attorney for PlaintiffIRespondent: John A. Swayne & L. Lamont Anderson 
Type of Hearing: Scheduling conference 
Present in court: Honorable Ron Schilling; Joan Fisher, via telephone, attorney for 
DefendantlPetitioner; attorney Oliver Loewy, via telephone, also for 
DefendantIPetitioener; John Swayne, Clearwater County Prosecutor, personally 
present on behalf of PIaintifflRespondent; Lamont Anderson of Attorney General 
Office present, via telephone. 
Court advises session is for scheduling conference for 3 cases, not being recorded 
but the clerk will take minutes. 
COURT MINUTES - Page I of 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 5  
Ms. Fisher advises court that Mr. Loewy present with her and is representing the 
Federal Court case. 
Court advises the Order Granting Limited Appearance and Waiver not signed yet 
but will sign it now. Court advises clerk will take minutes and provide copies to all 
counsel. 
Court inquires if parties ready for scheduling cases 81-8495, original criminal case, 
and SP02-00109 and SP02-00151,2 Post Conviction files. 
Ms. Fisher advises ready for pending motion and preliminary matters. 
Court inquires of Mr. Swayne if Motion for Summary Dismissal applies to all cases. 
Mr. Swayne advises applies to both the special cases 109 & 151. 
Court understands a Rule 35 motion is in the original case as well as a Petition for 
Post Conviction and Writ of Habeas Corpus. Inquires if same material as in SP02- 
109. 
Ms. Fisher advises are the same. 
- 
Court inquires if other issues in SP02-151. 
Ms. Fisher advises there are. 
Court wants to schedule hearing on Motion for Summary Dismissal and any other 
preliminary matters needing resolved. If evidentiary hearing is required, Court will 
schedule it then. Court inquires of Mr. Swayne if has responded to all briefing from 
PetitionerIDefendant. 
Mr. Swayne advises has not responded and requests gdditional time. 
Court asks Ms. Fisher what time limits she would like for preliminary matters. 
Ms. Fisher agrees to Mr. Swayne's request for additional time and advises she has 
not filed Brief in Opposition to Motion For Summary Dismissal in SP02-151. 
Court inquires if wants 90 days to file Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Dismissal. Ms Fisher agrees. 
Court will allow counsel to control time table, will give as much time for briefing as 
needed. 
Court gives Ms. Fisher until 711 1/03 to file responsive brief to the Motion for 
s:!?mar\,l E k l r r ~ ~ a !  in SP02-? 51. Ms. Fisher accepts. 
COURT MINUTES - Page 2 of 3 
Court sets 711 1/03 for filing brief. Mr. Swayne to file all responsive briefs to pending 
briefs of Petitioner on or before 10/10/03. Ms. Fisher to file response to Mr. 
Swayne's briefs by 11/14/03. Court will allow extensions for good reasons. 
Court and counsel agree to have Mr. Stuart present for all arguments. Agree to 
hold hearing in Boise. Court will later on in process look to some date early in 
JanuaryIFebruary 2004 and arrange for a courtroom at maximum security facility in 
Boise. Counsel agree. Court will work with Clearwater County Clerks Office for 
arrangements. 
Court provides contact information for counsel. Requests courtesy copy of 
briefings and important documents provided to him at his address. 
Ms. Fisher notes Supreme Court appointed Court as judge in 151 case, but no 
order appointing on Rule 35 or the other Post Conviction. 
Court understood he has been appointed to all pending cases, Clerk to check with 
Trial Court Administrator andlor Supreme Court. 
Ms. Fisher also notes no petition or order for Attorney General's office to appear. 
Court inquires of Mr. Anderson if intends to obtain permission from Court to appear 
and participate. 
Mr. Anderson advises just advisory capacity at this point, will discuss with Mr. 
Swayne and make determination and will file appropriate paper work if needed. 
Court requests if anything can be done by conference call, if not necessary to have 
minutes on the call, can be set up anytime. If needs minutes, Judge will probably 
come to Clearwater County. 
Court in recess 10:36 a.m. 
Vicky F. Edmonson 
Deputy C!erk 
Approved: 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of ldaho 
MICHAEL A. HENDERSON 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
Capital Litigation Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-001 0 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 334-2942 
JOHN A. SWAYNE, ISB #I985 
Prosecuting Attorney 
County of Clearwater 
PO Box 2627 
Orofino, ID 83544 
Telephone: (208) 476-561 1 
Facsimile: (208) 476-97 10 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CLEARWATER COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
) 
1 CASE NO. SP02-00151 
VS. 
i 
) PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
) SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN RE POST 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) CONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR 
) WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Petitioner-Respondent. ) 
COMES NOW, John A. Swayne, Prosecuting Attorney, in and for Clearwater 
County, State of Idaho, and hereby petitions the above-entitled court for the 
appointment of a Special Prosecutor in the interest of GENE FRANCIS STUART 
and upon being duly sworn, hereby deposes and says: 
1. That your affiant is the duly elected Prosecuting Attorney of Clearwater County; 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN RE POST CONVICTION RFLJpF 
AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 1 00000298 
2. That your affiant has the duty to respond to the Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on behalf of GENE FRANCIS STUART 
pursuant to ldaho Code §19-2719 and 19-4902; 
3. That the Petition For Post-Conviction Relief and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus filed 
on behalf of GENE FRANCIS STUART involves both complex and technical legal 
issues involving the sentencing of GENE FRANCIS STUART, for the crime of Murder 
in the First Degree, to the death penalty; 
4. That ldaho Attorney General Lawrence G. Wasden, or his designee, is the 
attorney presently assigned in the Petitioner's criminal Case No. SP02-00151 and has 
represented Clearwater County as a Special Prosecutor in other Post Conviction 
petitions regarding this same defendant and accordingly is familiar with the ongoing 
issues and court proceedings involving this case at both the state and federal appellate 
levels; 
5. That your affiant believes that because the above-named Petitioner has filed a 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in U.S. District Court and a subsequent Petition for 
Post Conviction Reliefmilt of Habeas Corpus in this case, the response to the pending 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus requires the 
continuing assistance of the Capital Litigation Unit and the ldaho Attorney General's 
Office in order to provide for the necessary continuity and expertise in the above- 
captioned case; 
6. That your affiant petitions this Court to appoint ldaho Attorney General Lawrence 
G. Wasden, or his designee, a member of the ldaho State Bar Association and 
experienced attorney in criminal prosecution, as the Special Prosecutor pursuant to 
ldaho Code §31-2603(b), in that he is a suitable person to perform the duties required 
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AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 2 
of your affiant and to assist the Clearwater County Prosecutor in responding to the 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on behalf of 
GENE FRANCIS STUART. 
DATED this day of 2003. 
w r w a t e r  Co nt Pros cuting Attorney 0 4  
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this q?ay of On& ,2003. 
~ U k e m  
NOTARY PUBLl 
Residing at 0rofino; thered 
Commission expires 
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IN THE DISTRICT COUT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER5pd2 - , .  
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
1 
) CASE NO. CR81-8943 
VS. 
) 
1 
lq JUN 12-  Y O 3  1 1 
1 Robin Chnstensen. Clerk D~st. Court Clearwater Count , Idaho 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) BRIEFING ORDER 
Defendant. i 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 
) 
) 
Petitioner! ) CASE NO. SP02-00109 
VS. 
1 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
1 BRIEFING ORDER 
Respondent 1 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 
) 
1 - 
Petitioner, 1 CASE NO. SP02-00151 
VS. 
) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
) BRIEFING ORDER 
Respondent. ) 
Following a conference call on April 9; 2003, P.! the hour of ?C):?5 z, n., the 
Court hereby sets the following cut-off dates: 
DefendanVPetitioner shall file it's responsive brief to the Motion for Summary 
Dismissal in SP02-151 by July 1 1, 2003; 
PlaintiffIRespondent shall file all responsive briefs to DefendantIPetitioner's 
pending briefs on or before October 10, 2003; 
DefendanVPetitioner shall file response to PlaintiffIRespondent's briefs by 
November 14,2003. 
BRIEFING ORDER- Page I of 2 O Q 0 0 0 3 0 1  
Upon completion of briefing a hearing will be scheduled at the Maximum 
Security Facility courtroom in Boise, Idaho. DefendantiPetitioner, Gene Francis 
Stuart, will be personally present at said hearing. 
Any preliminary matters not needing court minutes may be set up as a 
conference call. Any preliminary matters requiring court minutes will be scheduled 
for hearing at the Clearwater County Courthouse, Orofino, Idaho. 
DATED this 10 " day 0&$2003. 
RON HLING - - 
Presiding Judge 
- 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEFING 
ORDER was hand delivered or mailed, postage pre-paid, on the /3*day of 
April, 2003 to the following: 
John A. Swayne 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Cleanpater County Courthoc~se 
,/'hand delivered 
Joan M. Fisher 
Oliver W. Loewy 
Capital Habeas Unit 
201 North Main Street 
Mosc w, ID 83843 
/mailed 
ROBIN CHRISTENSEN 
Clerk of the District Court 
? cEcr3.w ,-: 
i: , 
: . ... a '  By 
BRIEFING ORDER- Page 2 of 2 O0000302 
JOAN M. FISHER 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho 
20 1 North Main Street 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Telephone: 208-883-01 80 
Facsimile: 208-882- 1492 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
Gene Francis Stuart, 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO, and 
TOM BEAUCLAIR, Director, Idaho 
Department of Correction, and 
GREG FISHER, Warden, Idaho 
Maximum Security Institution. 
Respondent. 
1 
1 CAPITAL CASE 
1 
1 
1 CASE NO. SP02-00151 
1 
1 NOTICE OF AND BRIEF IN 
1 OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S 
1 PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT 
1 OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR 
1 
1 
1 
Gene F. Stuart, Petitioner, through undersigned counsel, hereby files this Notice Of And 
Brief In Opposition To Conviction Relief And/or Writ Of Habeas Corpus ("Petition For Special 
Prosecutor"), filed with this Court on June 5,2003. 
The reasons for opposition are: (1) The plain language of the statute on which 
Respondent relies, Idaho Code Section 3 1-2603(b), precludes its application in postconviction 
matters because postconviction matters are civil in nature. See Section A. (2) The Court should 
deny the Petition For Special Prosecutor because Respondent has not shown good cause for 
Notice Of And Brief In Opposition To Respondent's 
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granting it. See Section B. (3) Idaho Code Section 3 1-2603(a) may not properly serve as a basis 
for appointing a special prosecuting attorney in this case. See Section C. (4) Finally, appointing 
a special prosecutor in this case in clear violation of Idaho Code Section 3 1-2603 would 
arbitrarily deprive Petitioner of his liberty interest in being opposed in postconviction 
proceedings by the prosecuting attorney for the county in which those proceedings are pending, 
in violation of his right to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. See, e.g., Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980); Bunkley v. Florida, 123 
If this Court rejects Petitioner's arguments, he requests an evidentiary hearing on whether 
good cause exists to grant the Petition For Special Prosecutor and/or whether the current 
prosecuting attorney is unable to attend to his duties. 
A. Idaho Code Section 3 1-2603 Has No Application To Civil Matters And Does Not Invest 
The Court With Jurisdiction To Appoint A Special Assistant Attorney-General In Civil 
Matters. 
Respondent asks this Court to appoint the Idaho Attorney General, or his designee, "as 
the Special Prosecutor pursuant to Idaho Code $3 1-2603(b)[.lV Petition For Special Prosecutor 
at 16. Idaho Code Section 3 1 -2603(b) provides in pertinent part that: 
The prosecuting attorney may petition the district judge of his 
county for the appointment of a special assistant attorney-general 
to assist in the prosecution of any criminal case pending in the 
county[.] 
Postconviction matters are civil in nature. See, e.g., Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 57 P.2d 787,790 
(2002)("An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature."); Stuart v. State, 36 P.3d 
Notice Of And Brief In Opposition To Respondent's 
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1278, 1283 (2001)("A petition for post-conviction relief is a civil proceeding."). Because this is 
a civil matter, Idaho Code Section 3 1 -2603(b) has no application. Further, because the authority 
which Section 3 1 -2603(b) invests in district judges to appoint special assistant attorney-generals 
extends only to criminal cases, this Court is without jurisdiction to grant Respondent's request. 
B. Respondent Has Failed To Meet Idaho Code Section 3 1-2603(b)'s "Good Cause" 
Requirement. 
Independent of Idaho Code Section 3 1-2603(b)'s inapplicability to the pending matter for 
the reasons noted in Section A, this Court should deny Respondent's application because it does 
not contain a prima facie showing that "good cause" exists to appoint a special assistant attorney 
general. Idaho Code Section 3 1-2603(b) allows a district judge to grant an application for 
appointment of a special assistant attorney-general but only "if it appears. . .that good cause 
appears for granting such petition." Respondent relies on several conclusory reasons as 
justification for granting its application. 
First, Respondent apparently contends that the prosecuting attorney lacks sufficient skills, 
knowledge, andlor time to adequately meet the "complex and technical legal issues" at issue in 
the postconviction matter. Petition For Special Prosecutor at 73. Of course, "[ilt is the duty of 
the prosecuting attorney. . .[t]o. . .defend all actions, applications or motions, civil or criminal, in 
the district court of his county in which the people, or the state, or the county, are interested, or 
are a party[,]" I.C. $3 1-2604(1), and a special assistant attorney general may be appointed only in 
the exceptional case where there is good cause. I.C. $3 1-260-3(b). Respondent makes no factual 
allegations whatsoever to support its conclusion that the current prosecuting attorney lacks 
Notice Of And Brief In Opposition To Respondent's 
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sufficient skills, knowledge, and/or time to fblfill his legal duties in this matter. Petitioner 
submits that the current prosecuting attorney possesses entirely adequate skills, knowledge, and 
time to fblfill his legal duties in this matter. 
Second, Respondent contends that the Attorney General or his designee has represented 
Cleanvater County as a special prosecutor in other postconviction petitions regarding Mr. Stuart 
and "accordingly is familiar with the ongoing issues and court proceedings involving this case at 
both the state and federal appellate levels[.]" Petition For Special Prosecutor at 4. While it may 
be that someone within the Attorney General's office is familiar with past postconviction 
petitions, the issues raised in the instant matter are new and many of them are based on facts 
previously outside the record. There is, therefore, no reason to think that the Attorney General or 
anyone in his office is more familiar with those issues than the current prosecuting attorney. 
Further, while members of the Attorney General's office have appeared in previous 
matters stemming from Mr. Stuart's 198 1 trial, the current Prosecuting Attorney, John A. 
Swayne, was the Cleanvater County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in 198 1 when Mr. Stuart was 
tried and has been with that oflice ever since. Indeed, beginning over ten years ago Prosecuting 
Attorney Swayne represented the State in district court postconviction litigation stemming from 
Mr. Stuart's 198 1 conviction. While Prosecuting Attorney Swayne was assisted in his efforts by 
past Idaho Solicitor General Lynn E. Thomas, Mr. Swayne was intimately involved with the 
litigation. This history makes plain that Mr. Swayne is at least as familiar with the pending 
matter as any member of the Attorney General's office. 
Third, Respondent asserts that the current Idaho Attorney General Wasden or his 
designee "is the attorney presently assigned in the Petitioner's criminal Case No. SP02-0015 1 [.I" 
Notice Of And Brief In Opposition To Respondent's 
Petition For Appointment Of Special Prosecutor - 4 
Petition For Special Prosecutor at 74. This assertion is contrary to the facts. This Court has not 
assigned the Idaho Attorney General or member of his staff to Clearwater County case SP02- 
001 5 1. Nor is the Idaho Attorney General or any member of his staff assigned to either of Mr. 
Stuart's two other matters now pending before this Court.' Also, contrary to Respondent's 
assertion, Case Number SP02-0015 1 is a civil, not a criminal, matter. See supra. 
Fourth, Respondent asserts that because Petitioner is seeking a writ of habeas corpus in 
federal court, the Cleanvater County Prosecuting Attorney "requires the continuing assistance of 
the Capital Litigation Unit and the Idaho Attorney General's Oflice in order to provide for the 
necessary continuity and expertise in the above-captioned case." Petitionfor Special Prosecutor 
at 75. Respondent alleges no facts in support of its conclusion that "necessary continuity and 
expertise" requires the appointment of a special assistant attorney general. Petitioner denies that 
such facts exist. Further, he asserts that any need for continuity may be met by the Idaho 
Attorney General or his designee's familiarizing himself or herself with the matter at the 
appropriate time in any litigation in which they properly appear. This, of course, is what the 
Idaho Attorney General does on a daily basis in appeals from criminal convictions and civil 
judgments. The Clearwater Prosecuting Attorney has sufficient expertise to adequately represent 
the State and ensure continuity in the pending postconviction matter. 
None of the reasons on which Respondent relies as justification for appointing a special 
'Specifically, in August, 2002, pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 2719 and 4901, et seq., 
Mr. Stuart filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief in light of, among other things, Ring v. 
Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002). The Court assigned that petition case number SP02-00109. 
Also in August, 2002, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, and in light of Ring, Mr. Stuart filed a 
motion to correct his illegal sentence. That motion was filed as part of Mr. Stuart's Criminal 
Case Number 8495. 
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prosecutor, considered separately or together, constitutes good cause. Petitioner denies all facts 
on which Respondent relies as justification for appointing a special prosecutor. 
C. The Court Should Not Grant The Petition For Special Prosecuting Attorney 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 3 1-2603(a). 
Petitioner notes that Idaho Code Section 3 1 -2603(a) provides that the district court, may 
under certain narrow circumstances and upon proper application, appoint a suitable person to 
perform the duties of a prosecuting attorney. While Petitioner reserves the right to fully brief his 
opposition to any application based on that subsection, he notes that the only circumstance which 
could possibly serve as a basis for appointment in this case is that the current prosecuting 
attorney "is unable to attend to his duties." I.C. $3 1-2603(a). There are at least two reasons why 
even if I.C. $3 1-2603(a) is considered a basis for the pending Petition For Special Prosecutor, 
that application must be denied. First, I.C. $3 1-2603(a) contemplates appointing a suitable 
person to perform the duties of the prosecuting attorney in all cases, not on a case by case basis. 
The pending application seeks an appointment in this particular case only. Second, the pending 
Petition For Special Prosecutor proffers no factual basis to believe that the current prosecuting 
attorney is unable to attend to his duties. For the same reasons that the pending application fails 
to make a prima facie case to meet Section 2603(b)'s "good cause" requirement, it fails to make 
a prima facie case to meet Section 2603(a)'s requirement that the current prosecuting attorney is 
unable to attend to his duties. Should the Court consider Idaho Code Section 3 1 -2603(a) as a 
basis for granting the pending Petition For Special Prosecutor, Mr. Stuart requests an opportunity 
to fully brief the issue. 
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Conclusion 
For these reasons, the Court should deny Respondent's Petition For Special Prosecutor. 
Unless this Court denies Respondent's Petition For Special Prosecutor, Petitioner moves that an 
evidentiary hearing be held on whether good cause exists to appoint a special assistant attorney 
general in this matter. In the event that the Court considers Respondent's Petition For Special 
Prosecutor pursuant to Idaho Code Section 3 1-2603(a), Petitioner requests (1) an opportunity to 
fully brief his opposition and (2) an evidentiary hearing on whether the current prosecuting 
attorney is unable to attend to his duties. 
Dated this $ day of June, 2003. 
Respectfblly submitted, 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of June, 2003,I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the attached document upon the attorneys named below by the method indicated 
below, first-class postage prepaid where applicable. 
John A. Swayne 
Clearwater County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 2627 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 
- + a i l  
- Hand Delivery 
- Facsimile 
Federal Express 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of ldaho 
MICHAEL A. HENDERSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
Capital Litigation Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-001 0 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 334-2942 
JOHN A. SWAYNE, IS9 #I985 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Clearwater County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 2627 
Orofino, ID 83544 
Telephone: (208) 476-561 1 
Facsimile: (208) 476-971 0 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CLEARWATER COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) CASE NO. SP02-00151 
) 
VS. 1 ORDER TO APPOINT SPECIAL 
) PROSECUTOR IN RE POST 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) CONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR 
1 WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Petitioner-Respondent. 1 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that ldaho Attorney 
General Lawrence G. Wasden, or his designee, State of ldaho, be appointed 
as special prosecutor in the matter of the PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, GENE FRANCIS STUART vs. State of Idaho, 
to assist the Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney, in that ldaho Attorney General 
ORDER TO APPOINT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN RE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 1 
Lawrence G. Wasden, or his designee, is a suitable person to perform the duties 
required in this matter and that good cause exists to appoint a special prosecutor to 
assist in the response to the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and/or Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, filed on behalf of GENE FRANCIS STUART. 
Dated this / 7 &  day of 
-, '""" 
Judge * 
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y : .  25 
JOAN M. FISHER 
Capital Habeas Unit g+, pp!  I 
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho v 4 3Ci!3 
201 North Main Street :-f( ?; Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Telephone: 208-883-01 80 
Facsimile: 208-882- 1492 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
Gene Francis Stuart, 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO, and 
TOM BEAUCLAIR, Director, Idaho 
Department of Correction, and 
GREG FISHER, Warden, Idaho 
Maximum Security Institution. 
Respondent. 
CAPITAL CASE 
CASE NO. SP02-151 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITION 
FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF AND 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS 
In its Answer To Fourth Petition For Post Conviction Relief ("Answer"), the State moves 
that the Court summarily dismiss Mr. Stuart's postconviction petition ("Petition"). This 
opposition and supporting brief is filed in compliance with the Court's order that Petitioner file 
its responsive brief to the State's motion by July 11,2003. Petitioner's opposition to the State's 
motion to summarily dismiss is brought pursuant to the Idaho Constitution, Article 1, Sections 1 
(right to defend life and liberty), 2 (equal protection), 3 (United States constitution as supreme 
law of land), 13 (rights to, among other things, counsel and due process), 16 (prohibition against 
expost facto laws), and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10, clause 1 
(prohibition against expost facto laws). 
ARGUMENT 
In his Petition, Mr. Stuart seeks relief on, broadly stated, three grounds: first, the 
prosecution engaged in egregious misconduct through its manipulation of state witnesses and 
their testimony; second, the prosecution withheld critical mitigating information from defense 
counsel and the court; and, third, prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in 
numerous ways. 
The State moves for summary dismissal on four grounds: 
(1) the "Petition should be dismissed without hearing because it is a 
subsequent petition filed outside the allowable time allowed for filing Post 
Conviction petitions. Idaho Code Section 19-4906, 19-27 19(5), and 19- 
271 9(1 I)." Answer at 5 (boldface omitted); 
(2) the "Petition is filed in a capital case and is not timely filed in that the 
issues raised were known or could reasonably have been known within 
forty two (42) days after entry of judgment. Idaho Code Section 19-271 9." 
Answer at 5.; 
(3) the "issues raised herein were not timely filed after they became known or 
reasonably could have been known and the Petition should be dismissed. 
Idaho Code Section 19-2719." Answer at 5. ; and 
(4) the "issues raised in the Petition are issues from the trial and should have 
been raised upon direct appeal or subsequent post conviction relief 
proceeding." Answer at 5. 
In moving to summarily dismiss the Petition, the State has not made any supporting arguments or 
assertions specific to any of Mr. Stuart's particular claims, broadly or specifically stated. 
Mr. Stuart contends that none of the claims raised in the Petition should be summarily 
dismissed for three reasons. First, Section 19-271 9 has no application because Mr. Stuart stands 
convicted of non-capital first degree murder, whereas Section 19-27 19 applies exclusively to 
capital first degree murder cases. Second, the statute on which the State's motion rests, Section 
19-27 19, violates state and federal constitutional provisions and its application in this case would 
violate Mr. Stuart's constitutional rights. Third, Section 19-27 19 violates other controlling Idaho 
law and is, therefore, invalid. Each of these arguments is developed in Section I. 
Independent of the arguments in Section I, however, there are other compelling reasons 
why the Court should deny the State's motion as it relates specifically to the Petition's ineffective 
assistance of prior counsel claims. While it may initially appear that Section 19-271 9 mandates 
that Mr. Stuart's ineffective assistance of counsel claims be deemed waived, removes jurisdiction 
from the Court to consider those claims on their merits, and requires the Court to summarily 
dismiss the Petition, Mr. Stuart contends that the Idaho Constitution, other Idaho law, and the 
United States Constitution demand a different result. See Section 11. To the extent that the State 
disputes that Petitioner did not know and could not reasonably have known the basis for his 
pending claims within a reasonable time before filing the Petition, Mr. Stuart moves for full 
briefing and an evidentiary hearing regarding the matter. 
Finally, setting aside the arguments against applying Section 19-2719 to summarily 
dismiss the Petition, Idaho Code Section 19-4901(4) applies to allow Mr. Stuart postconviction 
relief because material facts not previously presented and heard require vacating his conviction 
and sentence in the interest of justice. See Section 111. 
I. Section 19-2719 Has No Application To Mr. Stuart's Non-Capital First 
Degree Murder Case; However, Even If Section 19-2719 Applies, It Violates 
The Idaho Constitution, Other Idaho Law, And The Federal Constitution. 
Each of the State's grounds for summary dismissal rests on Idaho Code Section 19-2719. 
Mr. Stuart, however, was never convicted of capital first degree murder and, therefore, his death 
sentence was illegal for multiple reasons, including that the lack of a capital first degree murder 
conviction left this Court without jurisdiction to impose a death sentence on Mr. Stuart. See 
Petitioner's Response In Opposition To Motion For Summary Dismissal Of Petition For Post- 
Conviction Relief And/or Writ of Habeas Corpus, Clearwater County Case Number SP02- 
00109, incorporated herein by reference (31612003). Because Mr. Stuart was never convicted of 
first degree murder and, therefore, was never eligible for a sentence of death, Idaho Code Section 
19-271 9 has no application to this case. Consequently, the State's motion to summarily dismiss 
the Petition should be denied. 
Even were Section 19-27 19 applicable, though, it is invalid and relying on it to 
summarily dismiss the Petition would violate Mr. Stuart's state and federal constitutionally 
guaranteed rights as well as other state law. In particular, it violates state and federal 
prohibitions against expostfacto laws as well as state and federal due process and equal 
protection guarantees. See Subsections A & B. Also, it violates the Idaho separation of powers 
doctrine and Idaho's prohibition against retroactive application of statutes absent a statutory 
provision for such application. See Subsections C & D. 
A. Applying (1) Idaho Code Section 19-2719(3)'s forty-two day time 
limitation for filing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, (2) Section 
19-2719(5)'s mandates that claims filed outsides Section 19-2719(3)'s 
time limitations be deemed waived, and (3) that same statute's 
requirement that Idaho courts are without jurisdiction to consider 
such claims would violate the state and federal constitutional 
prohibitions against expost facto laws. 
Petitioner seeks relief from a death sentence imposed in 1982, two years before Idaho 
Code Section 19-2719 was enacted. The state and federal constitutions each prohibit expost 
facto laws. U.S.Const. art. I, $10, cl. 1. Idaho Const. art. I, $16. Applying a law enacted after 
the commission of the crime to "make more burdensome the punishment" violates the expost 
facto clause. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,52 (1990). For example, in Garner v. Jones, 
529 U.S. 244 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that increasing the interval between 
parole reconsiderations may violate the expost facto clause. Whether it does, the Court held, 
depends on whether the change "creates a significant risk" of making the punishment more 
burdensome, thereby prolonging the respondent's incarceration. Id. 
Here, applying Idaho Code Sections 19-2719(3) & (5) to Petitioner's case would 
unquestionably create a significant risk of making Mr. Stuart's sentence more burdensome. For 
if Petitioner were not sentenced to death and thus outside the scope of Section 19-27 19, his delay 
in asserting claims would be deemed a waiver only if he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 
waived the claims. I.C. $19-4908. As the Idaho Supreme Court has held: 
In capital cases, a successive petition is allowed only where the 
petitioner can demonstrate that the issues raised were not known or 
could not reasonably have been known within the 42-day time 
frame. This is in contrast with the UPCPA, which requires waiver 
to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. I.C. 519-4908. 
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,701,992 P.2d 144, 150 (1 999). Because the Section 19-4908 
hurdle is significantly less burdensome for petitioners than the Section 19-2719 hurdle, it is more 
likely that the Court would reach the merits of Mr. Stuart's claims if it applied Section 19-4908. 
Further, Mr. Stuart's claim are yemarkably strong. For example, trial counsel avers in a sworn 
statement filed with the Court that, "Before the guilty verdict, I did not prepare for sentencing 
proceedings [and] I conducted no investigation for sentencing purposes after the jury returned the 
guilty verdict." Petition for PostConviction Relief And Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus at 
Appendix K. Cf Wiggins v. Smith, - U.S. -, 2003 WL 21467222 at * 15 (2003) (reaffirming 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), holding that "'strategic choices made after less 
than complete investigation are reasonable' only to the extent that 'reasonable professional 
judgments support the limitations on investigation.' Id., at 690-691 [.I7'). The relative strength of 
Mr. Stuart's claims shows that he would likely prevail on their merits and thus obtain a reduced 
sentence andlor vacation of his conviction. Because death is a more burdensome penalty than 
life, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,411 (1 986)@lurality opinion)("execution is the most 
irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; . . . death is different."), applying Section 19-27 19 to 
block a merits review of Mr. Stuart's ineffective assistance of counsel claims constitutes an ex 
post facto violation. 
B. Idaho Code Section 19-2719 violates Petitioner's rights to due process 
and equal protection guaranteed under the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions. 
If Mr. Stuart did not stand under sentence of death, Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(3)'s 
forty-two day time limitation for filing claims would not apply. Neither would Section 19- 
2719(5)'s mandates that claims filed outside the time limitations be deemed waived and that 
Idaho courts have no jurisdiction to consider such claims. "I.C. $19-2719 does not eliminate the 
applicability of the UPCPA to capital cases, but it supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their 
provisions conflict." McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (Idaho 1999). 
Idaho law thus subjects only death sentenced petitioners to Section 19-2719's stringent 
requirements, while it allows non-death sentenced petitioners to proceed under the much more 
liberal UPCPA provisions alone. See, e.g., Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758,760,852 P.2d 1355, 
1357 (Idaho 1993)(noting, among other requirements unique to capital as compared to non- 
capital postconviction petitions, Section 19-27 19 "places a heightened burden on a [capital] 
petitioner which requires a prima facie showing by petitioner that the issues raised were not 
known and could not reasonably have been known within 42 days of judgment."); McKinney v. 
State, 133 Idaho 695, 701 992 P.2d 144, 150 (capital successive postconviction petitioners claims 
waived unless not known or could not reasonably have been known within 42-day time frame, 
whereas non-capital successive postconviction petitioners claims waived only if knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent waiver by petitioner). Because of this difference, I.C. $19-2719 
violates Mr. Stuart's due process and equal protection rights.' 
1 Under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), "post-conviction relief 
is not barred where new evidence is discovered, or where later case law suggests a conviction is 
unlawful." Aragon v. State, 1 14 Idaho 758, 766 n. 12, 760 P.2d, 1 174, 1 182 n. 12 (Idaho 1988) 
Enforcing Section 19-2719 against Mr. Stuart would violate his rights to equal protection 
and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article 
1, Sections 2 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution because there is no rational basis for the disparate 
treatment of death sentenced and non-death sentenced postconviction petitioners. Romer v. 
Evans, 5 17 U.S. 620,63 1-36 (1995); City ofcleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 
446-51 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,61-63 (1982); U.S.D.A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 
535 (1 973); Sterling H. Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Bender, 95 Idaho 8 13,8 15-1 6, 520 P.2d 860,861 - 
62 (Idaho 1974). 
Moreover, because Idaho's statutory postconviction scheme makes available different 
mechanisms for enforcing fundamental rights depending on whether the petitioner stands 
sentenced to death, that discriminatory scheme must be assessed with strict scrutiny. See Van 
Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 126, 15 P.3d 1129, 1134 (Idaho 2000) 
(if a fundamental right is at issue, appropriate standard of review of law infringing on that right is 
strict scrutiny); Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 7 1 1, 714, 535 P.2d 1348, 135 1 (Idaho 1975) (strict 
scrutiny when statute's classification infringes upon a fundamental right); State v. Breed, 11 1 
Idaho 497, 500,725 P.2d 202,205 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (strict scrutiny of statutory schemes 
that infringe upon a "'fundamental right' such as voting, procreation, or constitutional safeguards 
for persons accused of crimes"). See generally, Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise 
On Constitutional Law 5 18.41 at 800-01(3'* ed. 1999) ("When the government takes actions that 
(citing I.C.5 19-4901) (emphasis added). Also, under the UPCPA, I.C. 5 19-4908, a claim can 
only be waived ifthe waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 
695, 700-01,922 P.2d 144, 149-50 (Idaho 1999). As noted in the text, to the extent that Idaho 
Code Section 19-27 19 conflicts with the UPCPA, the Section 19-27 19 provision governs. 
burden the rights of a classification of persons in terms of their treatment in a criminal justice 
system it is proper to review these laws under the strict scrutiny standard for equal protection.") 
The fundamental rights at issue here are the right to fairness in the criminal process and 
the right to fairness in procedures for enforcing claims against governmental deprivations of life 
or liberty. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1 963); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (197 1); 
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Murray v. 
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989). See Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on 
Constitutional Law $1 5.7 (3d ed. 1 999). 
Even under a rational basis analysis, Idaho's disparate treatment of capital as compared to 
non-capital postconviction petitioners fails. Necessarily, then, it fails under strict scrutiny 
analysis as well, for under that standard of review, "a law which infringes on a fundamental right 
will be upheld only where the State can demonstrate the law is necessary to promote a 
compelling state interest." Van Valkenburgh, 135 Idaho at 126, 15 P.3d at 1134. The stated 
purpose of the offending statute, to eliminate purportedly unnecessary dclay in carrying out valid 
death sentences, is not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the violation of Petitioner's 
fundamental rights. 
Finally, I.C. $ 19-27 19(5) is unconstitutionally vague. First, the statute imposes an 
internally inconsistent standard of "known" or "should reasonably have known," in subsection 
(5) versus a standard of reasonably "could" have been known in subsection (5)(a). I.C. $19- 
25 15(5)(a). There is little question that "should" have known imposes a less stringent standard 
on a petitioner than "could have known." The internally inconsistent standards make application 
of the statute unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)(statute 
"may be impermissibly vague because it fails to establish standards for the police and public that 
are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests. Kolender v. Lawson, 
461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)"). 
It is impossible to glean from the statute or case law regarding 19-2719 waiver standard 
exactly what "should reasonably have known" requires. Within the concept of "reasonably 
should have known" is a requirement of at least minimal understanding, and familiarity with 
claims subject to bar. 
Even under an objective standard, the requirement of "reasonableness" put the question of 
default beyond a strict liability mandate that the State seeks to have applied and thus subject to 
hearing, argument, and appellate review. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not the 
types of claim that are familiar to the average lay person -they are defined and identified only if 
the party observing the performance (or lack thereof) has legal knowledge in the area under 
question. 
C. Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) violates the Idaho Constitution 
separation of powers requirement inasmuch as it purports to limit the 
district court's jurisdiction and, thus, is not a proper ground for 
summary dismissal. 
Idaho Code Section 19-271 9(5) purports to remove the district court's jurisdiction to 
reach the merits of postconviction petitions filed outside Section 19-2719(3)'s time requirements. 
Id. ('("The courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any such claims for relief as have been 
so waived or grant any such relief."). Creech v. State, 5 1 P.3d 387,389 (2002)(Idaho courts 
have no power to consider waived claims. I.C. $19-2719(5)."). However, legislative efforts to 
restrict the district court's jurisdiction violate the Idaho Constitution. 
The Idaho Constitution, Article V, Section 20, confers original jurisdiction on the district 
court to hear all cases. Idaho Constitution, Article 11, Section 1, mandates that the powers of the 
three governmental branches remain separate, and, more particularly, Article V, Section 13, 
specifically prohibits legislative restriction of judicial jurisdiction: 
The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial 
department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it 
as a coordinate department of the government; but the legislature 
shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law, 
when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their 
powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court, sofar as the 
same may be done without conflict with the Constitution[.] 
Id. (italics added). Of course, as the Supreme Court has long held, a Section 19-2719 petition "is 
a proceeding entirely new and independent from the criminal action which led to the conviction." 
Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534,636, 716 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1986). Thus, Article V, 513's 
reservation of power to the legislature has no application to Section 19-27 19 proceedings since 
they are not appeals. Further, "regulating the methods of proceeding in the exercise of the 
powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court" cannot reasonably be interpreted to vest the 
legislature with power to reduce the courts' powers, especially since that was expressly forbidden 
earlier in the exact same sentence. 
Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)'s removal of district court jurisdiction to consider 
postconviction claims filed outside Section 19-27 19(3)'s forty-two day filing requirement 
violates the Idaho Constitution's separation of powers mandate. In State v. Interest of Lindsey, 
78 Idaho 241,246,300 P.2d 491,494 (1956), the Idaho Supreme Court struck a statute 
purporting to transform previously criminal matters of juveniles into civil matters because "[tlhe 
legislature, by denoting as a civil matter what the law has previously regarded as a felony, 
attempt[ed] to take away jurisdiction vested in the district court by the constitution itself, and . . . 
attempted to render that court powerless to do anything about the prosecution of such persons." 
Similarly, in Boise City v. Better Homes, Inc., 72 Idaho 441,444-45,243 P.2d 303,304 (1952), 
the Supreme Court held that "[tlhe original jurisdiction conferred upon the district court by the 
constitution, Art. 5, $20, cannot be diminished by the legislature. ConstArt. 5, $13[.]" Again, 
in Clemons v. Kinsley, 72 Idaho 25 1,256-57,239 P.2d 266,269 (195 I), the Court held that 
"[tlhe broad jurisdiction [created by Art. 5, $131 is not subject to diminution by legislative act.". 
The Court reiterated this holding in Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Idaho 122, 127, 212 P.2d 103 1, 
1033-34 (1949). Finally, in McKnight v. Grant, 13 Idaho 629,637,92 P. 989,990 (1907), the 
Court held that, "We think [art. 5, $131 was . . . intended to preserve to the judicial department of 
the state government the right and power to finally determine controversies between parties 
involving their rights and upon whose claims some decision or judgment must be rendered or 
determination made." In short, the Idaho Supreme Court has consistently and long held that the 
legislature may not directly or otherwise restrict the district court's jurisdiction. Consequently, 
Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5) is unconstitutional and cannot stand as a bar to this Court's 
reaching the merits of Mr. Stuart's postconviction petition claims. 
D. Applying Idaho Code Section 19-2719 To This Case Would Constitute 
A Retroactive Application In Violation Of Idaho Law. 
It is long settled "that an amendment to an existing statute will not, absent an express 
legislative statement to the contrary, be held to be retroactive in application. Johnson v. 
Stoddard, 96 Idaho 230,526 P.2d 835 (1974)[.Iv Nebehr v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 1 13 
Idaho 609,614,747 P.2d 18,23 (Idaho 1987)(citations omitted). See Idaho Code Section 73-101 
("No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.") 
Though Idaho Code Section 19-27 19 was enacted much more than forty-two days from 
the date Mr. Stuart's judgment of conviction and sentence of death had been entered, the State's 
motion for summary dismissal turns on applying Section 19-27 19's forty-two day filing 
requirement and its associated anti-successive petition provisions to Mr. Stuart. This application 
would be retroactive in nature, as illustrated by Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223,912 P.2d 1 10 
(Idaho 1996). There, in postconviction proceeding, the lower court applied a statute enacted after 
the trial and direct appeal were concluded. The Supreme Court held that the statute's application 
was prospective, not retroactive, because (1) the statute changed postconviction procedures and 
did not materially affect any substantive rights of the appellant and (2) "the statutory limitations 
period [for filing the postconviction petition] had not yet run." Id. at 227, 114. By contrast, in 
Mr. Stuart's case, the forty-two day limitations period had already run when the statute was 
enacted. Consequently, the statute's application would be retroactive. 
More importantly, perhaps, is that in Paradis Section 19-2719's application was at issue 
only to the extent that it "merely changed the time period in which Paradis could file his claims 
for post-conviction relief." Id. at 226, 1 14. In Mr. Stuart's case, however, Section 19-271 9's 
anti-successive provision is at issue. In particular, Section 19-271 9(3) prohibits successive 
claims which were known or reasonably should have been known within forty-two days of the 
filing of the judgment imposing sentence of death. Absent this provision, Section 19-4908 
would govern whether Mr. Stuart's successive claims would be allowed. The Idaho Supreme 
Court has held that Section 19-4908, 
only prohibits successive petitions in those cases where the 
petitioner 'knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' waived the 
grounds for which he now seeks relief, or offers no 'sufficient 
reason' for the omission of those grounds in his 'original, 
supplemental or amended petition.' Thus, it is necessary that the 
trial court find the failure to include newly asserted grounds for 
relief in the prior postconviction relief proceeding was without 
sufficient reason before the application may be summarily 
dismissed on the ground of waiver. 
Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591,593,635 P.2d 955,957 (1981). The Palmer court went on to 
find that those claims which Petitioner's prior postconviction counsel had allegedly excised from 
the initial postconviction petition without the petitioner's knowledge or consent were not omitted 
pursuant to an "active, knowing choice made by" petitioner 
Mr. Stuart asserts that he has never knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived any 
of the claims raised in his pending postconviction petition. To the extent that he has ever agreed 
to omit any claim from a postconviction petition, he has agreed to it only after reaching an 
understanding, based partly on prior counsel's advice, that doing so would not prevent his later 
raising the claim(s). As in Palmer, the Court should conduct an evidentiary hearing and reach 
the merits of Mr. Stuart's claims. Thus, unlike Section 19-2719's time requirements as discussed 
in Paradis, that statute's procedural bar materially affects substantive rights. 
Applying Section 19-271 9's procedural bar to Mr. Stuart constitutes a retroactive 
application of that statute in violation of Idaho law. Section 19-2719's procedural bar cannot, 
then, be used as a ground to summarily dismiss the instant petition. 
Federal courts have noted that this same question may arise with regard to the 
Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). While the United States 
Supreme Court has held that, as a general rule, AEDPA applies to petitions filed after the act's 
enactment, it has also noted that specific AEDPA provisions may not be applied if doing so 
would have a retroactive effect. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327-28 (1997). As the Fourth 
Circuit concluded: 
We agree with petitioner and those courts that having had cause to 
consider the question in full, have concluded that the Supreme 
court did not hold in Lindh that courts are necessarily to apply the 
new provisions of chapter 153 to all habeas petitions filed after 
April 24, 1996 [i.e.- AEDPA's enactment date]. More particularly, 
we hold that Lindh did not foreclose-and indeed contemplated- 
continuing resort to Landgraf [i.e.-retroactivity of statutes] 
analysis in order to ensure that application of chapter 153's new 
provisions is not impermissibly retroactive in such cases. 
Mueller v. Angelone, 1 8 1 F.3d 557,567 (4th Cir. 1 999)(citing to In re Hansard, 1 23 F.3d 922, 
933 n.22 (6fi Cir. 1997), and citing to In re Minarik, 166 F.3d 591 (31d Cir. 1999), and Brown v. 
Angelone, 150 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 1998)). See Scott v. Boos, 215 F.3d 940,949 (9th Cir. 
2000)(federal prohibition against retroactive application of statute absent clear Congressional 
statement of intent looks to "parties' actions, not the date of filing"). 
11. The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims. 
Independent of Section 1's arguments that the State's motion should be denied because 
Idaho Code Section 19-271 9 is invalid as a matter of Idaho and federal constitutional law and, as 
well, invalid under other Idaho law, there are compelling reasons why the State's motion should 
be denied as it relates specifically to the Petitioner's ineffective assistance of prior counsel 
claims. Citing to Idaho Code Sections 19-4906, 19-27 19 generally, and 19-27 19(5) and 19- 
2719(11) specifically, the State argues that Mr. Stuart's petition should be dismissed without 
hearing because it is a subsequent petition filed outside the time allowed for filing postconviction 
petitions, because the issues raised were known or could have been known within forty-two days 
after entry of judgment, and because the issues raised were not timely filed after they became 
known or reasonably could have been known. Petitioner responds to all these arguments as they 
regard his ineffective assistance of prior counsel claims in this single section because each rests 
on the same statute, Idaho Code Section 2719.2 The remainder of this section describes generally 
Section 19-27 19 and applicable law, and it then explains in serial fashion why the Court should 
deny the State's motion with regard to prior counsel's ineffective assistance (a) at trial, (b) on 
direct appeal, and (c) in the initial postconviction proceedings. 
Idaho Code Section 19-271 9 governs capital postconviction actions. To the extent that it 
conflicts with the UPCPA, Section 19-271 9 governs. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 992 
P.2d 144 (1999). However, to the extent the Section 19-2719 is silent on a matter addressed by 
the UPCPA, the UPCPA provision governs. Id. 
Idaho Code Section 19-2719(3) provides that, "Within forty-two (42) days of the filing of 
the judgment imposing the punishment of death, and before the death warrant is filed, the 
defendant must file any legal or factual challenge to the sentence or conviction that is known or 
reasonably could be known." The Idaho Supreme Court has strictly construed this and Section 
19-2719's remaining provisions to provide a defendant a single "opportunity to raise all 
21daho Code Section 19-4906 sets out procedures for considering postconviction 
applications. Additionally, it provides that district courts may grant a motion for summary 
disposition where there is no apparent and genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The State nowhere argues that there is no apparent and 
genuine issue of material fact. Petitioner therefore believes the State's citation to Section 19- 
4906 is a reference to the statutory provision purporting to allow the court to dismiss applications 
where the court is satisfied that the applicant is not entitled to relief and that no purpose would be 
served by any further proceedings. I.C. Code $4906(b). 
challenges to the conviction and sentence in a petition for postconviction relief except in those 
unusual cases where it can be demonstrated that the issues raised were not known and reasonably 
could not have been known within the time frame allowed by the statute." State v. Rhoades, 820 
P.2d 665,677 (1991). 
A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Claims. 
In keeping with its strict construction, the Supreme Court has also held that ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims do not fall within the unusual cases exception because they 
"should reasonably be known immediately upon the completion of trial. E.g., Fetterly v. State, 
121 Idaho 417,419, 825 P.2d 1073, 1075 (1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1002 (1992)(citations 
omitted)." Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469,903 P.2d 58, 61 (1995). See, also, Paz v. State, 123 
Idaho 758, 852 P.2d 1355, 1356-57 (1993). Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that Section 19- 
271 9's "unusual cases" exception does not include a successive petition raising ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims even where trial counsel represented the defendant in his initial 
postconviction petition proceedings: 
This Court has strictly construed the waiver provision of I.C. $19- 
271 9. In Paz [v. State, 123 Idaho 758, 852 P.2d 1355, reh'g den'd 
(1993)], where the petitioner was represented by the same attorney 
at trial, on direct appeal, and in the first postconviction proceeding, 
this Court held that the petitioner waived the issue of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel by not raising it in his first petition. Paz, 
123 Idaho at 760, 852 P.2d at 1357. Likewise, where a petitioner 
was represented by the same attorney at trial, on direct appeal, and 
in the first post-conviction petition, and the district court denied 
the defendant's request for the appointment of an independent 
consulting attorney to review the record for claims of ineffective 
assistance, this Court concluded that the petitioner waived his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim by not asserting it in the 
first petition. Pizzuto 11, 127 Idaho at 472, 903 P.2d at 61. See 
also Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 4 17,4 19, 825 P.2d 1073, 1075 
(1 991). We have failed to find waiver by the petitioner only where 
prior counsel failed to file any petition for post-conviction relief. 
Dunlap v. State, 13 1 Idaho 576, 577,961 P.2d 1 179, 1 190 (1 998). 
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,701,992 P.2d 144, 150 (1 999). Consistent with this logic, the 
McKinney court held that even if counsel in petitioner's first postconviction proceedings was 
ineffective, Section 19-271 9 would not allow that to "excuse his failure to raise issues that 
should reasonably have been known" at the time of the first petition. Id. at 704, 153 (citing to 
I.C. $19-2719(5)). 
Since McKinney, the Supreme Court has addressed waiver of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims brought in successive petitions in five cases. Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573,21 
P.3d 895, reh g den 'd (2001); Rhoades v. State, 135 Idaho 299, 17 P.3d 243, reh g den 'd (2001); 
Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230, reh g den 'd (2001); Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 
10 P.3d 742, reh g den'd, (2000); Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636, reh g den 'd (2000). 
In none of these cases did the Supreme Court modify even slightly its earlier holding that-except 
for the extraordinary case "where prior counsel failed to file any petition for post-conviction 
relief '3-ineffective assistance of counsel claims are waived by failure to raise them within forty- 
two days of the entry of the judgment imposing a death sentence. Paz; Pizzuto; Fetterly; 
Dunlap; McKinney. 
Asserting that Mr. Stuart's petition is "a subsequent petition filed outside of the allowable 
time allowed for filing Post Conviction petitions[,]" and citing only to Idaho Code Sections 19- 
3McKinney, 133 Idaho at 701,922 P.2d at 150 (citing to Dunlap v. State, 13 1 Idaho 576, 
577,961 P.2d 1 179, 1 190 (1998)). 
4906, 19-27 19(5) and 19-27 19(1 I), the State concludes that the Court should dismiss the petition 
without hearing. While the State neither cites a single case nor provides any reasoned basis for 
its motion, the law as described above is indisputable and, for this reason, Mr. Stuart assumes 
that the State's position is that his failure to have met Idaho Code Section 19-2719(3)'s 
requirement that he file his pending claims in a postconviction petition within forty-two days of 
the judgment imposing the punishment of death necessarily requires, pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 19-2719(5), that "he [must] be deemed to have waived such claims for relief as were 
known, or reasonably should have been known."4 The Idaho Supreme Court has unquestionably 
ruled that ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims "should reasonably be known immediately 
upon the completion of trial." Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469,903 P.2d 58,61 (1995). Thus, if 
the above law were applied to Petitioner's case, his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims 
would not fall within the "unusual cases" exception carved out by Section 19-27 19(3) and 
recognized by the Supreme Court. See Fetterly v. State, 12 1 Idaho 4 17,4 19,825 P.2d 1073, 
1075, reh 'g den 'd (1 992); Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758,852 P.2d 1355, 1356-57, reh g den 'd 
(1 993). Consequently, the State's apparent argument goes, there is no need to determine whether 
Mr. Stuart has met the pleading requirements which Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(a) mandates 
for successive post-conviction petitions claiming to be within the scope of the Section 19- 
27 19(3) exception. 
While Mr. Stuart concedes that the above description accurately describes the current 
4To the extent that the State disputes that this and the remaining argument in this 
paragraph misconstrues its position, Mr. Stuart reserves the opportunity to fully respond to 
whatever argument the Court might allow the State to articulate at some later date in support of 
its motion to summarily dismiss styled "Affirmative Defense No. 1" in its Answer. 
state of Idaho law at it relates to Idaho Code Section 2719, he contends that it prevents 
postconviction petitioners "from timely raising [I ineffective assistance of counsel claims." 
Hoffian v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523,535-36 (2001). Specifically, Section 19-2719 prevents the 
timely assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel claims where the petitioner "continued to be 
represented by his original trial counsel during the forty-two day period." Hofman at 534. As 
the Ninth Circuit observed, the Idaho Supreme Court has squarely held that ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel claims are subject to the forty-two day filing requirement, and the fact that 
original trial counsel continues to represent death sentenced prisoners during that forty-two day 
window does not bring the claims within the exception to the forty-two day filing requirement. 
Id. at 533. Where, as in Hoffman, trial counsel continues to represent the petitioner during post- 
conviction proceedings, the petitioner is 
deprived of counsel who could review the record objectively for 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. . . .The practical reality, 
recognized by other states that employ the unitary post-conviction 
and appellate procedures-and, ultimately, recognized by the state 
of Idaho itself-is that "[ilt is the rare attorney who can be expected 
to contend on appeal that his representation was so poor that he 
deprived his client of a fair trial." Ciak [v. United States], 59 F.3d 
[296,] 303 [(2d Cir. 1995)l. 
[Rlaising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires that 
new counsel have the opportunity to conduct an investigation 
beyond the court records to uncover possible omissions made by 
trial counsel in the investigation and presentation of the case. See, 
e.g., Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612,623 (loth Cir. 1988) 
("[I]neffectiveness claims are ordinarily inappropriate to raise on 
direct appeal because they ... cannot be made on the basis of the 
record[.]"); Cruz v. Warden, 907 F.2d 665,670 ( 7 ~  Cir. 1990)("An 
ineffective assistance claim alleging that counsel failed to prepare 
involves facts outside the trial record and presents a situation in 
which the Illinois courts will not invoke the res judicata or waiver 
doctrines."). 
Hoffman's ... allegations of ineffectiveness at trial, sentencing, and 
on appeal ... required investigation outside of the record at trial. 
For the reasons outlined above, 8 19-27 19 effectively prevented 
Hoffman from timely raising his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. 
Mr. Stuart stands in Mr. Hoffman's shoes: Mr. Stuart was represented at trial, on direct 
appeal, and in postconviction proceedings until 1995--over a decade after Idaho's forty-two day 
filing requirement was enacted--by a single attorney, Mr. Robert Kinney.' Like Mr. Hoffman's 
claims, Mr. Stuart's ineffective assistance of counsel claims required investigation outside the 
trial record. Consequently, just as it did in Mr. Hoffman's case, Idaho Code Section 19-27 19 
"effectively prevented [Mr. Stuart] from timely raising his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims." Id. 
Where a State provides a mechanism to challenge the constitutionality of a conviction or 
sentence, the mechanism violates due process requirements where it fails to allow a full and fair 
opportunity to press a challenge. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,401 ("when a State opts 
to act in a field where its action has significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in 
accord with the dictates of the Constitution -and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process 
Clause."); Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530,535,944 P.2d 127, 132, reh 'g den'd (Ct. App. 
'Idaho law clearly provides that even though a petitioner's judgment of conviction and 
sentence of death was entered by the district court before Idaho Code Section 19-27 19 was 
enacted, that provision nevertheless applies. See, e.g., Esquivel v. State, 128 Idaho 390,913 P.2d 
1 160, reh 'g den 'd (1996). 
1997)("in determining whether the time limit of I.C. 5 19-4902 offends the federal constitution's 
due process guarantee, our inquiry is whether the statute provided the applicant with a reasonable 
amount of time in which to pursue his claim for relief'). By depriving Mr. Stuart of a full and 
fair opportunity to press his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Idaho Code Section 19-27 19 
and associated law violates his state and federal right to due process. Consequently, Section 19- 
2719 must be struck, at least as applied to preclude this Court's considering Petitioner's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. This Court should deny the State's motion to summarily 
dismiss Mr. Stuart's ineffective assistance of counsel claims for failure to have raised them in 
compliance with Section 19-27 19 time requirements. 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Direct Appeal Counsel Claims. 
As already noted, Petitioner was represented by the same attorney at trial, on direct 
appeal, and in postconviction proceedings until 1995. In Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573,21 P.3d 
895 (2001), the Idaho Supreme Court held that under such circumstances, petitioners must be 
allowed to bring ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel claims in a successive petition. 
There, the lower court dismissed the ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel claims on the 
ground that the petitioner failed to show that those claims were not and could not reasonably 
have been known at the time of her initial postconviction petition. The Supreme Court reversed, 
explaining: 
Under those circumstances, where the same counsel was 
prosecuting both the appeal and the simultaneous post-conviction 
proceedings, to hold that her counsel's failure to raise in the post- 
conviction proceedings the alleged errors they were making while 
prosecuting the appeal would effectively preclude [the petitioner] 
from ever having the opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel. . . .Thus, these claims should not 
have been dismissed on the ground stated by the lower court. 
Id. at 90 1. 
Similarly, here, Mr. Stuart did not have the assistance of independent counsel to review 
his record for potential ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel claims until the United 
States District Court for the District of Idaho appointed counsel to represent him in federal 
habeas corpus proceedings. Although Mr. Kinney-trial counsel, direct appeal counsel, and 
postconviction counsel-was replaced by substitute counsel in 1995, substitute counsel was 
appointed for the limited purpose of representing Mr. Stuart on the remand and appellate 
proceedings relating to the claims already raised by Mr. Kinney. If substitute counsel's 
appointment was not limited by the plain language of the appointment orders, his failure to bring 
ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel claims constituted ineffective assistance of initial 
postconviction counsel. See Petition at Section IIP (ineffective assistance of prior counsel claim 
supported by factual assertions including that prior counsel failed "to adequately conduct prior 
post-conviction proceedings with regard to each of the issues raised in the instant postconviction 
petition"). "[Ilneffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, provides sufficient 
reason for permitting newly asserted allegations to be raised in a subsequent post-conviction 
application. [Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 5911 at 596,635 P.2d [955, at] 960 [(1981)]." 
Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794,798,992 P.2d 789,793 (Ct.App. 1999). 
Upon appointment, federal counsel immediately began the task of collecting the record, 
reviewing it, and investigating the case. The American Bar Association's Guidelines for the 
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (rev. ed. 2003) 
describes state postconviction counsel's obligations thus: 
Counsel must be prepared to thoroughly reinvestigate the entire 
case to ensure that the client was neither actually innocent nor 
convicted or sentenced to death in violation of either state or 
federal law. This means that counsel must obtain and read the 
entire record of the trial, including all transcripts and motions, aw 
well as proceedings (such as bench conferences) that may have 
been recorded but not transcribed. In many case, the record is 
voluminous, often amounting to many thousands of pages. 
Counsel must also inspect the evidence and obtain the files of trial 
and appellate counsel, again scrutinizing them for what is missing 
as well as what is present. 
Like trial counsel, counsel handling state collateral proceedings 
must undertake a thorough investigation into the facts surrounding 
all phases of the case. It is counsel's obligation to make an 
independent examination of all of the available evidence-both that 
which the jury heard and that which it did not-to determine 
whether the decision maker at trial made a fully informed 
resolution of the issues of both guilt and punishment. 
Reinvestigation of the case will require counsel to interview most, 
if not all, of the critical witnesses for the prosecution and 
investigate their backgrounds. Counsel must determine if the 
witness's testimony bears scrutiny or whether motives for 
fabrication or bias were left uncovered at ht e time of trial. 
Counsel must also assess all of the non-testimonial evidence and 
consider such issues as whether forensic testing must now be 
performed, either because some technology, such as DNA< was 
unavailable at the time of trial or because trial counsel failed to 
ensure that necessary testing took place. 
Counsel must conduct a similarly comprehensive reevaluation of 
the punishment phase to verify or undermine the accuracy of all 
evidence presented by the prosecution, and to determine whether 
the decisionmaker was properly informed of all relevant evidence, 
able to give appropriate weight to that evidence, and provided with 
a clear and legally accurate set of instructions for communicating 
its conclusion. 
Guidelines at 12- 14 (footnotes omitted). 
Federal counsel filed the Petition as soon as possible after identifying potential issues, 
beginning to conduct appropriate investigation, and obtaining evidence supporting the claims 
r a i ~ e d . ~  Petitioner acknowledges that in his case, unlike in Row, his appeal and initial 
postconviction petition were not simultaneously prosecuted. This is a distinction without a 
difference, however, because Mr. Kinney's representing Petitioner on direct appeal and in 
postconviction proceedings "deprived [Petitioner] of counsel who could review the record 
objectively for ineffective assistance of counsel claims." Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 534. Because 
Petitioner has raised his ineffective assistance of counsel claims within a reasonable time after 
identifying them, they should not be dismissed and, consequently, the Court should deny the 
State's motion to dismiss Petitioner's ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel claims. 
C. Ineffective Assistance of Postconviction Counsel Claims. 
In explaining why the Court should reach his ineffective assistance of direct appeal 
claims, Petitioner argued why the Court should reach the merits of his ineffective assistance of 
postconviction counsel claims. Petitioner incorporates those arguments, supra at Subsection B, 
herein by reference. Because Petitioner has raised his ineffective assistance of postconviction 
counsel claims within a wholly reasonable time after identifying them, the Court should deny the 
State's motion to summarily dismiss them. Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794,798,992 P.2d 
789, 793 (Ct.App. 1999)rineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, provides 
6To the extent that the State may dispute this, Petitioner moves for an evidentiary hearing 
at which the issue may be fully and fairly developed and addressed. 
sufficient reason for permitting newly asserted allegations to be raised in a subsequent post- 
conviction application. [Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 5911 at 596,635 P.2d [955, at] 960 
[(1981)]."). 
If the Court (1) finds that substitute counsel's appointment was not limited in scope to 
prevent raising ineffective assistance of prior counsel claims and (2) rejects Petitioner's 
arguments that Section 19-271 9 may not serve as a proper basis to summarily dismiss the 
Petition, then it should reach the merits of Petitioner's claims that substitute counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel in order to determine whether to reach 
Petitioner's claims that trial and direct appeal counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 
111. The UPCPA Manifest Injustice Exception Applies. 
Under the UPCPA, I.C. 19-4901(4), post-conviction relief is available to a person 
claiming that there "exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that 
requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice." The manifest injustice 
language is not precluded by I.C. 5 19-27 19 and is therefore available in capital cases. See 
McKinney, supra. For the reasons stated in his Petition and in this pleading and based on the 
facts which should be fully and fairly developed at an evidentiary hearing, Mr. Stuart has 
unquestionably suffered a manifest injustice. In the alternative, if the court finds that I.C. $19- 
27 19 precludes a manifest injustice exception to filing successive petitions, the court must find 
that the statute is unconstitutional and violates the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of 
the Constitutions of the United States and Idaho. 
Conclusion 
For all these reasons considered separately and together and for all the reasons contained 
in Petitioner's previous pleadings in this case, the Court should deny the State's motion to 
summarily dismiss the Petition. 
Dated this 11 yay of July, 2003. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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COME NOW, L. W o n t  Anderson, Deputy Attorney General, Chief, Capital 
Litigation Unit and Special Prosecuting Attorney for Clearwater County, State of Idaho, 
and John A. Swayne, Prosecuting Attorney for Clearwater County, State of Idaho, and do 
hereby submit this brief in support of the state's Motion for Summary Dismissal. 
BACKGROUND 
A. Facts and Course of the Underlvin~z Criminal Proceedings and First A n a l  
Tha Idaho Supreme Court detailed the facts s~ounding Petitioner Gene Frmcis 
Stuart's ("Stuart") first-degree torture ~nurder of three-year-old Robert Miller as follows: 
Appellant and Kathy Miller, the mother of the deceased victim, 
Robert Miller, met in August, 1980, began dating, and subsequently 
moved in togeeher on September 20, 1980. Robert Miller was at that time 
two yeus old, and he lived with appellant and his mother. Appellant then 
assumed control over Robert. At that time the child was not yet toilet 
trained, and much of the punishment imposed upon the child dealt with 
this problem. 
Appellant \I-as a very dominant person and often critical of others 
in his presence. He was a strict disciplinarian who required almost adult 
behavior fi-om Robert over the course of their relationship. Appellant and 
Kathy Miller often argued about his treatment of Robert, and Ms. Miller 
moved out of the premises several times after the child had been bruised 
and beaten by the defendant. 
In the spring and summer of 1981, appellant assumed primary 
control over Robert, feeding, clothing and caring for him. Robert often 
accompanied appellant to his place of business. 
In late summer and early fall of 1981, appellant and Ms. Miller 
began sharing the managmat duties of a smdl tavern near Orofino. 
Appellant and ME. Miller would work scparare shifts, with Miller working 
during the day and appellant working at night. Each would take care of 
Robert *le the other was working. 
In October of 1980, there suddenly appeared bruises and blisters 
on Robert's backside. In November of 1980, Robe& had bruises across his 
forehead and a black eye. Later in November, Robeat sustained a torn and 
cut ear. Various explanations were given by appellant for these injuries, 
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including a spanking with a stick for the backside bruises, and a tricycle 
collision for the black eye. After the torn ear appeared, Ms. Miller moved 
out because of the injuries to her son. Appellant later apologized and 
convinced Miller to move back in. Ms. Miller apparently moved in and 
out several times, a1 least some of which moves resulted from the force 
used in Robert's disci?he. 
In Mar~h Robert's bottom, up to the middle of tlis back, was 
covered with bruises, which the defendant claimed resulted fiom a fall in 
the shower. In April, R O W  had bruises on his chin. Robert had little 
round btuises on his chest in November of 1980 and September of 1981. 
These bruises appeared because of appellant's habit of jabbing him in the 
chest with a finger while scalding him. 
Appellant had other unique requirements, He attempted ta teach 
Robert, a two yem old, table manners, requiring that Rob& learn ta 
properly use his fork (pick it up with his left hand, transfer it to the right 
hand, stc.) and use his napkin to wipe his mouth afler every bite. If Robert 
failed to perform correctly, he was often made to stand in a comer. Other 
requirements of Robat were that he look only at hi plate, md repl~ce his 
fork on the table after every bite. Appellant demanded these movements 
of Robert while failirag to follow them himself. At one time appellant hit 
Robert 011 the hand wit3 his fork when he picked up the fork with the 
wrong hand. 
'There were two behaviors exhibited by Robert that appella 
punished in patticulx. O I ~  was "boobing", rol~ghly translated as pouting 
or sulking. The other was wetting his pants. AAer Robert would wet hjs 
pants or exhibit any other ummptable behavior, he would be given a cold 
shower &in which he would emerge shaking with cold and blue lips. 
In May of 1981, Robert's penis was darkly bruised on the top md 
bottom Tnerc was no explanation for this injury. Also in May Robert's 
bottom and Dead were bruised and scratched. Appellant explained that 
Robert fell because thc toilet seat bmke when he sat on it. Also in May, a 
silver dollar size patch of hair was discovered as missing fiom Robert's 
head. In d y  spring Robert: complained of a hurt left arm, although no 
visible marks were seen. 
On September 19, 1981, Ms. Miller was working the day shift at 
the tavw with appeUz~t ccaring for Robert Appellant gave his version of 
the events of that day at trial, - ffn: only version availzlble, since appellant 
and Robed were alone during the day. Robert spent two ho~irs at a 
fiend's house, where appellant picked him up and took him home. He 
attempted to feed him lunch, but Robert refwed to a. Accol7jilg to 
appellant, he then began poking Robert in the chest as punishment. He 
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then struck him in the chest with his fist, swatted him and &hated hi to 
eat. Robert then proceeded tu eat uritlr no c.mplahts. After Robert 
finished eating, he was put duwn f ~ r  a nap, According to appellant he 
later went to deck on him and fmnd that Robert had vomited on the bed. 
Appellaut then bathed Robert and put him back down. However, he then 
noticed that Robert's breathing was unusual. Appellant testified that at 
thls point Robert was still dive He atte"pted mouth-to-mouth 
rmuscitation, and Robert again vomited. Appellant ?hen purportedly 
rushed X o b e ~  to the hospital. Robat was bad an arrival. Emergency 
room personnel noted that RobeA's body was cold, indicating the 
posslb~lity that he had been dezd for longer than appellant's testimony 
would indicate. 
autopsy was conducted upon Robert, which disclosed the cause 
of death as internal htxnonrhaging caused by the rupture of the liver. The 
pathologist felt that this rupture was cawed by more t,h one blow; 
however, he admitted that a well placed single blow could have u s e d  the 
mpture. The pathologist also testified that death would have occurred 
between cine and one and a half hours after such injury, contradicting 
appeliant's testimony concerning the time fime of events of the 
afternoon. A n-mber of bruises were found on the victim's body, both 
internal and external. These bruises were of differing ages. In addition, 
Robert had suffered a subdural hematoma in the head region, which the 
pathologist testified would have been caused only by a fair mount of 
blunt trauma to the head. Also: X-rays taka of Robert indicated that he 
had suffered a brokc lefl arm several months before the date of death. 
State v. S t u a  110 Idaho 163, 165-67,715 P.2d 833 (1 986) (Stuart r). 
On September 21, 198 1,  Stuart was charged with injury to child, I.C. 9 19-1 501, 
inifoi~ing Robert" death. (#17014, Supp. R., p, 1.)' Qn October 2, 1981, the csse was 
dismissed. (#170!4, Supp. R.,p.14.) 
Prior to the injury to child case being dismissed, St1uu-t was charged on October j ,  
1981 with Robert's first-degree murder by torture. (#14865, R., p.1 . j b t  +is initial 
appearance on Q ~ t ~ b e r  2, 1981, S W  was represented by Daniel Johnson ("Johnsou"). 
-- 
' Case +:7014 ir the Idaho Supreme Cow's number for Stuart's &st post-conviction 
case in which Clearwater County Case #8458 was augmented to the record. 
Case #I4865 is the Idabo Supreme Court's numbex for Stuart's underlying conviction 
far first-degree murder and his sentence of death. 
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(#I 7014, Supp. K., y.26.) On October 5, 1981, Johnson filed a M~tion  to Withdraw 
(#17014, Supp. R., p.41, which was granted by the magistrate the same day (#17014. 
Sum. R., p.5). Robat Kinney ("Kinney") was appcinbd to represent Stuart or: 
October 13, 1981. (817014, Supp. R., p.7.) A preluninary hearing was held and Stuart 
was bound over to district court. (#170i4, Supp. Re, p.26; #14865, K., p.6.) 
An Infurmation charging Stuart with Robert sl fust-degree torture murder was 
filed November 15, 1981. jff14865, R., pp.3-5.) Aaz mended information wts filed 
February 10, 1982, Stuart with Robert's first-degree torture murder and of being 
a persistex~t violator in violation of I.C. $19-2514. ($14865, R., pp. 14-15,) 
On December 9, 1981, Stuart informed the court of his intent to rely on a mentd 
disease or mentd rlefect defense. (it14865, R., p.28.) Based upon S+wrt's Noticc of 
Intent to Rely on the Deftnse of Mental Disease or Mm+A Defect, m January 13, 1982, 
thc district court ordered that Stuart be given a psychiatric exmination and that the 
psychiatrist file a report with the court, Kimey and the pmsecutor. (fi14865, R., pp.9- 
10.) A report was received by the rmpective parties. (#14865, R., p.27.) On June 24, 
1982, the district cow-t ordered a second psychiatric evaiuation. by Dr. Rob& Wetzler. 
i#14865, R., p.24.) 
On May 27, 1982, Stuart filed a Motion in Limine, seeking ta exclude the 
testimony of Sharie Lee Ddy, Theresa Jacobsen and Vicki Nelson (#I 4865? R., p.22)- 
which was denied by the district court (#14865,13.: p.23). 
Stuart filed a Motion for Lnvestigaaive Assistance on July 29, 1982, '"for purposes 
of discovering facts ma h f o ~ o n  which defendant believes will impeach the 
testimor~y of prosecution wimesses testifying at tihe preliminary hearing in this cause, and 
which are expected to testify at Lmal." (#14865, R., p.28.) The district court indicated it 
was prepared to grant the mntion, but requested Mtio~ial information fi-om Kinney. 
(#14865, R., p.30.) Based upon the d i t i o n d  information provided by Kinney, the 
district court initially denied the, motion and ordered that Kinney lirst contact the 
witnesses by telephone. (#14865, R., p.31.) The wurt subsequently authorized the 
expenditure of $300.00 for ICinney to travel to Seattle. Washington, to personally contact 
the witnesses. (#14865, It., p.37.) 
On September 21, 1 982, Stuart filed a Motion for Dlsmvcry. (#14865, R., pp.39- 
41.) The state responded with a Notice of Compliance on September 27, 1982, and 
further notified Stuart that "all files of the Prosecutor's Office and the Sheriffs OEce me 
open for inspection and examination by defense counsel." (#14865, R., pp.42-43.) 
Prior to trial commmcing, Stusut filed a number of requested jury instmaions 
(#14865, R., pp.85-99.) Jury trial commenced on October 4, 1982. (#14865, R., pp.71- 
52.) kt the conc1l;lsion of the presentation of evidence. a jury imuuction conference was 
held at which both parties shbd they had no objection to the instructions that would be 
given by the district court, the order in whch they would be given or requested 
instrcctions that were not given (iY14865, Tr., p.918.) On October 14, 1982, the jury 
found Stuart guilty of first-degree murder. (#14865, R., p.?O.) Stuart pled guilty to the 
sentencing fmhanement. (#14865, Tr., pp.969-71.) 
On October 20, 1982, the state filed pr Notice of Intent to Request Death Penalty, 
requesting that the district court find three statutory aggravating Factors. (#I4865 ~j j . 83 -  
84.) A presentace report was completed and a copy provided to both pi&=. (#I 4865, 
R., p.208.) The district court concluded the state had proven two statutory aggravating 
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factors: (1) "The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting 
exceptional depravity;" and (2) "The defendant by prior conduct or conduct in the 
commission of the murder at hand has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which 
wilt probably constitute a continuing threat to society." (#I 4865, R., pp.2 14- 15.) While 
the district court examined the record for mitigation, the court ultimately found there was 
no mitigation that would outweigh the aggravating circumstances and imposed the death 
penalty. ($1 4855, R., pp.211-13, 216, 227-28.) The Judgment of Conviction was filed 
December 9, 1982. (#14865, R., pp.227-28.) 
Kinney represented Stuart throughout the course of his apped. On June 3, 1983, 
Stuart's Motion for Research Assistance on Appeal (#17014, R., p.4) was granted by the 
district court (#17014, R., p.5-7). Kinney was given additional papent  a d  
reimbursement W n g  the c o w  of the appellate process. (#:7024, K., pp. 14- 15,27-28.) 
On May 3, 1985, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Stuart's convictions and sentence. 
Stuart I. Stuart's motion for rehearing was denied by the court on February 20, 1986. Id. 
The supreme murt's Remittitwr was issued March 14, 1986, with the direction that Stuart 
be given forty-two days in which to file any post-conviction challenge prior to issuance 
of a &at .  wanant and that any such petition be governed by the dictates of I.C. 4 19- 
2719. (#17014, R., pp.150-5 1.) 
B. Facts and Course of Stunt's First Post-Conviction Relief Case and Appeal 
Afier obtaining an extension of time fiom the district court,3 (17014, R., pp, 161 - 
62), Stuart, still represented by Kinney, fled his first Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
Stuart's underlying criminal case was presided over by the Honorable Andrew Schwam. 
Porter's post-conviction case was presided over by the Honorable Ron Schilling. 
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on June 3, 1986, and an Ati~davit of D a ~ d  Simn~ons discussing conversations he had 
with Stuart about Stuart's childhood (ti17014, R., pp.163-82). On December 23, 1986, 
the distnct c o w  gave notice of its intent to dismiss Stuart's postconviction pebtion. 
(#I 701 4, R , pp.189-95.) Stuart responded with three affidavits: (1) AMidavit of Katrina 
Matteoni; (2) Afdidavit of Lynn Matteoni; and (3) AEdavit of Robert E. Kiiurey and e, 
reply to the court's order. {#17014, R., pp.204-27.) On May 11, 1987, the district court 
denied Stuart post-conviction relief. (#I 7014, R., pp.334-41.) Otf October 16, 1990, the 
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of post-conviction relief. 
v. State, 801 P.2d 1216,801 P.2d 1216 (1990) (Stuart 11). 
C. Facts and Course o f - S W s s  First Swwssive Post-Conviction Relief Case an .  
Appeais 
While his appeal -was pending Stuart, with the corltinuing assistance of b e y ,  
filcd his first successive post-conviction relief petition, alleging constitutional violations 
basd  *on the alleged recording by employees of the Clearwater Sheriffs Department of 
ran-uasations between Sbart and his attorney. (#i8653, R, pp.22-45.)4 On Febmiq I, 
l989, the district court entered an order preliminarily addressing some of the issues raised 
by Stuart's petition, but sought additional briefing on the question of whether an 
evidcnuay hearing was waranted. (#18653, R., pp.73-79.) ~ f i e r  the state filed its brief 
and s1:pprting affidavits, the district court filed a notice of intent to dismiss the petition. 
(818653, R., pp.94-104.) Stuart responded with a reply a d  a number of additional 
affidavits. (318653, R., pp.112-54.) On March 28, 1990, the district murt erntad a11 
/ 
order s u m m ~ l y  denying pst-conviiction relief. (#18653, R., pp. 176-78.) 
" 
' Case t18653 is the 1&o Supnme Court's number for Stuart's first successive post- 
conviction relief case. 
On November 28, 1990, the Idaho Supreme C v m  reversed the district court's 
order s~?mmdly dismissing Stuart's petition and o r d a d  the district cowt to conduct an 
cvide~tiary hearing on two questions: "(1) whether there was recording of attorney-cllent 
coversations on the part, of the Sheriffs Department; and, (2) whether the appellant's 
constitutionid rights were vidated." Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 935, 801 P.2d 1283 
(1990) (Stuart III). The court M1er explained that if attorney-client conversations were 
recorded, "the State will be required to show that the evidence at trial had an ongn 
independent of the eavesckopping." I& 
An evidantiary bearing commenced on April 5, 1W2, addressing the question of 
whether any attorney-client conversations involving S t m  had been monitored or 
recorded. (e20060, R., pp.~78657.)\5 On >me 10, 1992, the district court concluded no 
anorney-client c d s  were monitored and derlied Stuart post-conviction relief. (k2006CI, 
R., pp.537-70.) The wurt expressly addressed niissing portions of two telephone logs, 
The court ulthatefy concluded because the spoliation doc&ne did not apply, no 
inference or presumption existed in favor of either party. (420060, R., pp.565-68.) 
On February 21, 1995, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district cowt's 
finding, rhat the destruction of the logs was not attributable to the state, was unsupported 
by substantial and coripetent evidence. mart v. State, 127 Idaho 806,813-14,907 P.2d 
783 (1995) (Stuart TV). As a result, the court ooncludcd Stuart was entitled, under the 
spuhdion doctrine, to a favorable inference regarding the missing logs. g. 127 Idaho at 
516-17. However, the c o w  remanded Stuart's case to the district court to dctermioe the 
"proper scope" of the inference. 13, at 8 1 7. 
-- 
v a s e  #2006!3 is the Idrho Supreme Court's number for Stuart's first successive post- 
conviction relief case after it was remanded in Stuart 111. 
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On October 11, 1993, while his appeal was pending, Stuart filed a Motion f ~ r  
Relief from Judgment based upon state v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 721, 852 P.2d 87 (1993), 
aslang the district court to reconsider an issue involving the court's failure to instruct the 
jury on the included offense of second-degree torture murder. (#2 1684, R., PP. 1 -9.)6 
Concluding Tribe should not be retroactively applied, the district court denied Stuart's 
motion. (#2 1684, R, pp. 17-19.) The Idaho Supreme Court a f i e d  the district court on 
February 15, 1996. Stuart v. State, 128 Idaho 436,914 P.2d 933 (1 996) (Stuart V). 
On November 9, 1995, while Stuart's appeals were pending, the district court 
authorized Kinney's withdrawal and appointed Scott M. Chapman ("Chapman") to 
represent Stuart. (#26661, R., pp.40-44.)7 Based upon the Idaho Supreme Court's 
decision 1n Stuart IV, the district court applied the spoliation doctrine and concluded 
Stuart met his burden of establishing his attorney-client conversations were recorded or 
monitored by the Clearwater Sheriffs Department. (#2666 1, R, pp.75-84.) Based upon 
its findings, the court ordered another evidentiary hearing on the question of whether the 
evidence at trial 'had an origin independent of the cavadropping." (#26661, R., p.83.) 
On May 23, 2000, the disbict wurt denied Stuart post-conviction relief, concluding the 
state had proven the trial evidence was obtained from a source independent from the 
eavesdropping, the trial evidence would have inevitably been found irrespective of the 
eavesdropping and that the nexw between the evidence presented at trial and the 
eavesdropping was too attenuated to warrant reversal. (#26661, R., pp.367-95.) 
\ 
' Case #21684 is the Idaho Supreme Court's number for Stuart's first successive post- 
conviction relief case after it was remanded in Stuart 111, challenging the district court's 
denial of his Motion for Relief from Judgment. 
' Case #2666 1 is the Idaho Supreme Court's number for Stuart's first successive post- 
conviction relief case after it was remanded a second time in Stuart W .  
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On December 4, 2001, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's 
denial of post-conviction conviction relief. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 36 P.3d 1278 
(2001) (Stuart VQ. 
b'hile Stuart's habeas case was pending and with the assistance of new counsel 
from the Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington and Idaho ("Federal Defenders")), 
Stuart filed a Petition for Catiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which was 
denied June 10,2002. Stuart v. Idaho, 536 U.S. 907 (2002). 
With the assistance of new counsel k r n  the Federal Defenders, on January 17, 
2002, Stuart filed an Application for Stay of Execution with the federal district court and 
a Statement of Issues that he intended to include in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
(Appendix A, B.j On January 18, 2002, the federal distnct wurt formally appointed the 
Federal Defenders to represent Stuart during the course of his federal habeas proceedings. 
(Appendix C.) On June 24,2002, Stuart filed his federal habeas petition. (Appendx D.) 
Stuart's federal habeas case was stayed on November 14, 2302, pendmg the completion 
of state court proceedings. (Appendix E.) 
On August 2, 2002, Stuart filed his second successwe Petition for Post- 
Conviction Rdief and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus, contending, based upon Ri- 
Arizona 536 U.S. 584 (2002), that his death sentence should be vacatdR Stuart's second 
successive petition is pending before the district court. 
On December 3, 2002, Stuart filed the instant third successive post-co~viction 
petition raising multiple prosecutorid misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. 
8 Stuart also couched his second successive petition in terms of a Motion to Correct 
Illegal Sentence ~ d e r  LC.R. 35. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. Introdu~tion 
Stuart raises several prosecutorial misconduct ciaims, including claims based 
upon the following allegations: (1) the prosecutor advised a witness not to say Stuart 
suffered from mental health difficulbes; (2) the prosecutor was aware that before 
testifying at the preliminary hearing, state witnesses were ingesting small tab pills which 
allegedly had a "calming effect"; (3) the state encouraged "prior bad acts witnesses to 
exchange there anticipated testimony" by housing them in a hotel for the pre1imina.y 
hearing and trial, bringing them into a single room before the preliminary hearing and 
failing to advise them not to "exchangc their anticipated testimony"; and (4) the state 
encouraged "prior bad acts witnesses to exaggerate" Stuarts misdeeds by "providing a 
heightened sense of danger" by providing a "police presence at the witnesses' 
accommodations," relating to at lwt one witness that the state had received calls fiom 
community members threatening Stuart, compelling Stuart to wear leg irons at his 
preliminary hearing and using heightened security measures at trial. Stuart also raises an 
allegation that the state withheld exculpatory evidence from Stuart's counsel, including 
interviews iiom witnesses that could have allegedly supplied mitigation evidence. 
Stuart also raises multiple ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel 
c l ~ m s ,  including claims based upon the following allegations: (I) failure to adequately 
raise, brief and argue at trial and on appeal that Stuart's incriminating statements should 
have been suppressed; (2) failure to adequately raise, brief and argue at trial and on 
appeal the inadmissibility of prior bad act evidence; (3) failure to adequately raise, brief 
and argue at trial and on appeal that the verdict was based upon impossibly confusing 
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jury instructions; (4) failure to adequately raise, brief and argue at trial and on appeal 
sufficiency of the evidence; (5) failure to adequately raise, brief and argue at trial and on 
appeal, the trial court's failure to instruct on the included offense of second degree 
murder by torture; (6) failure to adequately raise, brief arid argue at trial and on appeal, 
that Stuart was convicted of violating an uncanstitutianally vague statute; (7) failure to 
adequately raise, brief and argue at trial and on appeal, that Stuart was denied his right to 
speedy trial as guaranteed by Idaho law and the federal Constitution; (8) failure to 
adequately raise, hief and argue at trial and on appeal that prosecutorial misconduct 
violated Stuart's constitutional rights; (9) failure to adequately raise, brief and argue at 
trial and on appeal that Stuart's constitutional rights were violated by use of au impartial 
jury; (10) failure to adequately raise, brief and argue at trial and on appeal constitutiod 
violations based upon the district corn's failure to record chamber conferences; (1 1) 
failure to adequately raise, brief and argue at trial and on appeal that heightened security 
measures at the time of Stuart's trial violated due, process; (12) failure to adequately raise, 
brief and argue at trial and on appeal the constitutional ramifications of the state engaging 
in plea negations to not smk the dcath penalty in exchange for a guilty plea; (13) failure 
to request sufficient h d i n g  to conduct investigation; (14) failure to conduct guilty phase 
and sentencing phase investigation; (1 5) failure to research "significant issues affecting 
the constitutionality" of' Stuart's conviction; (16) failure to conduct post-conviction 
proceeding with regard to the issues raised in Stuart's instant successive petition; and 
(1 7) failure to raise issues on appeal constituting fundamental errore9 
a In his Response in Opposition to Motion for Summary Dismissal, Stuart contends he 
has raised ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel claims. The state has scoured 
Stuart's successive petition and finds no allegations regarding ineffective assistance of 
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Finally, Stuart also raises a claim based upon the length and conditions of his 
confinement. 
Because Stuart has failed to make a primu facie case showing that the claims in 
his third successive post-conviction petition were not known or could not reasonably 
have been known when he filed his prior petitions for post-conviction relief, under the 
dictates of LC. 5 19-2719, each must be dismissed. Further, Stuart's claims have not 
been timely raised under the dictates of I.C. 5 19-2719. Finally, Stuart has failed to meet 
the drctates of I.C. 4 19-2719(5)(a) by supporting his claims with "(i) a precise statement 
of the issues or issues asserted together with (ii) materid fads stated under oath or 
affirmation by credible persons with hand knowledge that would support the issue or 
issues asserted," such that post-conviction r~lief is warranted. 
B. Stuart's Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Is Governed BY I.C. 8 19- 
371 Cl 
1. The Legal Parameters Of LC. 6 19-2719 
Idaho Code 4 19-2719 sets forth special appellate and post-conviction procedures 
in all capital cases. Capital post-conviction proceedings, like non-capital post-convrction 
proceedings which are governed by the Unifonn Post-Conviction Procedure Act 
(UPCPA)? are civil in nature and governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
- 
post-conviction counsel claims. The only possible reference to an ineffective assistance 
of post-conviction counsel claim is in regard to claim paragraph 104(8) and (9). 
However, the reference to postconviction is in the context of ineffective assistance of 
trial and appellate counsel claims. To the extent this court believes Stuart has raised an 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel claim, the state submits it is untimely 
and not cognizable. Further, as explained in McKinney, 133 Idaho at 703, 
"ineffectiveness of post-conhlction counsel is not an independent ground for a subsequent 
post-conviction proceeding." Likewise, ineffective assistance of post-conviction cowsel 
does not excuse Stuart's failure to raise claims in his iirst post-conviction petition. Id_ 
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Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469,470,903 P.2d 469 (1995). Idaho Code 4 19-2719 does 
not eliminate the appiicability of the UPCPA in capital cases, but modifies and 
"supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their provisions conflict." McKinnev v. State, 
133 Idaho 695,700,992 P.2d 144 (1999); P M o .  127 Idaho at 470: 
Specifically, I.C. § 19-2719 provides a capital defendant one opportunity to raise 
all challenges to the conviction and sentence in a post-conviction relief petition which 
must be filed within forty-two days after entry of judgment. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 
795, 806, 820 P.2d 665 (1991). The only exception is provided in I.C. § 19-271 9(5), 
which permits a successive petition "in those unusual cases where it can be demonstrated 
that the issues raised were not known and reasonably could not have been known within 
the time frame allowed by the statute." I& 120 Idaho ai 807; Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 
573, 575, 51 P.3d 387 (2002). If a capital defendant fails to comply with the specific 
requirements of I.C. $ 19-2719, including the specifier! time limits, the issues are 
"deemed to have [been] waived" and "[tlhe courts of Idaho shall have no power to 
consider any such claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any such reliefw I.C. 
4 19-27 19(5); Cree~h, 137 Idaho at 575, n.2. 
A capi'd defendant who brings a successive petition for post-conviction relief has 
a "heightened burden and must make a prima facie showing that issues raised in that 
petition fit within the narrow exception provided by the statute." Pizmto, 127 Idaho at 
471. Even if the petitloner can demonstrate the claims were not known or could not 
reasonably have been known, I.C. 5 19-2719(5)(a) details the additional rq~irements that 
must be met before the successive petition may be hesrd: 
An allegation that a successive postconviction petition may be 
heard because of the applicability of the exception herein for issues that 
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were not known or could not reasonably have been known shall not be 
considered unles the applicant shows the existence of such issues by (i) a 
precise statement of the issue or issues asserted together with (ii) materid 
facts stated under oath or affhation by d i b l e  persons with first hand 
knowledge that would support the issue or issues asserted. -4 pleading that 
fails to make a showing of excepted issues supported by material facts, or 
which is not credible, must be summarily dismissed. 
I.C. 8 19-27 19(S) (a). Failure to meet the rea.uirements of LC. 5 1 9-271 9(5)(a) mandates 
dismissal of the successive post-conviction petition. Fields v. StAa 135 Idaha 286, 289- 
Additionally, claims which were not known or wtuch could not have reasonably 
been known within forty-two days of judgment must be asserted ''within a reasonable 
time after they are known or reasonably could have been known." Paz v. State, 123 
Idaho 758, 750, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 701. If the petitioner 
fails to comply with each of the requirements detailed in I.C. 8 19-2719(5), the petition 
must be summarily dismissed. 1°C. 5 19-271 9(5) specifically provides: 
If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section 
and within the time limits specified, he shall be deemed to have waived 
such claims for relief as  were known, or reasonably should have been 
known. The courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any such 
clalms for relief as have been so waived or grant any such relief. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Finally, I.C. 8 19-271 9(5)(b) explains that a successive post-conviction petition is 
"facially insufficient" if it merely alleges "matters that are cumulative or ;mpeaching or 
would not, even if the allegations were true, cast doubt olz the reliability ofthe convicti~n 
or sentence." If evidence is merely cumulative with evidence already within the 
possession of the defme at the time the first petition for post-conviction relief is filed, a 
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procedural bar exists mandating dismissal of the successive petition. Sivak v. State, 134 
Idaho 641, 647-49,8 P.3d 636 (2000). 
In State v. Beam. 11 5 Idaho 208, 21 3, 766 P.2d 678 (1 988), the Idaho Supreme 
Court discussed the purpose and policy behind the passage of I.C. 8 19-2719: 
The underlying legislative purpose behind the statute stated the need to 
expeditiously conclude criminal proceeding and recognized the use of 
dilatory tactics by those sentenced to death to "thwart their sentences." 
The statute's purpose is to "avoid such abuses of legal process by 
requiring that all collateral claims for relief . . . be consolidated in one 
proceeding. . . ." We hold that the legislature's determination that it was 
necessary to reduce the interminable delay in capital eases is a rational 
basis for the imposition of the 42day time limit set for I.C. (5 19-2719. 
The legislature has identified the problm and attempted to remedy it with 
a statutory scheme that is rationally related to the legitimate legislative 
purpose of expediting constitutionally imposed sentences. 
The United States Supreme Court has specifically approved requiring a ciiminal 
defendant to present all of his collateral claims in a single post-conviction proceeding. In 
Mwch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972), the Court, discussing federal habeas corpus 
proceedings which prohibit piccemeal litigation by requiring that all claims be brought in 
a single petition for a writ of habeas corpus, explained the respective states can employ a 
similar procedure for post-conviction relief procedures. The Court concluded: 
There can be no doubt that States may iikcwise provide, as Maine 
has done, that a prisoner seeking post-conviction relief must assert all 
known constitutional ~laims in a single proceeding. Indeed, the Court of 
Appeals agreed that the Maine statutory scheme was an "orderly 
procedure of the state courts," as that tam is used in Fay v. Noia, [372 
U.S. 391,438,83 S.Ct. 822,849,9 L.Ed.2d 637 (1963)]. No prisoner has 
a right either under the Federal Constitution or under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to 
insist upon piecemeal collateral attack on a preamptively valid criminal 
conviction in the face of such a statutory provision. 
Mwch, 409 U.S. at 45-46. 
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Idaho Code 6 19-271 9 also has a great deal of interplay with federal habeas law. 
The ability of a state to ensure that its judgments carry a measure of finality rather than 
being subject to repetitive federal attack, depends in substantial measure on the regular 
and consistent enforcement of state procedural rules and bars. Addressing the interplay 
between state procedural bars and federal review, the Supreme Court, in Johnson v. 
Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988), r e W  to honor a state procedural bar and 
explained: 
[Wle consider whether that bar provides an adequate and independent 
state ground for the rehsaI to vacate petitioner's sentence. "jW]e have 
consistently held that the question of when and how defaults in 
compliance with state procedural rules can preclude our consideration of a 
federal question is itself a federal question." H m y  v. -Mississippi, 379 
U.S. 443, 447, [85 S.Ct 564, 567, 13 L.Ed.2d 4081 (1965). "[A] state 
procedural ground is not 'adequate' unless the prooedural rule is 'strictly 
or regularly followed. ' Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149, [84 
S.Ct. 1734, 1736, 12 L.Ed.2d 7661 (1964)." IIathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 
255, 262-263, 102 S.Ct 2421, 2426-2427, 72 L.Ed.2d 824 (1952); see 
Henty v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. at 447-448, 85 S.Ct. at 567-568. We find 
no evidence that the proceduraI bar relied on by the Mississippi Supreme 
Court here has been consistently or regularly apphed. Rather, the weight 
of Mississippi law is to the contrary. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has historically followed the requirements of I.C. 19- 
2719, by strictly and regularly dismissing successive capital post-conviction relief claims 
because of petitioners' failure to meet the narrow exception of I.C. Q 19-271 9(5). See 
Creech, supra; Porter v. State, 136 Idaho 151, 32 P.3d 151 (2001); Row v. State, 135 
Idaho 573, 2 1 P.3d 895 (2001); Rhoades v. State, 135 Idaho 299, 17 P.3d 243 (2000); 
Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 912 P.2d 1 10 (1 996); Pimto,  supra; Lankford v. State, 
127 Idaho 100, 897 P.2d 991 (1995); Paz. supra; Petter1y v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 825 
P.2d 1073 (1991). The court has also historically followed the requirements oE1.C. 9 14- 
2719, strictly and regularly affirming the district courts' dismissal of successive capital 
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post-convic;ion claims because of petitioners' failure to meet the narrow exceptions of 
I.C. § 19-2.719(5), including the pleading requirements of I.C. $4  19-2719(5)(a) and (b). 
See Fields, supra; Pizzuto v. State, I34 Idaho 793, 10 P.3d 742 (2000); Sivak v. State, 
134 Idaho 641,8 P.3d 636 (2000); McKinneey, mpra. 
2. Because Stuart Was Convicted Of First D e m  Murder And Given A 
Death Sentence, I.C. 6 19-2719 Is Amlicable To His Successive Post- 
Conviction Petition 
Stuart's contention that I.C. 8 19-2729 is not applicable to lus case because he 
was never convicted of capital first-degree murder (Response, p.4) is ludicrous and 
without merit. First, Stuart expressly states on the firsi page of his successive petition 
that "This petition is bro~ght pursuant to I.C. §g 19-2719, 194901 et seq., and 19-4201 
et seg." (Petition, p. 1) (emphasis added.) 
Furtner, 1.C. $ 19-2719(3) expressly states, ''WitLh forty-two (42) days of the 
filing of the judgment imposing the punishment of death, and before the death warrant is 
filed, the defendant must file any legal or factual challenge to the sentence or conviction 
that is knowx or reasonably should be known.'' Clearly, the triggering device for 
application of I.C. g 19-271 9 is the "filing of the judgment imposing the punishment of 
death." Judgment imposing the punishment of death was filed in Stuart's case on 
December 9, 1982. (#14865, R., pp.227-28.) Further the Idaho Supreme Court has 
affirmed that judgment. See Stuart I. 
The mere fact that Stuart contends the judgment was illegally imposed based upon 
Ring v. Arizonq does not result in I.C. 19-2719 being inapplicable to his case. All 
capital defendants contend their convictions and death sentences are invalid or otherwise 
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illegal. Following Stuart's logic would result in I.C. $ 19-2719 never applying to any 
cast and complctcly thwart the legislative intent behind the statute.'' 
Finally, Stuart's contention that "[blecause [he] was never convicted of first 
degree murder and, therefore, was never eligible for a sentence of death" (Response, p.4), 
is likewise ludicrous and unsupported by the record. Stuart was clearly convicted of first- 
degree murder, (#14865, R., pp.70.) Based upon his first-degree murder conviction, 
Stuart was also eligible for the death penalty, see I.C. Ej 18-4004, which was properly 
imposed by the district court. 
3 .  Stuart Has Failed To Establish I.C. 6 19-2719 Violates EX Post Factc 
Laws 
Stuart further contends, because his conviction was entered prior to the leaslative 
enactment of I.C. 9 19-2719, that application of the statute to his case would constitute a 
violahon of ex post kcto laws. (Response, pp.5-6.) 
The United States Constitution, article I, § 10, and the Idaho Constitution, &cle 
I, 5 16, prohibit the enactment of ex post facto laws. As explained in State v. Bvers, the 
United States Supreme Court has defined what constitutes an ex post facto law: 
la,  every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and 
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. 
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when 
wrnmitted. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and id3ict.s a 
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or 
different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of 
the offense, in order to 2onvict the offender. 
'' As detailed above, Stuart has filed a different post-conviction petition based upon & X i .  
As will 'be explained in the state's briehg in that case, because -is not retroactive, it 
has no application to Stuastts case. 
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Bvers, 102 Idaho 159, 166, 627 P.2d 788 (1951) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Ball.) 
386, 390 (1798)). 
The Supreme Court's ex post factu jurispmdence has focused upon the third 
category because such laws "implicate the central concerns of the Ex Post Facto Clause: 
the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases 
punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was con~urnmated." h c e  v. 
Mathis, 519 U.S. 433,441 (1997Xintemal quotes and citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
As explained in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 (19771, the Ex Post Facto 
Clause generally does not apply to procedural matters: 
It is equally well settled, however, that the inhibition upon the 
passage of ex post facto laws d ~ e s  not give a criminal a right to be tried, in 
all respects, by the law in force when the crime charged was committed. 
The constitutional provision was intended to secure substantial personal 
rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation, and not to limit the 
legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do riot 
affect matters of substance. 
Even though it may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, a 
procedural change is not ex post facto. 
(Internal quotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added'). 
The Supreme Court has identified "two critical elements [that] must be present for 
a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: It must be retrospective, that is, it must apply 
to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected 
by ii." Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1 9BO)(footnote omitted). However, "no ex 
post facto vio1,ation occurs if the change effected is merely procedural, and does not 
i n a w e  the punishment nor change the ingrdents of the offense or the ultimate facts 
necessary to atablish guilt." Id. at 29, n. 12. "Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto 
Clause is not an individual's right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and 
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governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was 
prescribed when the crime was consummated." Id. at 29 (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court, in Collins v. Younpblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990), narrowed 
what constitutes an ex post facto violation by overruling several prior cases. After the 
defendant was sentenced, the Texas legislature amended the remedy that was available 
when an unauthorized fine was imposed at sentencing. Under the law at the tinle the 
defendant was sentenced, if the law did not authorize the fine, the judgment and sentence 
were void and the defendant was entitled to a new bid. Id, 497 U.S. at 39. ~ f t e r  
Youngblood was sentenced, new legislation was enacted permitting the appellate court to 
merely reform an improper verdict, thereby elhinaeing the new trial remedy. I& at 40. 
'I'he Supreme Court reiterated that procedural changes do not violate the Ex Post Fscto 
Clause. 14. at 45. The Court reasoned, "While these cases do not explicitly define what 
they mean by the word 'procedural,' it is logical to think that the tern refers to changes in 
the procedures by which a criminal case is adjudicated, as opposed to changes in the 
substantwe law of crimes." Id. at 45. The Court concluded the new statute "is ar 
procedural change that allows reformation of improper verdicts. It does not alter the 
definition of the crime of aggravated sexual abuse, . . . nor does it increase thc 
punishment for which he is eligible." Id. at 44 (emphasis added). The Court explained 
that language from other cases discussing whether a procsdural change may violate the 
Ex Post Facto Clause if it deprived a defendant of "substantial protections" or infringed 
upon "substantial personal rights," had "imported confixion into the interpretation of the 
Ex Post Facto Clause." Id. at 45. 
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Idaho's appellate courts have followed the Supreme Court cases detailed above. 
See State v. Lovelace, 2003 WL 21697869, * 13-14 (Idaho 2003), pet's for reh 'rg 
pending. In Mellineer v. State, 113 ldaho 3 1, 34,740 P.2d 73 (Ct. App. 19871, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals quoted Dobbert and Miller, in concluding that a change in the statute of 
limitations in Idaho's Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act ("UPCPA") was 
procedural in nature and dzd not materially affect the petitioner's substantial rights. See 
also LaFon v. State, 1 19 Idaho 387, 389-90, 807 P.2d 66 (Ct. App. 1991); Essuivel v. 
State, I28 Idaho 390, 913 P.2d 1160 (Ct. App. 1996). The Idaho Supreme Court 
expressly adopted Mellin~er UI State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 247, 796 P.2d 121 
(1990). In Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223,227, 912 P.2d 110 (1996), the Idaho Supreme 
Court applied the rationale of 07Nei11 in a capital case. 
This same analysis has also been applied to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), which was enacted by Congress in 1996 and significantly 
changed the manner in which federal habeas cases are litigated and iimited the cases in 
which the federal courts can grant habeas relief. The federal caurts have uniformly held 
that, because the changes made by the AEDPA we procedural in nature, they do not 
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Libby v. Mamusson, 177 F.3d 43, 46-47 (1" Cir. 
1999); Seymour v. Walker? 224 F.3d 542,560 ( 6 ~  Cir. 200); Neellev v. Na~le ,  13 8 F.3d 
917, 921 ( l l& Cir. 1998) (overmled on other grounds by Williams v. Tador, 529 U.S. 
362 (2000)); United States v. Ortiz, 136 F.3d 161,168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
Similar analysis was used in Mitchell v. State, 934 P.2d 346, 349 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1 9971, when the petitioner challenged amendments to Oklahoma's capital post- 
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conviction statutes. The court explained that, because such changes were "procedural in 
nature," they did not violate the ex post fact0 clause. Id. 
Likewise, the enactment of I.C. 8 19-2719 was procedural in nature. The statute 
"neither made criminal a themtofore innocent act, nor aggravated a crime previously 
committed, nor provided a greater punishment, nor changed the proof necessary to 
convict." Seymour, 224 F.3d at 560 (quoting Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293). Rather, "these 
provisions simply b i t  the circumstances under which [Stuart] may collaterally attack his 
conviction." Libby, 177 F.3d at 46. 
Further, Stuart cannot complain of a lack of fair notice or prejudice. AAer his 
first appeal, but prior to the filing of his first post-conviction petition, the Idaho Supreme 
Court advised Stuart that his post-conviction proceedings would be governed by the 
dictates of I.C. 5 19-2719. (#17014, R., pp.150-51.) 
4. I.C. 6 19-2719 Does Not Violate Stuart's Due Process Or Eoual Pmtection 
Rights 
Stuart contends I.C. 4 19-2719 violates his equal protection and due process rights 
because I.C. 4 19-2719 allegedly offers capital petitioners less protection than non-capital 
petitioners under the UPCPA. (Response, pp.7-9.) Stuart's contention is based upon the 
claim that there is "no rational basis [citations omitted], for the disparate treatment of 
non-capital prisoners" and that he is entitled to "strict scrutiny of the discriminatory 
classification." (Response, p.9.) 
This issue has been repeatedly addressed and rejtcted by the Idaho Supreme 
Court. In State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 211-13, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), the court 
expressly held I.C. # 19-2719 does not violate equal protection. In State v. Rhoades, 120 
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Idaho 795, 806, 820 P.2d 665 (1991j, the court expressly concluded LC. § 19-2719 does 
not violate due process. The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed both of these 
cases. See Lankford, 127 Idaho at 102; State v. Hoffian, 123 Idaho 638,647,851 P.2d 
934 (1993); State v. Cad, 121 Idaho 425, 430-31, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991); State v. 
Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 72, 822 P.2d 960 (1991); Paz v. State. 118 Idaho 542, 559,798 
P.2d 1 (1990); State v. Fetterlv. 115 Idaho 231,235-36, 766 P.2d 701 (1988). 
Because Stuart has failed to even cite these controlling cases, he obviously hrts 
failed to provide any argument as to why they are not contralling, resulting in the 
rejection of his contentions that LC. 8 19-2719 violates due pmcess and equal protection. 
Stuart's claims are without merit and should be summarily rejected. 
5.  Idaho Code 4 19-2719 Is Not Unconstitutionally Void For Vameness 
Because It Gave Stuart Sufficient Notice That He Was Waiving Aav 
(%hns That Were Known Or Could Have Been Known But Were Not 
Filed Within The S~ecified Time Limits 
The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears tbe burden of proving 
its invalidity and must overcome a strong presumption of constitutionality and clearly 
show the invalidity of the statute. Olsen v. J. A. Freeman CQ., 117 Idaho 706, 709, 791 
P.2d 1285 (1990); State v. Nelson, 11 9 Idaho 444, 447, 807 P.2d 1282 (Ct. App. 199 1). 
"Where a statute is capable of two interpretations, one of which would make it 
constitutional and the other unconstitutional, . . . the court should adopt that construction 
which upholds the validity of the act." Cowles Publishina Co. v. Mastrate Court, 11 8 
Idaho 753, 759, 800 P.2d 640 (1990). "[L]cgislative enactments are presumed 
constitutional and . . . appellate courts are obligated to seek an interpretation of the statute 
which upholds its constitutionality." State v, Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 13, 696 P.2d 856 
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(1985). The Idaho Supreme Court has articulated a threepart test to analyze a 
constitutional challenge based upon the void-for-vagueness doctrine: 
First, the court must ask whether the ordinance regulates constitutionally 
protected conduct. If the answer to this first step is in the afEmative, then 
the next step asks whether the ordinance precludes a significant amount of 
the constitutionally protected conduct. If the answer to this step is also in 
the affirmative, then the ordinance is quite likely ovabroad and must be 
restricted in its application or mvritten. But if the ordinance does not 
regulate constitutionally protected conduct, or if the ordinance does not 
preclude a significant amount of such conduct, then h e  next and last step 
is to ask whether (a) the o h c e  gives notice to those who are subject to 
it, and (b) whether the ordinance contains guidelines and imposes 
M~cient  discretion on those who must enforce the ordinance. 
State v. Bitt, 118 Idaho 584,587-88,798 P.2d 43 (1990). 
Stuart does not contend LC. 8 19-2719 regulates constitutionally protected 
conduct, but merely claims, "[ilt is impossible to glean f?om the statute or case law 
regarding 19-27 19 waiver standard exactly what 'should reasonably have known' 
requires." (Response, p.10.) However, the courts have recognized that "in most Enghsh 
words and phrases there lurk uncertainties." I33 11 8 Idaho at 584 (quoting Robinson v. 
United States, 234 U.S. 282 (1945)). "The requirement of reasonable d t y  docs not 
preclude the use of ordinary tcrms to cxprcss ideas which find adequate interpretation in 
common usage and understanding." bdstrom v. Dist, Bd of Health Panhandle District 
l, 109 Idaho 956,960,712 P.2d 657 (Ct. App. 1985); & -, v. 
105 Idaho 447,455, 670 P.2d 854 (1 983) (quoting Horn v. Burns and Roe, 536 F.2d 251, 
254-55 (8& Cir. 1976)). Constitutional standards under the vagueness doctrine do cot 
require that every word used in a criminal statute be statutorily defined. "Where the 
legislature bas not provided a definition, terms in a statute are given their commonly 
utlderstmd meanings." State v. Ridwds, 127 Idaho 3 1,38, 896 P.2d 357 (1995). Even 
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if there is some "possible W i t y  for vagueness," it "may be avoided if the statute is 
given a limiting judicial construction, consistent with the apparent legislative intent and 
comporting with constitutional limitations." Id, 
Contrary to Stuart's claim, neither the phrase, "reasonably should have been 
known" nor the phrase, "could not reasonably have been known," is unconstitutionally 
vague. Both phrases clearly delineate the necessity of filing any legal or factual 
challenge to the conviction or sentence that is known or reasonably mdd have been 
known when the first post-conviction petition is filed. It is not the terms "wuld" or 
"should" that are dispositive, but the texm "reasonably," whch indicates the standard is 
based upon an objective examination of whether the claim could have been known at the 
time of the filing of the first postconviction petition. This rationale is certainly 
supported by the legislature's policy statement which accompanied passage of I.C. 6 19- 
2719 and parts of wfiich are contained within the statute itself and states, 'The following 
special procedures shall be intqreted to accomplish the purpose of eliminating 
unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death sentence." 
Idaho Code jj 1 9-27 19 is not unconstitutionally vague. It provides notice that 
claim which were known or reasonably could have been known are waived it they were 
not filed within the time limits specified within the statutt. 
6 .  I.C. 4 19-2719 Does Not Violate The Idaho Constitution's Separation Of 
Powers Doctrine 
Stuart contends LC. 6 19-2719 violates Idaho's separation of powers doctrine 
under the Idaho Constitution, art. II, § 1. (Response, pp.10-12.) While Idaho's appellate 
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courts have not directly addrtssed this issue, it has been addressed in the context of 
habeas corpus. 
In Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228,280,392 P.2d 279 (1964), the Idaho Supreme 
Court explained that because the writ of habeas corpus is expressly recognized in Idaho's 
constitution, "the writ is not a statutory remedy." The court concluded, 'While the 
legislature (absent certain contingencies) is without power to abridge tbis reanedy secured 
by the Constitution, it may add to the efficacy of the writ. Statutes are usually enacted 
for this purpose and should be construed so as to promote the effectiveness of the 
proceeding." I '  Addressing the enactment of the UPCPA., the supreme court concluded 
the UPCPA is "an expansion of the Writ of Habeas Corpus." Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 
235,237,459 P.2d 1017 (1969). 
Because the UPCPA is an expansion of the writ of habeas corpus and the 
legislature is not barred from adding to the efficacy of the writ, it naturally follows that 
LC 8 19-2719 does not unduly restrict the district court's jurisdiction in violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine. Rather, LC. 3 19-2719 merely establishes the parameters 
in which relief may be granted when a s~sccegsive post-conviction petition has been filed. 
As explained in mlcland v. Blaine Countv Medical Cb-., 134 Idaho 464, 471, 4 P.3d 
Because it is properly within the power of the legislature to establish 
statutes of limitations, statutes of repose, create new causes of action, and 
otherwise modify the common law without violating separation of powers 
principles, it necessarily follows that the legislature also has the power to 
limit remedies available to plaintiffs without violating tbe separation of 
powers doctrine. 
Because the legislature has the powex to limit the remedies available to plaintif%, 
it necessarily has the power to limit the remedies of capital petitioners in seeking post- 
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conviction relief. Stuart has failed to establish I.C. 5 19-2719 results in a constitutional 
violation under the separation of powers doctrine. 
7. Amlication Of 1°C. 8 19-2719 To Stuart's Case Does Not Constitute 
Retroactive Application In Violation Of S t a t 0 . B  
Stuart correctly notes that Idaho law "proh"bits the retroactive application of 
newly passed legislation." Matthews v. StateJ 122 Idaho 80 1, 804, 839 P.2d 121 5 (1 992) 
( c i a  I.C. 8 73-101). However, I.C. $ 73-101 provides an exception, if the legislature 
exprcssly declares its intent to make a new rule of law retroactive. I& At the time LC. $ 
19-2719 was passed, the legislature expressly stated: 
This act shall apply to all cases in which capital sentences were 
imposed on or prior to the effective date of this act but which have not 
been canied out, and to all capital cases arising after the effective date of 
this act. 
I981 Idaho Sea. Laws 390. 
Obviously, this language clearly states the legislature's intent to make 1.C. 8 19- 
2719 retroactive to all capital cases. B m e  of this language, Stuart's a r p e n t  
regarding retroactivity is without merit. 
8. Idaho Code 6 19-2719 Does Not Permit The Filing Of A Successive Post- 
Conviction Petition Under LC. 6 19-490 l(41 
Stuart chums he should be permitted to file a successive post-conviction petition 
based upon I.C. 8 19-4901(4). (Response, p.26.) However, even if 1.C. § 19-4901(4) 
permits the filing of a s'ucccssive post-conviction petition in non-capital cases, the filing 
of a successive postconviction petition in a capital case is governed exclusively by I.C. 
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In capital cases, a successive petition is allowed only where the 
petitioner can demonstrate that the issues raised were not known or could 
not reasonably have been known within the 42-day time flame. 
McKinnev, 1 3 3 Idaho at 700 (emphasis added). 
Stuart's claim that if "I.C. 19-2719 precludes a manifest injustice exception to 
filing successive petitions, this court must then find the statute is unconstitutionaI and 
violates the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Constitutions of the United 
States a ~ ~ d  Idaho," (Response, p.26) is without merit and has been addressed above. 
C. Stuart Has Failed To Make A Prima Facie Showing That His Prosecutorial 
Misconduct Claims Are Not Barred BY I.C. 19-27 19 
1. Stuart's Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims Were Known Or Reasonably 
Could Have Been Known When He Filed His First Petition 
As explained in McKinnev, 133 Idaho at 706-07, "Even if the State violated 
[Stuart's] right to due process . . . , [Stuart] was required to raise this issue, like other 
constitutional issues, within the time fiame mandated by I.C. § 19-2719." See also 
Porter, 136 Idaho at 261. In a successive petition for post-conviction relief, Stuart is 
requited to "make the required prima facie showing that the issues could not reasonably 
have been known during the first proceeding." McKinne~, 133 Idaho at 707. Therefore, 
the court must "initially examine[ ] whether the information alleged by [Stuart] to be 
exculpatory reasonably should have been known at the time of [Stuart's] first post- 
conviction petition." Porter. 136 Idaho Lit 261. 
Stuart first contends, "The prosecution advised at least one witness not to say that 
.Mr. Stuart suffered fiom mental health difficulties." (Petition, . )I  ' Stuart's claitn is 
" Apart from the procedural bars of LC. Ij 19-2719, Stuart's contention regarding this 
claim is simply incorred In a statement allegedly signed by Theresa lo Jacobson, she 
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based upon a statement allegedly signed by Theresa Jo Jacobson on October 28, 2002. 
Likewise his next three claims are also based upon the statement allegedly signed by 
Theresa. (Petition, p.8.j Clearly, this information was available to Stuart during the time 
of his trial and prior to the filing of his h t  post-conviction petition. Theresa testified at 
Stuart's preliminary hearing and his trial. She was also listed as a witness on the 
Information (#14865, R, p.5) and the Amended Information (#14865, R., p.16). SPart's 
counsel certainly had the opportunity to interview Theresa and cross-examined her at 
both hearings. 
The state is not mandated to spoon-feed information to Stuart or his attorneys. 
The courts have recognized criminal defendants have a duty to exercise reasonable 
diligence in obtaining and presenting evidence: 
[Rlegardless of whether the evidence was material or even exculpatory, 
whea information is fully available to a defendant at the time of trial and 
his only reason for not obtaining and presenting the evidence to the Court 
is his lack of reasonable diligence, the defendant has no R d y  claim. 
United States v. Stuart, 150 F.3d 935, 937 (8& Cir. 1998); ynited States v. Wit% 470 
F.2d 328,337 (7b Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Brown, 628 F.2d 471,473 (5th Cn. 
1980)). The Ninth Circuit also recognizes situations in which "same defense diligence 
[is] required." United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242, 1250 (9" Cir. 1978). 
Further, Stuart and his counsel were obviously aware of thz alleged "police 
presence" during the preliminary hearing and trial. They would also have been aware of 
Stuart allegedly being in leg irons at the time of his pre1iminary hearing. ~ e c t b e  all of 
states, "When Mr. Harrleson and I were tallcing, I said Gene Stuart was bezerk. -Mr. 
Harrelson said in subscmce that I should try to refrain fiom using words like 'insane' and 
'crazy."' (Petition, appendix A, p.2.) Being instructed to ''refrain h m  using words like 
'insane' and 'crazy,"' M y  constitutes being advised "not to say that Mr. Stuart 
suffered from mental health difficulties." 
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this "evi&nce" was masonably available to Stuart at the time of trial or the filing of his 
first post-conviction petition, he has failed to establish these claims were not known or 
reasonably could not have been known when he filed his first post-conviction petition. 
Stuart has also failed to esttiblish his claim involving "exculpatory evidence" was 
not known or reasonably could not have been known when he filed his fiat post- 
conviction petition. Stuart's claim is based, for the most part, upon transcripts of 
interviews that were conducted during the course of the state's investigation Stuart has 
failed to establish those transcripts and interviews were not provided to Stuart and 
Kinney. In fact, some of the e~hibits upon which Stuart is relying for this claim have 
"Defendant's exhibit" tags attached to them. (Petition, Appendices, C, p.1; E. p.1.) 
Clearly, like his other prosecutorial misconduct claims, this specific claim was known or 
reasonably wuld have been known when Stuart filed his first post-conviction petition. 
Stuart's successive post-conviction petition f d s  to explain how he became aware 
of the underlying facts that fonn the basis of his prosecutorial misconduct claims. Stuart 
has failed to provide any dlidavits fiom Kinney stating he did not have the information 
dunng the course of Stuart's trial or post-conviction proceedings. Neither has Stuart 
provided affidavits detailing when hie new attorneys became aware of the information. 
Because of Stuart's failure to affirmatively detail when the information became known or 
reasonably could have been known, his claim fails. Row. 135 Idaho at 578 ("?'he court 
below properly dismissed these claims because Row made no attempt to show that these 
alleged facts were not known or could not reasonably have been known at the time of her 
f ~ s t  post-conviction proceeding"). 
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Because of his failure to establish these claims were not known or reaS0~bly 
could not have been known when ha filed his first post-conviction petition, Stuart's 
prosecutorial IIlisconduct claims must be dismissed. 
2. Stuart's Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims Have Not Been Asserted Within 
A Reasonable Time 
Even if Stuart's p~osecutorial misconduct claims were not known at the time of 
the f h g  of his first post-conviction petition, they have not been asserted within a 
reasonable time after they were known or reasonably could have been known. Stuart's 
successive post-conviction petition also fails to explain when he became aware of the 
evidence upon which he bases his prosecutorial misconduct claims. 
Presumably, Stuart fails to detail when the information became known or 
reasonably could have been known because he was fully aware of the underlying facts 
well before the filing of his successive petition. In Dunlm v. State, 131 Idaho 576, 577, 
961 P.2d 11 79 (1998), the Idaho Supreme Court explained that filing a petition for post- 
conviction relief within forty-two days after the appointment of new counsel was a 
reasonable time for asserting claims that could not have been known. Because Chapman 
was appointed as Stuart's new c o w 1  on November 9, 1995, Stuart had forty-two days 
fkom the appointment in which to file his successive petition. 
Stuart contends, because Chapman was allegedly appointed "for the lirnited 
purpose of representing Mr. Stuart on the remand and appellate proceedings relating to 
the claims already raised by Mr. Kinney," that his appointment should not be the new 
stsrting point for the filing of a successive petition (Elesponse, p.23.) However, there is 
nothing in the order of appointment limiting Chapman's responsibilities to "clliims 
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already raised by Mr. Kinney." Further, even if Chapman's appointment was limited, 
Stuart has failed to explain why the successive petition was not filed within forty-two 
days of the Federal Defenders being appointed to represent him in federal court in his 
habeas case in January 2002. Finally, even if Stuart should have been given additional 
time to file his petition after the appointment of the Federal Defenders, he has failed to 
detail when the underlying claims were known and if they were filed within the hay-two 
day time requirement of I.C. 19-2719. See Rhoades, 135 Idaho at 301 ("Dunlap 
supports the State's position that a successive petition must be filed within forty-two days 
of the time the claim is known or reasonably knowable," but declining to adopt the state's 
position because the six-month delay in filing the successive petition was unreasonable). 
Because of Stuart's failure to establish a prima facie case showing the clairas 
were timely filed after they were known or reasonably could have been known, he is not 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Rather, the claims must be dismissed. 
3. Stuart Has Failed To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Regardla& 
His Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims 
Further review of these claims is not required. However, should this court find 
that Stuart or his counsel did not know and reasonably could not have known of the 
prosecutorid misconduct claims raised in the successive post-conviction petition and that 
those claims were timely hled, the claims still fail because of Stuart's failure to meet the 
additional requirements of I.C. 5 19-2719(5)(a) and raise a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding the claims raised in the successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
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a Standard Of Review 
An application for post-conviction relief is a civil proceeding, entirely new and 
independent from the criminal action that led to the conviction. The petitioner bears the 
burden of establishing relief should be granted baed upon a preponderance of evidence. 
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678,662 P.2d 983 (1983); Russell v. State; 118 Idaho 
65, 67, 794 P.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1990); Wolf v. State, 117 Idaho 645, 647, 791 P.2d 26 
(Ct. App. 1990). 
The court may grant a motion for summary disposition when it appears there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a n~Eltler of 
law. Idaho Code 19-4906(c); Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 536, 716 P.2d 1306 
(1986); Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 761 819 P.2.d i159 (Ct. kpp. 1991). 
Additionally, an application for post-conviction relief may be summarily dismissed 
where the allegations, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to the relief sought. 
Clark \. State, 92 Idaho 817, 830,452 P.2d 54 (1969). 
The factual showing in the post-conviction relief application must be in the fom 
of evidence which would be adrmssible at an evidentiary hearing. Dra~eau v. State, 103 
ldaho 61 2, 617, 651 P.2d 546 (1982); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 824, 702 P.2d 860 
(Ct. App. 1985). Bare or conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are 
inadequate to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. B a t h  v. Gardner, 11 0 Idaho 
156,159,715 P.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1986); Stone, 108 Idaho at 826. 
The district cow may review the pleadings, depositions, admissions and 
affidavits to determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists. Moreover, the court must 
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liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. 
State v. R i m ,  124 Idaho 894,896,865 P.2d 986 (Ct. App. 1993). 
b. Stuart Has The Burden Of Establishinp His Claims Of 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
To establiqh his prosecutorial misconduct claims, Stuart must present sufficient 
evidence to prove the prosecutor obtained a conviction '%by the knowing use of perjured 
testimony." Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 538, 716 P.2d 1306 (1986) (quoting United 
States V. A m ,  427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). If Stuart makes such a showing, the 
conviction "mLISt be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony 
would have affected the judgment of the jury." I@ "This standard is a 'strict standard of 
materiality not just because [these cases] involve prosecutorial misconduct, but more 
importantly because they involve a corruption of the truth-seeking h c t i o n  of the trial 
process. "' Id (quoting Amrrs, at 104). 
c. Stuart Has Failed To Establish There Is A Material Issue Of Facc 
With Renard To His Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims 
Stuart's initial claims of prosecutorial misconduct are extraordinarily vague, but 
are allegedly based upon Name v. Ulinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1 959) and Moonev v. Holohan, 
294 U.S. 103 (1935)' both of which involve the state's use of pejured testimony. 
However, the f&s iuticulated by Stuart do not support such a claim; there is no 
allegation the state used perjured testimony. Rather, Stuart's alleged facts relating to 
issues allegedly committed by persons other than prosecutors. They also involve pretrial 
issuw such as witness interviews, witness housing aad security at the time of Stuart's 
preliminary hearing and trial. Stuart has failed to explain how any of the alleged facts 
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establish "egregious misconduct" by the prosecutors that violated Stuart's due process 
rights. 
Certainly, there is no proscription preventing someone fkom interviewing 
witnesses and explaining that certain zas of testimony should not be blurted out while 
testifying. Stuart makes no claim that if Theresa had been directed to lie if asked whether 
he  was "insane" or "crazy." However, should the court deem this claim has any merit, 
the state will provide the court with a copy of Theresa's interview with Robert Hamlson, 
~ ~ l x c h  drrectly contradicts her claim that Harrelson told her she should refrain from using 
the words "insane" or "crazy." 
Likewise, there is no proscription against housing witnesses in the same hotel or 
same room prior to their testifqing at a preliminary hearing or trial, particularly in small 
communities such as Orofino and Moscow. Stuart has provided no evidence supporting 
the claim that the state "encouraged" witnesses to "exchange their anticipated testimony." 
He has not even alleged that witnesses actually changed their testimony as a result of 
allegedly talking with each or that Stuart's due proms rights were otherwise violated as 
a result of witnesses allegedly being housed together. 
Stuart has also failed to establish the state had anything to do with Theresa being 
offered "smalt tab pills." Theresa's "impression" thd a police oEcer allegedly in b e  
room, "supplied the pills" is nothing more than rank speculation. Neithcr is there any 
evidence establishing Stuart's implied claim of drug ingestion Based upon Theresa's 
statement, it is just as likely that the "mall tab pills" were Tic Tacs, candy, sugar plus or 
any number of thmgz other than drugs, 
BRIEF INSUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISiWSSAL - 37 
Finally, Stuart's claim contending the prosecutor encouraged witnesses to 
exaggerate their testimony by providing a ''heightened sense of danger," is without merit. 
The alleged facts articulated by Stuart fail to demonstrate witnesses exaggerated their 
testimony. Further, Stuart has failed to establish the alleged facts themselves, concerning 
security issues at the time of Stuart's preliminary hearing and trial, were not warranted. 
Merely because extra security measures may have been taken does not mean the s~ate was 
trying to get witnesses lo exaggerate their testimony or that the alleged goal of 
embellishment was actually accomplished by such measures. 
d. Stuart Has The Burden Of Establishing The Prosecutor Withheld 
Exculpatorv Evidence 
The withholding sf evidcnce by a prosecutor from the defense rhat is favorable to 
the accused, irrespective of the prosecutor's good or bad faith, violates due process only 
if the evldence is material either to guilt or punishment. Bradv v. Man/.land, 373 U.S. 83, 
87 (1963). In United States v. Badev, 473 U.S. 678, 682 (1985), the Supime Court 
examined the issue of "materiality" by looking at Strickland v. Washinplton, 456 US. 668 
(1 984), and concluded, "The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability, 
that, had the evidence been &closed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. Additionally, it is clear that Bradv 
applies to impeachment evidence. I& at 675-76. Howcva-, it has no application if the 
evidence contains "merely ~umulative impeachment evidence." United States v. 
Mar&, 9 13 F.2d 724,732 (9& Cir. 1990). 
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e. Stuart Has Failed To Establish There Is A Material Issue Of Fact 
With Repard To His Bra& Claim 
Conspicuously absent h m  Stuart's B r a y  claim is any allegation that tiis attorney 
did not have the documents and other information which form the basis of Stuart's claim. 
As noted above, some of the documents actually have "Defendant's Exhibit" stickers 
attached to them. (Petition, appendices C, p.1, E, p.1.) Additionally, as detailed above, 
the state had an "open file policy" that permitted Kinney access to "all files of the 
Prosecutor's office and the Sheriffs Office." (#14865, R., p.42.) AS evidenced by the 
"Defendant's Exhibit" stickers, Kinney obviously took advantage of this policy and was 
aware o f  or had copies of the documents forming the basis of Stuart's Bradv claim. Even 
if Kinney did not have the actual documents, because the infomation was all based upon 
Stuart's clildhood, the information fkom the documents was clearly available to Kinney 
from Stuart. 
D. Stuart Has Failed To Make A Prima Facie Showing That His Ineffect~ve 
Assistance Of Trial Counsel Claims Are Not Barred Bv 1.C 4 19-2719 
I. Stuart's Ineffectwe Assistance Of Trial Counsel Claims Were Known Ox 
Reasonably Could Have Been Known %'hen He Filed His First Peti l i i  
The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claims are claims that were known or reasonably should have been known when 
a petitioner files the first post-conviction petition. Pizzuto, 127 Idaho at 472 ("A claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is also one that should reasonably be b u r n  
immediately upon the completion of trial"); Paz, 121 Idaho at 759-60 (same); Fetterlv, 
12 1 Idaho at 41 9 (same); see also Row, 1 3  5 Idaho at 578; Rhoades, 13 5 Idaho at 303. 
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In an attempt to overcome this long line of cases, Stuart relies upon Hoffman v. 
Arave, 236 F.3d 523 (2001), for the proposition that this court should ignore Idaho 
Supreme Court precedent regarding the application of LC. 19-27 19. However, until the 
Idaho Supreme Court expressly states it is abandoning this long line of precedent 
requiring that ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims be raised in the f i t  post- 
conviction petition, tbis court is bound to follow those cases, not the Ninth Circuit. 
Additionalb, even if this court feeis constrained to examine the dictates of 
Hoffman, it must be understood that the Ninth Circuit was examining LC. 8 19-27 19 in 
the context of federal habeas law, not state law. As explained by the Ninth Circuit, I.C. 5 
19-2719 provides a procedural bar that ?revents capital litig=ts from raising claims for 
the first time in e federal habeas petition. Id, 236 F.3d at 530. Wheri I.C. 5 19-2719 is 
regularly and consistently applied by Idaho cuurts, principles of comity a d  fderal~sm 
prevent capital litigalts h m  raising Lrst-time claims in federal court. See Coleman v. 
Thompson, 502 U.S. 722, 729-31 (1991); Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 376 (gth Cir. 
1997) (quoting Morales v. Calderon, 85 F.3d 1387, 1392 (9' Cir. 19%)). Wh;n state 
courts deviate fmm regularly and consistently applying procedural bars, the federal courts 
disregard the bars and capital litigants are permitted to skirt principles of comity and 
fgderalism by rais~ng new claims for the first time in federal habeas petitions. 
While the Ninth Circuit found that in Hoffman's case I.C. 4 19-27 19 frustrated his 
exercise of Sixth .4mendroent claims, the court also found, "The Idaho Supreme Court 
has strictly construed the waiver provision of the stap~te as limiting a capitd defendant to 
'one opportunity to raise all challenges to the wnviction and sentence in a petition fcr 
post-conviction relief except in 'unusual cases."' Hoffman, 236 F.38 at 533. Should 
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this court conclude it is not going to "strictly constri34 the waiver provision," such a 
ruling would have an adverse impact on the state's ability to prevent capital litigants from 
raising first-time claims in federal court, even when new counsel has been appoirited to 
represent capital litigants during the course of their first post-conviction proceedqs. 
While the Ninth Circuit concluded I C. 4 19-271 9 fixstrated Hofhm's  exercise 
of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims when he was represented by the sm~e 
attorney at trial, sentencing, post-conviction and appeal, this is a separate issue, relevant 
in federal court to determine whether I.C. 8 19-2719 is ar! adequate and independent 
procedural bar. Ho&an, 236 F.3d at 530. This court should leave this question for 
another day to the federal courts and follow the precedent establ~shed by the Idaho 
Supreme Caurt, which has regularly and consistently followed the dictates of I.C. 4 19- 
2719. 
2. Stuart's Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel Claims Have Not Been 
Asserted Within A R w n a b l e  Time 
Like his prosecutorial misconduct claims, even if Stuart's ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel claims were not known at the time of the filing of his first post-conviction 
petition, they have not been asserted within a reasonable time after they were known. 
Stuart's successive post-conviction petition fails to explain when he became aware of the 
evidence upon which he bases his prosecutorial misconduct claims. Because of Stuart's 
failure to affirmatively detail when the claims became known or reasonably could have 
been known, his claims fail. R m  135 ldaho at 578 ("The court below properly 
dismissed these claims because Row made no attempt to show that these alleged facts 
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were not known or could not reasonably have been known at the time of her first post- 
convktion proceeding"). 
3. Stuart Has Failed To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Reggding; 
His Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel Claims 
Further review of these claims is not required. However, should this court find 
that Stuart or his counsel did not know and reasonably could not ha\-e known of the 
pmsmutorid misconduct claims raised in his successive post-conviction petition and that 
those clairns were timely filed, the petition still fails because of his failure to meet the 
additional requirements of I.C. 9 19-27 19(5)(a) and raise a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding the claims raised in the successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
a. S M  Has The Burden Of Establishine; Deficient Performance And 
Pre-iudice 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Stuart must show his 
sounsel's representation was deficient and that the deficiency was prejudicial. Strickland 
v. Washinrrton, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1994). The first element "requires a showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 
gwlrenteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment" Id. In making such a determination 
there is a strong presumption that counsel's performance falls w i t h  the ''wide rauge of 
professional assistance." I& at 689. Stuart has the burden of showlng that fris trial 
counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. 
The eEitiveness of trial mmel's performance must be evaluated from wuflsel's 
perspective at the time of the alleged error, not with hindsight. I .  at 689. As explained 
by the Supreme Court- "There are countless ways to p i ~ ~ i d e  effective assistance in any 
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given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particulat client 
ir, the same way." Id. Strategic and tactical choices are " v i d i y  unchallengeable" if 
made after thorough investigation of the law and facts. Strategic choices made after less 
than cornplete investigation are unch Jlengeable if "reasonable professional judgments 
support the limitations on investigation." Id. at 690-91. 
The Strickland Cour also discussed the duty of defense counsel to conduct a 
reasonable investigation. A 'kreasonab!e Investigation" does not mandate an "exhaustive 
investigation." As explained by the Stpreme Court: 
[Clounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In 
any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be 
directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a 
heavy memure of deference to wunsel's judgments. 
Stricklmd, 466 U.S. at 96 I .  
Ln the context of trial counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress, the Supreme 
Court has explained such a failure "does not constitute per se inefffective assistance of 
counsel." Kimrnelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986). Rather, trial counsel has 
a duty to make a reasonable investigation or make a reasonable decision that makes a 
particular investigation unnecessary. I& In assessing the reasonableness of the 
investigation and decision, a reviewing court must consider all the circumstances to 
assess counsel's overall performance throughout the case. Id. at 386. 
The second prong requires Stuart to show that "counsel's errors were so serious as 
to deprive the defendant of a fair ti4 a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687. This requires Stuart to demonstrate "there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been 
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different. A rsasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome." I_d at 694. In making such a determination a reviewing court "must 
consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury." Id. at 695. These 
standards are "rigorous" and 'lzighly demanding." M d s a n ,  477 U.S. at 3 8 1. 
In the context of a suppression motion forming the basis of an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, ''the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment 
c.laim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have 
been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice," 
Id. 477 U.S. at 375. 
b. Stuart Has Failed To Establish There h A Material Issue Of Fact 
With Regard To His Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel 
Claims 
The vast majority of Stuart's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are 
based upon Kinney's alleged failure to "adequately raise, brief and argue" various issues 
at trial. The obvious reason for the adverb "adequately" is that most of the issues were 
raised, briefed and argued at trial. For example, Kinney filed a Motion in Liminz to 
exclude "bad act evidence," which was denied by the district court. Ldcewise, Kimey 
argued there was insufficient evidence to support a verdict of first-degree torture murder, 
which was rejected by the district court. Stuart has failed to explaic what else Kinney 
should have done to "adequately raise, brief and argue" these various claims. 'Therefore, 
Stuart has failed to establish deficient ptrforrnance. 
Likewise, because Stuart has failed to establish how the claims should have been 
"adequately" raised, briefed and argued, he has failed to establish how the result of his 
t r ial  would have been any different. 
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E. Stuart Has Failed To Make A Prima Facie Showing That His Ineffective 
Assistance Of Ap~ellatt: Counsel Claims Are Not Barred Bv I.C. 19-2719 
1. Stuart's hcffective Assistance Of A ~ ~ e l l a t e  Counsel Claims Have Not 
Been Asserted Within A Reasonable Time 
Unlike ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
concluded that when the same counsel represents a capital defendant on appeal and the 
first post-conviction case, the defendant is precluded Erom having the opportunity to raise 
an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in the first petition. R- 135 Idaho 
at 579. Howevcr, as explained in Porter, 136 Idah6 at 260, such claims "must be asserted 
within a reasonable time after they are known or reasonably could have been known." As 
detailed above, the "reasonable time" period is forty-two days after the claims are known 
or reasonably could have been known. 
However, even if this court rejects the forty-twc day time paiod, Stuart's 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims were not timely filed. Stuart's first 
appcl!ate brief was obv~ously filed sometime prior to the Jdahu Supreme Court's decision 
in Stuart I, which was issued May 3, 1985. In Porter. 136 Idaho at 260, the supreme 
~our t  conciuded that a 'Yhree-year span from the date of Porter's first appellate brief to 
the assertion of his current claims is an unreasonable length of time for the pursuit of 
post-conviction relief." Clearly, Stuart's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
claims have been raised more than three years &ex the filing of his first appellate brief. 
In Porter. the supreme court also noted that the Federal Defenders were appointed merely 
one year prior to raising ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims. Id. 
S t u t ' s  case, the Federal Defders were appointed on Jmuary 17,2002, almost on year 
pnor to the filing of this successive post-conviction petition. 
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Based upon the dictates of Porter, Stuart's ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel claims were clearly not filed within a reasonable period of time. 
2. Stuart Has Failed To Raise A Genuine lssue Of Materid Fact Regarding 
His Ineffective Assistance Of Appellate Counsel Claims 
Further review of these claims is not requ11-d. However, should this court find 
that Stuart's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims were f i ld within a 
reasonable period of time, the claims still fail because of Stuart's failure to meet the 
additional requirements of I.C. § 19-2719(5)(a) and raise a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding the claims raised in the successive petition for post-conviction relief 
a. Stuart Has The Burden Of  establish^ Deficient Performance A d  
Preiudic~ 
Cer i i ly ,  tho Strickland standard applies to appellate counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 
469 U.S. 387 (1985). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, 
Stuart must show his counsel's representation on appeal was deficient and that the 
deficiency was prejudicial. strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The relevant inquiry is whether 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for col~nsel's errors, Stuart would have 
prevailed oon appeal. Smith v. Robbins 528 U.S., 259, 285 (2000). 
While there is a constitutional right to effective appellate counsel: there is nc? 
obligat~on to raise every nonfiivolous issue. Jones v. B a r n s  463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 
(1983). "Exp&encsd udvocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the 
impoflance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central 
Issue ~ possible, or at most on a few key issues." I& As explained in Smith v. Stewart, 
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140 F.3d 1263, 1274, n.4 (gh Cir. 1998), appellate counsel is not required to file 'kitchen 
sink briefs," the filing of which is not good appellate advocacy. 
b. Stuart Has Failed To Establish There Is A Material Lsue Or" Fact 
With R e d  To His Ineffective Assistance Of Amellate Counsel 
claims 
Like his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, the vast majority of Stuart's 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are based upon Kirmey's alleged faiillre to 
"adequately raise, brief and argue7' various issues on appeal. The obvious reason for the 
adverb "adequately" is that most of the issues were raised, briefed and argued on appeal. 
Stuart has failed to explain what else Kinney should have done to "adequately raise, brief 
and argue" these various claims. Therefore, Stuart has Mled to establish deficient 
performance. 
Likewise, because Stuart has failed to establish how the claims should have b m  
"adequately" raised, briefed and argued on appeal, he has failed to establislh how the 
result of his appeal would have been any different. 
F. Stuart's Claim Remvdinn The Length And Conditions Of His Confinement Is Not 
A Cumizable Post-Conviction Claim 
1. Stuart's Claim R e d i n g  Conditions And Lennth Of Corfinement Mu& 
Be Filed In Ada Countv 
In Row. the Idaho Supreme COW denied relief based upon conditions of 
confinement, explaining: 
Allegations challenging the conditions of confinement must be brought by 
a petition for habeas corpus under the Idaho Habeas Corpus and 
Institutional Litigation Procedures Act, Idaho Code $8 19-4201 et seq., 
and not by a petition for post-conviction relief under Idaho Code § 19- 
2719. A petition far writ of habeas corpus must be filed in the district 
court of the ccsunty in which the person is detained. T.C. 4 19-4202. Row 
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filed the petition in this case in A& County. Because Row was at the time 
being detained at the PocateUo Women's Correctional Center, the proper 
place to file a petition for habeas corpus was Bannock County. The lower 
court did not err in dismissing this claim without prejudice. 
Likewise, Stuart has not properly raised his conditions and length of confinement 
claim in the proper venue. Because Stuart is presently housed in Boise, Idaho (Petition, 
p.2), his petition must be filed in Ada Comty. Therefore, this claim must be dismissed. 
2. Stuart's Length And Conditions. Of Confinement Claim Has Not Been 
Asserted Within A Reasonable Time 
In McKinnev, 133 Idaho at 702, n.2, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that a 
six-year delay in filing a length and conditions of co-mt claim is "excessive." In 
Creech, 137 Idaho at 577, the court explained that a length and conditions of confinement 
claim filed thirteen years after being on death row was not timely and should have been 
raised in the fust post-conviction petition. 
Because Stuart's length and conditions of confinement claim has been filed more 
than twenty years after he was placed on death row, it is clearly untimely and must be 
dismissed. 
3. Stuart Has Failed To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Reairding 
His h R t h  And Conditions Of Confinement Claim 
Further review of this claim is not required. However, should this court find that 
Stuart's claim was filed within a reasonable period of time, the chiin still fails because of 
his failure to meet the additional requirements of I.C. Q 19-2719(5)(a) and raise a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding the claim. 
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Jurisdictions addressing this issue have soundly rejected it in its entirety. See 
White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439-40 (5& Cir. 1996) ("'No other circuit has found that 
inordinate delay in carrying out m execution violates the condemned prisoner's eighth 
amendment rights," citing cases). In McKcnzic v. Day, 57 F.3d 1493 ( 9 ~  Cir. 1995), the 
Ninth Circuit rejected this argumat and explained: 
'4 defendant must not be penirlized for pursuing his constibitional rights, 
but he also should not be able to benefit from the ultimately u~successful 
pursuit of those rights. It would indeed be a mockery of justice if the 
delay incurred during the proaccution of claims th~t  fail on the merits 
could itself accrue into a substantive claim to the very relief that had been 
sought and properly denied in the first place. If that were the law, death- 
row b a t e s  would be able ts avoid fheir sentences simply by delaying 
proceedings beyond some threshold amount of time, while otha ddeathrow 
[sic] inmates - less successfd in their attempts to delay - would be forced 
to face their sentences. Such differential treatment would be far more 
"arbitrary and unfair" and "cruel and u n d '  than the current system of 
fulfilling sentences when the last in line of appeals fails on the merits. 
Id. at 1494 (quoting Ri&mond v. Lewjs, 948 F.2d 1473 Cir. 1990), rev'd on other 
p w l d s ,  506 U.S. 40 (1992), vacated, 986 F.2d 1583 (9'Cir. 1993)). 
The rdtionale for denying relief on this type of claim is also eloquently discussed 
in Turner v. Jabe, 5 8 F.3d 924, 933 /4& Cir, 2 995) (Luttig, C.J., concurring): 
It is a mockery of our system of justice, and an afiont to 
lawabiding citizens who are already rightly disiliwioned wirh that system, 
for a convicted murderer, who, through his own interminable efforts of 
delay and systemic abuse ha secured the almost-indefinite postponement 
of his sentence, to fhen claim that the almost-indefinite postponement 
renders his sentence unconstitutional. This is the crowning argument on 
behalf of those who have politicizd capital punishment even within the 
judiciary With this argument, we have indeed entered the theater of the 
absurd, where politics disguised as "intellectualism" occupies center stage, 
no argument is acknowledged to be ikivolous, md common sense and 
judgment play no role. Arzd while this predictable plot unfolds wit6 our 
acquiescence, if not our participation, sve lament the continuing decline in 
respcct for the c o W  and for the law. 
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00000389 
This is not -- or at least it should not be - a political game. The 
object is to apply the law, not to defeat it through subterfuge. Petitioner's 
claim should be recognized for the £iivolous claim that it is, and his delay 
in raisq it, for the manipulation that it is. See McKeNie v. Day, 57 F.3d 
1493 (9 Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, - U.S. 1 15 S.Ct. 1840, 13 1 
L.Ed.2d 846 (1395). As long as the c o w  indulge such sophistic 
arguments, then such arguments will be made, md the politicization of 
capital punishment within the courts will continue. 
This claim is clearly without merit. For Stuart to allege a constitutional violation 
based upon allegations that the state delayed resoiution of his case is ludicrous. Stuart 
has failed to establish he is entitled to relief based upon this clairn. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfolly requests this wurt grant the state's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal and dismiss Stuart's third successive Pdtion for Post-Conviction Relief. 
DATED this 1 O~ day of' October, 2003. 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on or about the 1 0 ~  day of October, 2003, I caused to 
be serviced a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated 
below, postage prepaid where applicable, and addressed to the following: 
Joan M. Fisher X L.S.Mai1 
Federal Defenders of Hand Delivery 
Eastern Washington Bc Idaho Overnight Mail 
201 N. Main Facsimile 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Honorable Ron Schilling 
P.O. Box 1251 
Meridian, ID 8 3 680- 1 25 1 
X U . S . M d  
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
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Attorney General 1 
State of Idaho I 
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L. LaMONT OX, TSB # 3687 3YI-2___PEPY; /y 
KRISTINA M. SCI.1INDELE, ISB #6090 
Deputy Attorneys ?pa' Criminal Law Div~sron 
Capital Libgation  tit 
P.O. Box 83710 1 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 33/4-2400 
i 
JOHN SWa4YNE, 
Clemater County 
Box 2627 I 
Orofino, ID 83544 / 
Telephone: (208) 47fi-5611 
IN TKE DI TRICT COURT 01; THE SEXOM) JUDICIAL DZSTNCT 4 
STATE OF IDAHO, and 
TOM BEAUCLAIR. Dimtor, Idaho 
Department of Correction, and 
GREG FISHER, Warden, Idaho 
Maximuni Sei;tuity Institution, 
Respondents. 
1 CASE NO. SF-02-1 5 1 
1 
; 
1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY DTSM1SSA41d 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
) 
1 
1 
) 
COME. NOW, L. hMont Anderson, Deputy Attorney General, Chief, Capital 
Litigation Unit and Special Prosecuting Attorney for Clearwater County, State of Idaho, 
and John A.. Swayne, Prosecuting Attorney for Clearwater County, State of Idaho, and do 
hereby move, pursuant to Idaho Code 9s 19-27 19 and 19-4906(c), for summary dismissal 
of the Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus filed by Petitioner on or about December 3,2002. The basis of the state's motion 
is that Petitiom has failed, based upon the pleadings before this court, to establish he has 
complied with the requirements of Idaho Code $ 19-2719. Therefore, the state is entitled 
to judgmenr as a matter of law. 
In support of this motion, the state specifically moves this court to take judicial 
notice of the record and transcripts in the underlying case of State v. Stuart. Idaho 
Suprenle Court #14865, the record and transcripts of the post-conviction case of Sn~art v. 
State, Idaho Supreme Court #17014, the records and transcripts of the successive post- 
-
conviction relief cases of - v. State, Idaho Supreme Court ##18653, 20060, 21684 
and 26661 and the state's brief in support of its motion for summary dismissal 6ltd 
r;onte~uporaneous!y with this motion, and supporting affidavits and docun~ents that may 
be subsequently filed by the state. 
DATED this loth day of Oetober, 2003. 
Deputy Attorney ~herd 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO, and 
TOM BEAUCLAIR, Director, Idaho 
Department of Correction, and 
GREG FISHER, Warden, Idaho 
Maximum Security Institution, 
Respondents. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on or about the loth day of October, 2003, I caused to 
be serviced a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated 
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Joan M. Fisher X U.S. Mail 
Federal Defenders of Hand Delivery 
Eastern Washington & Idaho Overnight Mail 
201 N. Main Facsimile 
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Honorable Ron Schilling X U.S. Mail 
P.O. Box 125 1 Hand Delivery 
Meridian, ID 83680- 125 1 Overnight Mail 
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APPENDIX A 
CAPITAL HABEAS UNIT 
Federal Defendcn of 
Eastcrn Washington and Idaho 
Joari M. Fisher - Tdaho Bar #3854 
Bruce D. Livingston - Missouri Bar #34444 
Paula Swensen - Texas Bar #24013599 
20 1 North Main 
Moscow ID 83843 
Telephone: 208-883-01 80 
Facsimile: 208-883-1 472 
I 1N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDMfO 
GENE; V. STUART 
Petitioner, 
1 
1 
) 
1 CAPITAL CASE 
VS. 1 
) C A S E N ~ [ ( V ~  ? - 7 
GREG FTSHER, Warden of the ldwho ) 
- - RLW 
Maximum Security Institution, 1 
Dcpt. of Corrections, State of Idaho, 1 APPLICATTON FOR STAY OF 
1 EXECUTION 
Respondent. ) 
1 
Petitioner, GENE F. STI.JART, was sentenced to die after being convicted of first degree 
murder by torlure in the District Court of Clearwater County, Stale of Tdaho. Petitioner's 
I conviclion and sentencc wcrc affimicd on appeal by the Idaho Supreme Court. A death warrant I for C;cnc 1;. Stuart was issued on January 10,2002, scheduling Petitioner's execution for January I 24,2002, a copy of which is attached hereto. 
APPLICATION FOR W A Y  OF EXECUTION - 1 
Yctitioner, with the assistance, and over signature, of the Capital Habew Unit of  tbe 
Fedenl Defenders of E~lslern Washington and Idaho, respectfully requests that this Court issue 
an Order staying Pctitioncr's cxecutioll pending disposition of the Pctition for Writ of I-Iabeas 
Corpus, which will be filed timely under 28 USC 9 2254 and Local Rule 9.4. 
This application is based on the files ilnd records underlying Sttrart v. State, 907 P.2d 783 
(1 985); Stcltc v. Stunrt, 7 16 P.2d 83 3 ( 1985); Stuart v. State, 9 14 P.2d 933 (1 996); S'tutrrr v. State, 
801 P.2d 1216 (1990); A'ttrart v. State, 801 P.2d 1283 (1990); lStuart v. State, 2001 WL 1539142, 
Petitioner I'urlher relies on thc Statement of Issues setting forth in summary fashion the numerous: 
non-frivolous issues to be raiscd in  this first Petition to tlis Courl. 
DA'I'ED this &%; of Jilnwy, 2W2. 
RESPECTFULLY SUSMI'I"TED, 
CAPITAL HABEAS UNIT 
By: 
- 
mLI(=ATTON FOR STAY OF EXEC'U'I'ION - 2 00000399 
CERTlFlCATE OF SERVICE 
I ,7K- I hereby cerlify that on the . day o w  2002.1  caused to be served a true 
a d  col~ect copy 0.C the foregoing documcnt by t h l m  cated below, postage prepaid 
where applicable, and addrcsscd to: 
Alan G. Lance 
Idaho Attorney General 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capital 1.; tigintion lJnit 
Stutehouse Mail, Room 10 
PO Box 83720 
Boise ID 83720-0010 
&.S. Mail 
Ilmd Delivery 
-&simile 
Overnight Mail 
